23-3136 Elfido Gonzalez Castillo v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA On Petition for Review of an Order…

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
Nos. 23-2123, 23-2800 & 23-3136
_______________
ELFIDO GONZALEZ CASTILLO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
_______________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A090-276-154)
Immigration Judge: Jennifer Piateski
_______________
Argued March 5, 2024
Before: JORDAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 24, 2024)
_______________

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Ben Winograd [ARGUED]
Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center
3602 Forest Drive
Alexandria, VA 22302
Counsel for Petitioner
Merrick B. Garland
Kitty M. Lees [ARGUED]
Lindsay Marshall
OIL
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 848
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
Counsel for Respondent
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Elfido Gonzalez Castillo, a Mexican citizen, received a
Notice to Appear (“NTA”) in the Immigration Court in
Cleveland, Ohio, and the NTA was filed and docketed in that
Court. Hearings were held. Castillo attended virtually from
the Moshannon Valley Correctional Center in Philipsburg,
Pennsylvania, where he was detained, and the Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) conducted the final hearing virtually while
physically present in Virginia. A couple of weeks after that
final hearing, the IJ ordered that Castillo be removed from the
country. The question before us now is this: Which United

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States Court of Appeals – the Third Circuit, the Fourth Circuit,
or the Sixth Circuit – is the proper one in which Castillo should
file his petition for review? An argument can be made for each.
What has historically been a simple venue decision is
complicated now by the reality that parties and judges and
court offices can be widely separated geographically and still
come together virtually for legal proceedings.
The law requires that a petition for review of a final
order of removal “be filed with the court of appeals for the
judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the
proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2); cf. Khouzam v. Att’y
Gen., 549 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding § 1252(b)(2)
non-jurisdictional). Castillo filed three petitions for review
here in the Third Circuit, asserting that venue is proper before
us “because the Immigration Judge completed the proceedings
in Philipsburg, Pennsylvania, which is within the jurisdiction
of this judicial circuit.” (23-2123, Pet. at 1.) We conclude,
however, that the Immigration Judge completed the
proceedings in Cleveland, Ohio, so venue does not lie here; it
lies in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
We will, therefore, transfer Castillo’s petitions to that court.
I. BACKGROUND
Castillo was admitted to the United States as a lawful
permanent resident in 1989. In March 2009, he filed an
application for naturalization with U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services. Soon thereafter, in July 2009, Castillo
was indicted for sexually abusing his niece. When he appeared
for his naturalization interviews in September and October of
2009, he did not disclose that those criminal charges were
pending. He was sworn in as a United States citizen on

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October 27, 2009. Two months later, he pled guilty to third-
degree sexual assault.
In December 2019, the government filed a civil
complaint in district court under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) to revoke
Castillo’s naturalization. The government argued that Castillo
had provided false testimony to procure naturalization, which
demonstrated that he lacked the good moral character required
to attain citizenship. In May 2022, the district court revoked
his citizenship.
Then, in August 2022, the Department of Homeland
Security issued the earlier mentioned NTA, charging Castillo
with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for
having been convicted of child abuse. The NTA was filed in
the Immigration Court located in Cleveland, Ohio, and it called
for Castillo to appear there. He applied for cancellation of
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). A remote hearing was
held, at which the IJ attended virtually from Richmond,
Virginia, and Castillo attended virtually from the detention
center in Phillipsburg, Pennsylvania. After the hearing, the IJ
exercised her discretion and denied Castillo’s application for
cancellation.
On appeal to the BIA, Castillo argued that he was not
removable because he was a U.S. citizen when he was
convicted of the removable offense. Before considering
Castillo’s argument, the BIA conducted a choice-of-law
analysis under its recent decision in Matter of Garcia, 28 I. &
N. Dec. 693 (B.I.A. 2023). In Garcia, the BIA held that the
choice of which Circuit Court’s law is controlling is based on

