Amy Spahr; Matthew Cain v. Amy Collins; Ramona Mira Amy Collins

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 22-2787
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AMY SPAHR; MATTHEW CAIN
v.
AMY COLLINS; RAMONA MIRA
AMY COLLINS,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(No. 1-19-cv-00113)
U.S. District Judge: Honorable Maryellen Noreika
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Argued July 8, 2024
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Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 9, 2024)
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OPINION
Robert S. Bria, Esq.
Ronald G. Poliquin, Esq. [ARGUED]
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.

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The Poliquin Firm
1475 S Governors Avenue
Dover, DE 19904
Counsel for Appellees
Andrew R. Fletcher, Esq.
Joseph C. Handlon, Esq. [ARGUED]
Robert M. Kleiner, Esq.
Kenneth L. Wan, Esq.
Office of Attorney General of Delaware
Delaware Department of Justice
820 N French Street
Carvel State Office Building
Wilmington, DE 19801
Counsel for Appellant
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Amy Collins appeals the District Court’s order denying her motion for
summary judgment seeking qualified immunity on Plaintiffs Amy Spahr and Matthew
Cain’s procedural due process claim. For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse.
I
Spahr and Cain resided together with their son and Spahr’s daughter. On January
17, 2018, Delaware’s Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families
(“DSCY”) received a report alleging that Spahr and Cain’s children were living in an
abusive and filthy household and that the children were told not to tell anyone about the
conditions. Collins, a DSCY caseworker, went to the house to speak with Spahr and,
when no one answered, left a note on the door for Spahr to contact her. In a subsequent

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phone conversation, Spahr told Collins that she could not meet with her. Collins then
went to the house with a police escort and assessed the house in Cain’s presence.1
When Spahr returned home that evening, she found Collins, Cain, another DSCY
employee, and her father in the driveway. The parties dispute what happened next.
Spahr claims that after Cain went back inside the house, Collins coerced her into signing
a Child Safety Agreement (the “Agreement”)2 by (1) refusing to let her know where her
children were; (2) telling her that DSCY would seek an order placing the children in
foster care if she refused to sign;3 and (3) asking Spahr to sign it in the presence of her
father on the driveway, even though Spahr told the caseworkers that she could not read
the Agreement because it was dark outside. Collins claims that (1) she, the other DSCY
employee, Spahr, and Spahr’s father discussed the Agreement in a state vehicle; (2)
Spahr had “as long as she needed to” review the document, Appellant’s Br. at 10; (3)
Spahr was not upset and voluntarily signed the Agreement; and (4) Spahr said that she
would come to Collins’s office the next day.
1 Collins asserts that she obtained permission to enter the home from the owner of
the property, Thomas Redden, who is Spahr’s father, but Spahr claims that the DSCY
pushed its “way through [] under threat of foster case.” App. 654.
2 Child safety agreements are not mentioned in the Delaware code, but they further
the goals of protecting children “at imminent risk of out-of-home placement” by allowing
children to reside with family members, rather than be placed in foster care, while DSCY
investigates allegations of abuse or neglect. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 9003(a)(3)(b)
(2023); see also id. § 9003(a)(4) (empowering the DSCY to implement case plans to
place children outside of their home “in the least restrictive setting available and in close
proximity to the child’s home”).
3 Cain also claims that DSCY told Spahr that if she did not sign the Agreement,
DSCY would file for custody.

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The Agreement, which was limited to thirty days, provided that the children would
reside with other family members pending the DSCY’s investigation. Sometime after the
Agreement was signed, Spahr and Cain attempted to revoke it, and in response, DSCY
filed a petition for emergency custody, which a state court judge denied. As a result, the
children were permitted to return home about three weeks after Spahr signed the
Agreement.
Thereafter, Spahr and Cain brought, among other things, a procedural due process
claim against Collins, and Collins moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds. Spahr v. Collins, Civ. No. 19-113, 2022 WL 3700897, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 26,
2022). The District Court (1) determined that it is “clearly established that parents have
the right to not be coerced to relinquish custody of their children without due process of
law,” id. (citing Isbell v. Bellino, 962 F. Supp. 2d 738, 750 (M.D. Pa. 2013)); and (2)
denied Collins’s summary judgment motion on the procedural due process claim because
it found a factual dispute as to whether Collins coerced Spahr to sign the Agreement, id.
at *2.
Collins appeals the order denying her qualified immunity.
II4
A
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability “insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “When the
defense of qualified immunity is raised and denied, a defendant is generally entitled to an

