United States of America v. Joshua Calibe Lowry

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 23-1516
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOSHUA CALIBE LOWRY,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2:21-cr-00020-001)
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 8, 2025
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 11, 2025)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
In this appeal, Appellant Joshua Lowry raises two challenges to his conviction for
possessing a gun as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), both of which he
acknowledges are foreclosed by our precedent. Because that precedent controls, we will
affirm.1
First, despite his many prior felony convictions and the fact that he was still on
probation for a drug-trafficking offense when found in possession of the firearms in this
case, Lowry raises a Second Amendment challenge, arguing that our Nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation does not support the application of § 922(g)(1) to him. But
his Second Amendment challenge fails because Ҥ 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied
to convicts on . . . probation.” United States v. Quailes, 126 F.4th 215, 224 (3d Cir. 2025).
Lowry concedes that his as-applied challenge is foreclosed by Quailes and
expresses his view that it was wrongly decided. But until the Supreme Court or our
Court sitting en banc hold otherwise, Quailes controls. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1.
Second, he asserts that § 922(g)(1) “exceeds Congress’ powers under the
Commerce Clause,” because, in his view, the regulation does not “substantially affect[]
interstate commerce.” Opening Br. 18 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
559 (1995)). Again, however, and as Lowry admits, we have repeatedly said the opposite
and held that § 922(g)(1) is valid under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v.
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because Lowry raised neither of his arguments before the District
Court, we review for plain error. United States v. Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526, 528 (3d Cir.
2024).

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Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670,
672 (3d Cir. 1996).
In short, whatever future challenges Lowry may wish to preserve by raising these
two claims in this Court, they fail under controlling circuit precedent. We therefore will
affirm.

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