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the “location of the Immigration Court where venue lies[.]”1
Id. at 703. Because Castillo’s NTA was filed in Cleveland,
Ohio, the BIA applied Sixth Circuit law. That ruling was
outcome determinative before the BIA. Castillo’s argument
(which is, in essence, “I can’t be removable for convictions that
occurred after I became a citizen”) is foreclosed by BIA
precedent.2 While some circuit courts – including ours – have
rejected that precedent,3 the Sixth Circuit has not yet addressed
1 [T]he controlling circuit law in Immigration Court
proceedings for choice of law purposes is the law governing
the geographic location of the Immigration Court where
venue lies, namely where jurisdiction vests and proceedings
commence upon the filing of a charging document, and will
only change if an Immigration Judge subsequently grants a
change of venue to another Immigration Court. Matter of
Garcia, 28 I. & N. Dec. 693, 703. (B.I.A. 2023).
2 In Matter of Gonzalez-Muro, 24 I. & N. Dec. 472
(B.I.A. 2008), the BIA held that a noncitizen who, like Castillo,
pled guilty to or was convicted of crimes between his unlawful
acquisition of citizenship and its revocation, was removable.
Id. at 474.
3 Three circuit courts, including ours, have rejected
Gonzalez-Muro. See Singh v. Att’y Gen., 12 F.4th 262, 277-78
(3d Cir. 2021) (holding that noncitizens who were naturalized
citizens at the time of their conviction are immune from
removal under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)); Hylton v. Att’y Gen., 992
F.3d 1154, 1160 (11th Cir. 2021) (same); Okpala v. Whitaker,
908 F.3d 965, 970 (5th Cir. 2018) (same).

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it. So the BIA was able to apply its precedent and dismiss the
appeal.
Castillo timely filed a petition for review in our Court
(C.A. No. 23-2123), asserting that venue is proper here
“because the Immigration Judge completed the proceedings in
Philipsburg, Pennsylvania.” (23-2123, Pet. at 1.)
Simultaneously, Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration
with the BIA. The BIA denied that motion, and Castillo,
seeking to overturn the ruling, filed another petition for review
(C.A. No. 23-2800), which has been consolidated with the
original petition for briefing and scheduling purposes. Then,
he filed a second motion to reopen with the BIA.4 It denied his
motion, and Castillo filed a third petition for review (C.A. No.
23-3136) relating to that order, and it too has been consolidated
with the others.
Upon screening each petition, the Clerk determined that
venue might be appropriate in the Sixth Circuit and asked the
parties to show cause why the petition should not be transferred
there. In response, the government moved to transfer the
petition to the Sixth Circuit. Castillo opposes transfer and
asserts that venue is proper here. We address this threshold
venue issue now so that the case can proceed on the merits in
the appropriate court. And the venue question implicates yet
4 Castillo argued that the attorney who represented him
before the IJ provided ineffective assistance by failing to
challenge his removability on the ground that he was a
naturalized citizen at the time that he was convicted of the
removable offense.

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another question, namely, whether we have the inherent power
to transfer the case, if need be.
II. DISCUSSION5
A. Venue lies in the Sixth Circuit.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), venue lies in “the court of
appeals for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge
completed the proceedings.” (emphasis added). Which
judicial circuit that might be in this case is not immediately
clear, as the NTA was docketed in, and ordered the respondent
to appear in, the Immigration Court in Ohio (covered by the
Sixth Circuit), but the hearings were conducted remotely by an
IJ physically located in Virginia (covered by the Fourth
Circuit), and with the petitioner appearing from his detention
center in Pennsylvania (covered by the Third Circuit). In that
scenario, any one of those three circuit courts of appeals could
conceivably be the appropriate venue.
The circuit courts that have addressed § 1252(b)(2) in
similar contexts have arrived at conflicting conclusions, with
the First, Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits on one side of
5 Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), we have
jurisdiction to review final orders of removal, regardless of
whether venue lies here. See Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d
235, 249 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) is
a non-jurisdictional venue provision).

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the split, and the Fourth and Tenth on the other.6 Now it is our
turn to weigh in.7
6 Compare Bazile v. Garland, 76 F.4th 5, 13 (1st Cir.
2023) (holding that “an IJ necessarily completes the
proceedings for the purposes of section 1252(b)(2) at the court
where the proceedings are commenced, absent a formal change
in administrative venue”), Sarr v. Garland, 50 F.4th 326, 332
(2d Cir. 2022) (holding that judicial venue lies in the court
“where – absent evidence of a change of venue – proceedings
commenced,” meaning the immigration court “identifie[d]” on
the charging document), Ramos v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 948, 949
(7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the IJ “completed the
proceedings” where “the court is located,” meaning “where all
parties were required to file their motions and briefs” and
“where the orders were prepared and entered”), and Plancarte
Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831-32 (9th Cir. 2022)
(concluding that IJ “completed the proceedings” at the hearing
location designated on the charging document or initial hearing
notice unless the IJ had granted change of venue), with
Herrera-Alcala v. Garland, 39 F.4th 233, 240-41 (4th Cir.
2022) (holding that the IJ “complete[s] the proceedings” from
the physical location of the IJ during the hearing), and Yang
You Lee v. Lynch, 791 F.3d 1261, 1264-66 (10th Cir. 2015)
(tying “judicial venue to the IJ’s location when he or she
completes removal proceedings”).
While the Tenth Circuit’s holding focuses on “the IJ’s
location,” much of its analysis may be consistent with our
holding today. There, the charging document ordered the
petitioner who was in Oklahoma (the Tenth Circuit) “to appear
before an IJ at the Dallas Immigration Court [(the Fifth
Circuit),]” and so “it appear[ed] that IJ venue began and
remained in Dallas.” Yang You Lee, 791 F.3d at 1264-65