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which a reasonable person would have known.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480,
483 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To
determine whether qualified immunity was properly granted or denied, we ask whether
(1) the conduct violates a constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established
when it was allegedly violated. Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir.
2021). Courts may begin with either question, and an answer in the negative to either
entitles the official to qualified immunity. Id. Here, we first examine whether the right at
issue was clearly established.
To determine whether a right is clearly established, “we must define the right
allegedly violated at the appropriate level of specificity.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). “This requires us to frame the right ‘in light of the specific
context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Once we define the right, we look for “factually analogous
Supreme Court precedent, as well as binding opinions from our own Court” to determine
whether the right was clearly established. Id. If there is no such binding precedent, we
examine whether there is a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the
immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine so long as the denial turns on an
issue of law.” De Ritis v. McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444, 451 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Oliver
v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 2017)). “If the denial of qualified immunity turns
on a genuine issue of fact, we lack jurisdiction to review” it. Minor v. Del. River & Bay
Auth., 70 F.4th 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2023). Collins challenges the District Court’s legal
conclusion that Spahr’s allegation of being coerced into signing the Agreement stated a
violation of a clearly established right. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this
question, De Ritis, 861 F.3d at 451, and exercise plenary review, Rush v. City of
Philadelphia, 78 F.4th 610, 619 (3d Cir. 2023).

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Courts of Appeals.” Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 247-48 (3d Cir. 2016)). “District court
opinions may [also] be relevant to the determination of when a right was clearly
established for [a] qualified immunity analysis.” Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 321 (3d
Cir. 2001). There need not be a case explicitly holding the specific conduct unlawful.
Rather, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear” such that a reasonable
official would understand that her conduct was unlawful under the then-existing law.
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).5
The District Court defined the right here as “the right [of parents] to not be
coerced to relinquish custody of their [minor] children without due process of law.”
Spahr, 2022 WL 3700897, at *1. In doing so, the Court recited the right as a “broad
general proposition” rather than “in light of the specific context of the case” as we
require. Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3 at 165 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). Here,
Plaintiffs do not assert that child safety agreements themselves violate due process, nor
do they identify what specific process they should have received before or after they were
presented with the Agreement.6 Instead, Plaintiffs’ central assertion is that informing a
5 See also City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam) (stating
“[i]t is not enough that a rule be suggested by then-existing precedent; the rule’s contours
must be so well defined that it is clear to a reasonable offic[ial] that h[er] conduct was
unlawful in the situation [s]he confronted” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018))).
6 Child safety agreements are not mentioned in the Delaware statutes or Delaware
Family Court Rules, but the text of the Agreement here shows that it was effective for no
longer than thirty days, and there is no dispute that a parent may revoke a child safety
agreement and that DSCY can thereafter seek a court order to place the child in foster
care if the suspicion of abuse remains unresolved at the time the agreement ends. Such

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parent that the child will be placed in foster care if the parent does not sign the agreement
is coercive and thereby renders the agreement involuntary and in violation of due process.
As a result, in the context of this case, the right is best phrased as follows: a parent
presented with a child safety agreement has the right to consider the agreement without
being told that she faces the possibility that the state will petition a court for an order to
place the child in foster care unless she signs the agreement.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ views, our opinion in Croft v. Westmoreland County Child
and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir. 1997), does not clearly establish this right.
There, we observed that separating a parent and child from the family home “during the
pendency of child abuse investigations absent any procedural safeguards raises a
procedural due process issue.” Id. at 1125 n.3; see also B.S. v. Somerset Cnty., 704 F.3d
250, 271 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that the state must follow procedural safeguards
anytime the “state seeks to alter, terminate, or suspend a parent’s right to the custody of
[her] minor children” (alteration in original) (quoting McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820,
827 (3d Cir. 2003))). We explained, however, that caseworkers may immediately remove
a child if they have “some reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable
suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse.” Croft, 103
F.3d at 1126. Although we noted that telling a parent that his child will be placed in
foster care if he did not leave the home during the pendency of the child abuse
limited duration voluntary agreements do not contemplate any interim court review of the
children’s placement with individuals of the parent’s choice.

