Racquel Lewis v. DMH INVESTMENTS, LLC & CITY OF PHILADELPHIA OFFICE OF HOMELESS SERVICES On Appeal…

DLD-148 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 23-1446
___________
RACQUEL LEWIS,
Appellant
v.
DMH INVESTMENTS, LLC & CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
OFFICE OF HOMELESS SERVICES
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-03207)
District Judge: Honorable John R. Padova
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction,
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 25, 2023
Before: JORDAN, CHUNG, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 7, 2023)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Raquel Lewis appeals pro se from the District Court’s dismissal with prejudice of
her complaint against Defendant the City of Philadelphia Office of Homeless Services
(OHS)1 and its remand to state court of her remaining state law claims. Her complaint
alleged a federal claim against OHS pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and additional state
law claims against OHS and Defendant DMH Investments, LLC (DMH).
We have jurisdiction to review the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 We may
summarily affirm a District Court’s decision if the appeal fails to present a substantial
question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 (2011); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6 (2018). For the reasons that
follow, we will summarily affirm.3
Lewis’s claims against OHS relate to the time period during which she and her
minor child were residents of a homeless shelter associated with OHS. Lewis’s
complaint broadly alleges that OHS committed numerous violations of federal statutes,
contrary to her constitutional rights, and that OHS was negligent and retaliatory. Lewis’s
claims against DMH relate to the actions of its employees during the time in which Lewis
1 Lewis filed her complaint in state court and OHS removed the matter to federal court.
2 Given the District Court’s partial remand order, our Clerk notified the parties that we
may lack jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and (d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). We
exercise jurisdiction because the District Court resolved Lewis’s federal claims and
remanded to state court after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, not because
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v.
HIF Bio. Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 641 (2009).
3 Our review of the District Court’s order is plenary. Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161
F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir.1998). To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

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rented an apartment it managed; Lewis asserts that DMH violated her lease agreement
and her privacy and was negligent in trying to enter her apartment while her minor child
was home alone. Viewing her complaint in the light most favorable to it and accepting all
its well-pleaded allegations as true, the scant factual allegations provided are not
sufficient to plausibly support Lewis’s conclusory claims for relief against OHS. See
Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570; Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”).
A complaint, such as that here, that solely “tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement,” cannot survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at
678; see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (2008) (noting that the
factual allegations in the complaint must not be “so undeveloped that it does not provide
a defendant the type of notice of claim” which is required by the federal rules). Thus, the
District Court properly dismissed with prejudice Lewis’s complaint against OHS.4
As Lewis’s federal claims against OHS were properly dismissed, it was likewise
proper for the District Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her
remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). This Court reviews the district
court’s decision to exercise or not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for an abuse of
4 Lewis did not respond to the motion to dismiss filed by OHS or otherwise provide any
indication that providing her with an opportunity to amend her complaint would not be
futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002)
(concluding that, prior to dismissing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e), a district court
must give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend her pleading to cure the defect unless
such an amendment would be futile or prejudicial).

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discretion. In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 (1999). Section 1367(c)(3)
expressly permits the district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction in the event, as
was the case here, the federal claims are resolved. In addition, the District Court noted
that, other than OHS’s motion to dismiss, the matter had not proceeded in the federal
forum, Lewis did not appear to be engaged in forum-shopping, and that her remaining
claims involved interpretation of state tort law. See City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (noting that § 1367(c) “reflects the understanding that, when
deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a federal court should consider
and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that the
state court was the most appropriate forum for Lewis’s remaining claims.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal does not present a substantial question. We
will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.

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