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(citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14, 1003.20). Several hearings were
conducted virtually with an IJ located in an Immigration Court
in Dallas and the petitioner physically in Oklahoma. Id. at
1262. For the final hearing, the parties appeared in person in
Dallas and no virtual conferencing technology was used. Id. at
1263. Yet, for reasons that are not clear, the final hearing
notice listed an address in Oklahoma City as the hearing
location. Id. Based on “the specific factual scenario”
confronted in that case, the Tenth Circuit declined to base
judicial venue on the Oklahoma City hearing location specified
on the final hearing notice, and concluded that judicial venue
was in the Fifth Circuit, “because the IJ held the final hearing
in Dallas, Texas; [the petitioner] and the government’s
representative physically appeared in Dallas for the final
hearing; and the IJ issued his final order from the Dallas
Immigration Court.” Id. at 1264, 1266. Thus, as the Tenth
Circuit’s conclusion appears to be based on more than just the
location of the immigration court, we place it on the “other
side” of the split.
7 While we have not considered this question at length,
we briefly addressed in Luziga v. Attorney General whether
venue was appropriate in this Circuit when an IJ conducted a
remote hearing while physically outside it. 937 F.3d 244 (3d
Cir. 2019). In that case, the IJ had “entered her appearance
over proceedings in York, Pennsylvania[,] from Arlington,
Virginia.” Id. at 250. To determine that venue was proper, we
referred to a statement in an earlier nonprecedential opinion
that “venue is proper where an IJ sitting outside our Circuit
appears by video conference within our Circuit.” Id. (citing
Angus v. Att’y Gen., 675 F. App’x 193, 196 n.4 (3d Cir. 2017)

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The operative question is where does the IJ “complete
the proceedings.” Our decision today does not turn on the term
“proceeding” but on the word “completed.” “Proceedings” in
this context is typically used to describe court-like hearings.
For example, § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) of title 8 of the U.S. Code
requires an NTA to include “[t]he time and place at which the
proceedings will be held[,]” which implies a court-like hearing.
(per curiam)).
Castillo argues that the situation is the same in this case,
“as the IJ was physically sitting in Richmond, Virginia, but
appeared by video at the hearing location[,]” which, he says,
was in Pennsylvania. (23-2123, 3d Cir. D.I. 13 at 12-13 (citing
A.R. at 78).) But Castillo reads Luziga too broadly. First, the
parties in Luziga did not contest venue, so our discussion there
appears to be no more weighty than dicta. Luziga, 937 F.3d at
250; cf. Nederland Shipping Corp. v. United States, 18 F.4th
115, 130 (3d Cir. 2021) (explaining that “drive-by
jurisdictional rulings carry little precedential weight”)
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Further,
while the petitioner in Luziga attended the hearings from York,
Pennsylvania, the charging document also directed the
petitioner to appear for a hearing at the Immigration Court in
York, and that notice and other notices and orders were
docketed in York. In our case, however, Castillo appeared
virtually from the detention center in Phillipsburg,
Pennsylvania but the charging documents were filed in, and
directed him to appear at, the Immigration Court in Cleveland,
Ohio. Because Luziga did not address which facts determined
the location of the relevant proceedings, nor do its facts mirror
the ones here, its venue decision does not control.