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investigation is “blatantly coercive,”7 id. at 1125 n.1, that statement is dicta because it
was not necessary to the “analytical foundations,” In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d
Cir. 2000), of Croft’s holding that a parent has a viable due process claim when an
official removes her child without “objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse.”8 103 F.3d
at 1126; see Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 170 (3d
Cir. 2016), as amended (Mar. 21, 2016) (similarly characterizing Croft’s holding).
When such objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse exists, Delaware law gives
DSCY officials the authority to remove a child from a home. Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, §
9003(a)(3)(b) (2023). From a practical perspective, the official must then determine
where to place the child. The child safety agreement provides one type of placement, and
the foster care system provides the other.9 Informing a parent of those options, and the
legal consequences thereof, is no more legally coercive than informing a criminal
defendant offered a plea agreement of the maximum penalty he faces for his crimes
absent the agreement. See United States v. Green, 388 F.3d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that “accurate information regarding the possible ramifications of proceeding
7 Moreover, Croft’s dicta must be read in the context of the case, namely one in
which child welfare officials lacked an objectively reasonable basis to suspect abuse. 103
F.3d at 1126. The Court did not hold that it is coercive to offer a child safety agreement
or to remove a child where there is such a basis to suspect abuse.
8 One district court also held that Croft’s discussion about procedural due process
rights to be dicta. See Exel v. Govan, Civ. No. 12-4280, 2016 WL 1118781, at *4-5
(D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2016), aff’d, 708 F. App’x 82 (3d Cir. 2018) (nonprecedential).
9 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 2512 (explaining the circumstances under which,
when “emergency custody or other emergency relief is sought by DSCY[], the [c]ourt
may issue an ex parte order awarding emergency custody to DSCY[] and order removal
of a child from the home”).

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to trial cannot be construed as coercive” but “[r]ather[,] . . . is exactly the kind of accurate
information regarding sentencing exposure which the defendant must have in order to
make an informed decision about whether to accept a plea offer”). In short, if a child is
subject to removal from his home based on objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse or
neglect, then informing his parent of the legal consequences of failing to enter a child
safety agreement, such as foster care placement, does not constitute illegal coercion.
Even if we held that such conduct could constitute illegal coercion, which we do not, to
say that it would be constitutionally improper to tell a parent the legal consequences of a
decision was not clearly established in this circuit at the time of the events here.
Our sister circuit courts have also held that there is no due process violation when
a child welfare official tells a parent that a child believed to be in an abusive situation
will be removed from the parent’s custody and placed in foster care unless the parent
agrees to a plan that places the child with a person of the parent’s choosing pending the
completion of the investigation. See Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir.
2008) (stating that there is no forbidden coercion when an official with legal authority
over child welfare matters told parents that formal removal proceedings would
commence unless the child was placed with a family member under a voluntary safety
plan); Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2006) (official with proper legal
authority informing a parent that the child will be removed and offering a safety plan
giving the parent the option of identifying where the child is placed does not violate due

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process).10 Those courts explained that such plans are interim arrangements pending the
completion of an investigation and reflect the parent’s understanding that the official is
exercising her legal authority to (1) remove the child based upon a suspicion of abuse and
(2) offer alternate placement arrangements for the child rather than remove the child
without giving the parent a chance to provide input concerning the child’s interim
placement.11
Given the absence of Supreme Court precedent, a binding statement from our
circuit, or consensus of authority from other circuits who have spoken on the topic, we
cannot say that the law is clearly established that a child welfare official violates
procedural due process when she informs a parent that her child is being removed from
the home based upon an objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse and that the state will
petition the court for an order to place the child in foster care unless the parent signs a
10 The Dupuy court explained, “[i]t adds nothing to say as the plaintiffs do that
they did not really consent—that the state ‘coerces’ agreement to safety plans by
threatening to remove the child from his parents’ custody unless they agree to the plan. It
is not a forbidden means of ‘coercing’ a settlement to threaten merely to enforce one’s
legal rights.” 465 F.3d at 762 (emphasis omitted).
11 There is also a lack of agreement among the district courts. As stated
previously, one district court also held Croft’s discussion about procedural due process
rights to be dicta, Exel, 2016 WL 1118781 at *4-5, while three other district court cases
have relied on Croft to hold that a child welfare official is on notice that it is coercive to
tell a parent that failing to sign a child safety plan will lead to the child’s placement in
foster care. None of these cases, however, examined whether Croft’s statement about
coercion was dicta, nor do they acknowledge that the child objectively suspected of being
abused was going to be removed from the premises regardless of whether the parent
signed any agreement. See Isbell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 749-50; Starkey v. York Cnty., No.
1:11-CV-00981, 2011 WL 11071762, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2011); Billups v. Penn
State Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., No. 1:11-CV-01784, 2012 WL 1392294, at *19-20
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2012). These different views also suggest that the law on this subject
is not clearly established.