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Section § 1229a(b)(1) specifies an IJ’s duties and powers in
conducting removal proceedings, including administering
oaths, receiving evidence, interrogating witnesses, and holding
parties in contempt, all of which are typically relevant to
conducting court-like hearings. Further, § 1229a(b)(2)
specifies the “form of proceeding” “may take place” in person,
or through video or telephone conference, which implies court-
like hearings. Then, § 1101(b)(4) of the same title defines an
“immigration judge” as someone being “qualified to conduct
specified classes of proceedings, including a hearing under
section 1229a of this title[,]” which indicates that hearings are
one type of proceeding.
But sometimes the word “proceedings” refers not just to
the hearings but to another part of the process, or to the entire
adjudication. For example, the statute says an NTA, which by
its very nature calls for a hearing, shall be given “in removal
proceedings[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). That indicates the
word “proceedings” is broader than just a reference to the
hearing. Also, some parts of the statute explicitly refer to both
“proceedings” and “hearings” to describe different aspects of
the process, which indicates that “proceedings” is not merely a
synonym for “hearings.” Section 1229(b)(1) requires that “an
alien be permitted the opportunity to secure counsel before the
first hearing date in proceedings under section 1229a of this
title[,]” and § 1229a(c)(1)(A) states that “[a]t the conclusion of
the proceeding the immigration judge shall decide whether an
alien is removable from the United States[]” and such decision
“shall be based only on the evidence produced at the hearing.”
That differentiation between “proceedings” and “hearings” is
especially relevant here because the IJ’s decision was rendered
after, rather than “at,” the conclusion of the hearing.

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For our purposes today, it ultimately does not matter
whether the relevant “proceeding” is the final merits hearing or
the broader adjudication process because, under either reading,
the IJ “completed” the “proceedings” in the Cleveland, Ohio
Immigration Court.8 The NTA, the filing of which vests
jurisdiction and commences the “proceedings,” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.14(a), was filed in the Cleveland Immigration Court
and directed Castillo to appear there. Upon that filing,
administrative venue vested in that Immigration Court, 8
C.F.R. § 1003.20(a), and the IJ could have “change[d] venue
only upon motion by one of the parties[.]” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.20(b).9 Logically, then, without a formal change of
venue, the IJ conducted, and “completed,” those proceedings
where they began – in Ohio.10 See Ramos v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d
8 In his partial concurrence, our colleague bases his
conclusion that “proceedings” means “hearings” on select
provisions in the immigration statutes in which the word
conveys that meaning in those specific contexts, but our
colleague does not account for the instances in which
“proceedings” is used more broadly. Further, he does not
address the import of the word “completed” in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(2), which, given the facts of this case, is the basis for
our holding. We decline to speculate on whether our differing
approaches may yield different results on different facts.
9 Here, no party moved to change venue at any point
before the Immigration Court.
10 We are aware of the BIA’s recent precedential
decision in Matter of M-N-I-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 803 (BIA 2024),
which the parties have brought to our attention. That decision
addressed whether an administrative change from an

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948, 949 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the IJ “completed his
role” at the immigration court’s location, which “would have
been true even had … the IJ participat[ed] from, say, a vacation
home [outside of the Circuit]”).
Therefore, in the context of remote proceedings or
hearings, the physical locations of the IJ and other participants
are not what dictates the answer to the question of where the
proceedings occur. Instead, we agree with the First, Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits that “proceedings” take place in
the Immigration Court in which the proceedings began, unless
there is a formal change of venue. See Bazile v. Garland, 76
F.4th 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2023); Sarr v. Garland, 50 F.4th 326, 332
(2d Cir. 2022); Ramos, 371 F.3d at 949; Plancarte Sauceda v.
Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 832 (9th Cir. 2022). Judicial venue
under § 1252(b)(2) thus aligns with administrative venue. See
Bazile, 76 F.4th at 13 (“[W]here the IJ completes the
proceedings – that is, judicial venue – must align with
administrative venue.”).11
immigration court in Ohio to one in New Jersey also affected
a change in venue. Id. at 806-07. The BIA answered that in
the negative. That is not, however, the issue before us now.
11 Our holding is also consistent with the BIA’s Garcia
analysis, which aligns judicial venue under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(2) to “the geographic location of the Immigration
Court where [administrative] venue lies, namely where
jurisdiction vests and proceedings commence upon the filing
of a charging document.” 28 I. & N. Dec. at 703. As an agency
opinion on court procedure, Garcia receives no strong or
binding deference. See Garcia, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 702 n.10
(acknowledging that § 1252(b)(2) “is a judicial review

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An alternative interpretation tying judicial venue to the
physical location of the IJ or any party would be untenable and
yield anomalous results. If the IJ were outside the country for
the final merits hearing, or when issuing a final order, where
would judicial venue lie? And even if the IJ conducted all
proceedings domestically, that “would create uncertainty for
the parties, who … may only learn the location of the IJ
presiding over a particular hearing shortly before the hearing
takes place, and long after the briefing is finished.” Bazile, 76
F.4th at 12. Surely an interpretation that would allow the IJ’s
physical movement to change where venue lies and hence,
potentially, the legal precedents governing an action, all
without the parties’ knowledge or consent, ought to be
avoided.12 And a party’s movements could likewise lead to
provision that is subject to interpretation by the circuit courts”
and that the BIA has “no role, nor [is it] afforded any deference,
in interpreting that statute” nor any “role in determining in
which circuit court a petition for review is properly filed”); see
also Ebbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 F.3d 103, 110 (3d
Cir. 2003) (offering no Chevron deference where agency
statutory interpretation “extend[ed] beyond the administrative
stage into … judicial proceedings”).
12 In Herrera-Alcala, the Fourth Circuit held that
“[v]enue under § 1252(b)(2) depends on the location of the
Immigration Judge[,]” based on where the IJ “sat … during the
proceedings.” 39 F.4th at 241, 243. While the court suggested
that it did “not address whether an Immigration Judge acts
from his assigned work location while physically located
elsewhere,” id. at 241 n.4, nothing in its analysis limits its
conclusion that venue “depends on the location of the

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uncertainty. Instead, the more logical interpretation is that the
place where proceedings commence with the filing of the
charging document in a particular Immigration Court is also
the place where, for venue purpose under § 1252(b)(2), the IJ
also “complete[s] the proceedings,” assuming there is no
formal change of venue. Here, the Immigration Court where
proceedings began and ended is in Cleveland, Ohio, and so
judicial venue lies in the Sixth Circuit.
B. We have the inherent power to transfer
Castillo’s petitions to the Sixth Circuit, and it
is in the interests of justice to do so.
Having determined that venue lies in the Sixth Circuit,
we now address whether we have the power to transfer
Immigration Judge” to the place where the IJ is assigned. Id.
at 243.
The Fourth Circuit’s conclusion appears to rely on the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Ramos, which held that the IJ
would have completed his role in Chicago (the Seventh
Circuit), even if he had participated in the proceedings
remotely while on vacation in Michigan (the Sixth Circuit). Id.
at 241 (citing 371 F.3d at 949). In Ramos, however, Chicago
was not just the IJ’s location; it was the location of the
immigration court, “where all parties were required to file their
motions and briefs” and “where the orders were prepared and
entered[.]” Ramos, 371 F.3d at 949. It was on that basis that
the Ramos court held that under § 1252(b)(2), “the alien may
petition for review” – and thus venue lies – “in the circuit
where the immigration court is located.” Id.

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Castillo’s petitions to that circuit. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, if
“an appeal, including a petition for review of administrative
action, is … filed” and the “court finds that there is a want of
jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice,
transfer such action or appeal to any other such court … in
which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time
it was filed or noticed[.]” That is clear enough. But, while
Congress has expressly authorized us to transfer cases when
we lack jurisdiction, it has been silent as to our power to
transfer when we have jurisdiction but venue is improper. See
Khouzam, 549 F.3d at 249 (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) is a non-
jurisdictional venue provision).
While § 1631 does not explicitly grant us the power to
transfer a case like this, neither does it forbid it, and we believe
we have the inherent power to do so. “[S]itting in equity, [we]
possess[] all of the common law equity tools of a Chancery
Court (subject, of course, to congressional limitation) to
process litigation to a just and equitable conclusion.” Eash v.
Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (quoting ITT Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351,
1359 (5th Cir. 1978)). Accordingly, “in the absence of
contrary legislation, courts under their inherent powers have
developed a wide range of tools … to achieve justice in their
results.” Id. at 564. Thus, even though § 1631 does not
comment on transfer in a circumstance like this, its silence does
not “eliminate[] any inherent power in the courts to transfer a
case to cure improper venue.” Alexander v. Comm’r, 825 F.2d
499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam). We hold, then, that we
have the inherent power to take a petition over which we have
jurisdiction but not venue and transfer it to another circuit