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child safety agreement that places the child with a family member or other responsible
person. Therefore, the District Court erred in concluding that Collins was not entitled to
qualified immunity.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse.

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Spahr v. Collins, No. 22-2787
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.
Constitutional due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard
before an impartial tribunal in connection with the government’s deprivation of a person’s
life, liberty, or property.1 A parent’s loss of physical custody of a child is unquestionably
a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.2 Normally, under Delaware
law, such a deprivation can occur only after the Department of Services for Children, Youth
and Their Families, commonly referred to as ‘DSCYF,’ files a petition (giving notice) and
there is a court hearing (an opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal). See Del.
Code Ann. tit. 13, §§ 2511, 2512(b). In emergency situations, however, Delaware allows
courts to issue ex parte orders upon a petition from DSCYF establishing probable cause to
believe that the child is in actual or imminent danger, see id. § 2512(a), but such an order
lasts no longer than 15 days in the absence of a hearing unless extended by the court for
good cause, see Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 65.2(a).
Amy Spahr lost custody of her children without the benefit of any of those
processes. DSCYF did not petition for such relief beforehand (or promptly thereafter);
there was no court hearing; and there was no ex parte order. In lieu of any of that process,
DSCYF caseworker Amy Collins arrived at Spahr’s house unannounced and presented
Spahr with a Child Safety Agreement, which upon her signing, relieved Spahr of physical
1 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential
principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’” (quoting Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950))).
2 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this case
– the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children – is perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (“[A] natural parent’s desire for and right to the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children is an interest far more
precious than any property right.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

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custody of her children for the next 30 days – a period of greater duration than an ex parte
order. After Spahr signed the agreement, there was no hearing to assess whether she did
so voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.3 Indeed, Spahr now claims that she was
coerced into signing the agreement, and that remains a fact in dispute.4 Without a hearing
to ascertain that such an agreement – which bypasses the notice and opportunity to be heard
otherwise provided by Delaware law – was obtained consensually as opposed to by
coercion, fraud, or genuine misunderstanding (for instance, of a parent’s retained right to
revoke the agreement), there is considerable room for error in the deprivation of a private
interest of the highest order: the physical custody of one’s minor children. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (requiring that courts consider the private interest
subject to deprivation and “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards” in addition to the governmental interests in play).
But even if Spahr’s procedural due process rights were violated – either by the
deprivation of the physical custody of her children through coercion or by the absence of a
hearing in front of an impartial tribunal to ascertain that she legitimately consented to the
3 Cf. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 139 (1990) (holding that a patient who was unable
to provide informed consent – but who was deemed voluntarily admitted to a mental-health
institution – stated a procedural due process claim based on his commitment without the
benefit of procedural safeguards).
4 In finding that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Collins coerced
Spahr to sign the Child Safety Agreement, the District Court considered Spahr’s deposition,
in which she “repeatedly testified that Collins led her to believe that she either had to sign
the Child Safety Agreement or her children would end up in foster care,” Spahr v. Collins,
2022 WL 3700897, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 26, 2022); see, e.g., Spahr Dep. 80:5–7 (App. 221)
(“I was told if you don’t sign this we’re going to put your children in foster care.”). There
is also a separate exchange in Spahr’s deposition, in which she recalled Collins indicating
“if I didn’t sign it that they would get a court order and my children would go into foster
care.” Id. at 77:8–11 (App. 218).

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loss of physical custody of her children – Spahr’s claim against Collins fails on qualified-
immunity grounds. That is so because neither this Court’s precedent nor a robust consensus
of persuasive authority affords notice to Collins that her specific actions violated Spahr’s
procedural due process rights, and those actions were not obviously unconstitutional.5 For
that reason, I concur in the disposition of this appeal, which concerns only the individual-
capacity claims against Collins and does not involve a broader challenge to a lack of
process under Delaware law in connection with Child Safety Agreements.
5 See Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (“The dispositive question is
whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established . . . in light of the
specific context of the case[.]” (emphasis in original) (cleaned up)); District of Columbia
v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (explaining that clearly established law must be “dictated
by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011))); cf. Hope
v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).

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