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where venue is proper.13 In so holding, we join a chorus of
other courts that have addressed the issue, and all are in
harmony.14
13 Our colleague’s partial dissent relies on our much
earlier holding in Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp., 170
F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 1948), and, while there are reasons to
believe that Schoen does not provide meaningful guidance to
this situation, even if it did, our later en banc decision in Eash
v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 1985),
would control. In Eash, we recognized a category of inherent
powers that are “necessary only in the practical sense of being
useful,” and we explained that courts “may exercise this kind
of inherent power only in the absence of contrary legislative
direction.” Id. at 563. Applied here, the transfer of this case
to another forum is practically useful, and there is no contrary
legislative direction.
14 See Sorcia v. Holder, 643 F.3d 117, 122 (4th Cir.
2011) (“Although the authority to transfer a case under § 1631
exists only when the transferring court lacks jurisdiction,
courts have inherent power to transfer cases over which they
have jurisdiction but not venue.”); Dornbusch v. Comm’r, 860
F.2d 611, 615 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (holding that the
court has the power to transfer a case to a circuit court “of
proper jurisdiction and venue” “either under section 1631, or,
if it be technically inapplicable because this Court is an
improper forum due only to a want of venue rather than a want
of jurisdiction, then … under … inherent or implied power”);
Thiam v. Holder, 677 F.3d 299, 302 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding
that even though it was not jurisdictionally mandated to
transfer the case under § 1631, “it is still our option to transfer
a petition to another circuit with jurisdiction”); Cordova-Soto

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Our holding also conforms to Congress’s apparent
intent in codifying § 1631, which was to “rescue cases
mistakenly filed in the wrong court,” and to allow transfer to
reach a just result. Dornbusch v. Comm’r, 860 F.2d 611, 613
(5th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Paul v. INS, 348 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Congress
intended [§ 1631] to aid litigants who were confused as to the
proper forum for review.”).
In considering whether transfer serves the interests of
justice, courts generally consider several factors, including the
reasonableness of a petitioner’s confusion about the proper
venue, whether transfer will delay resolution, inconvenience to
v. Holder, 732 F.3d 789, 792 (7th Cir. 2013) (“We join other
circuits that take guidance from § 1631 in assessing whether to
transfer a case from one court, like ours, having jurisdiction to
another that would also have proper venue.”); Bibiano v.
Lynch, 834 F.3d 966, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[W]here a court
has subject matter jurisdiction but venue is not proper, federal
circuit courts have inherent transfer authority and need not rely
on 28 U.S.C. § 1631.”); Yang You Lee, 791 F.3d at 1266
(“Federal circuit courts have inherent power to transfer a case
over which they have jurisdiction but lack venue.”); Becker v.
Comm’r, 852 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)
(“[U]nder circumstances properly justifying the exercise of our
equitable powers, we may transfer an appeal to the federal
court of proper venue”); Alexander v. Comm’r, 825 F.2d 499,
501 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that § 1631 did not
“eliminate[] any inherent power in the courts to transfer a case
to cure improper venue”).

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the parties, and waste of judicial resources. Bibiano v. Lynch,
834 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Sarr v. Garland, 50
F.4th 326, 333-34 (2d Cir. 2022) (identifying additional factors
including “whether transfer would result in ‘duplicative
proceedings’ in a sister circuit”). Here, transferring Castillo’s
petitions does indeed serve the interests of justice by curing the
venue defect at issue today. In addition, the petitions have not
yet been briefed, nor have the parties argued their positions on
the merits, so, as the government points out, transfer now will
not result in “duplicative proceedings, delay resolution, or
waste judicial resources.” (23-2123, Gov. Supp. Br. at 5
(Feb. 28, 2024).) And, as we hope is apparent from our earlier
discussion on venue, Castillo’s confusion in thinking that
venue was proper here was not unreasonable.
In short, all things considered, transfer to the Sixth
Circuit is fair and warranted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will transfer Castillo’s
petitions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.

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1
PORTER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I agree with the majority that venue lies in the Sixth
Circuit, but I draw that conclusion from the immigration stat-
utes alone, not from the regulations governing administrative
venue. I doubt that we are inherently empowered to transfer
Castillo’s petitions to the Sixth Circuit. Traditionally, federal
courts would dismiss cases over which they had jurisdiction
but lacked venue. For these reasons, I respectfully concur in
part and dissent in part.
I
The majority follows some of our sister circuits in
holding that an immigration judge “completes [removal] pro-
ceedings,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), where administrative venue
lies under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20, see, e.g., Bazile v. Garland, 76
F.4th 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2023). For Castillo’s removal proceedings,
administrative venue vested in Cleveland and was not
subsequently changed, so the majority concludes that judicial
venue lies in the Sixth Circuit. But administrative venue is “[a]
convenience Congress did not write into . . . bills passed by
both Houses and presented to the President for approval.”
Madrid-Mancia v. Att’y Gen., 72 F.4th 508, 512 (3d Cir. 2023).
I would reach the same result based only on the text of the
immigration statutes.
Specifically, I would analyze § 1252(b)(2) based on an
intratextual comparison of “proceedings” elsewhere in the
immigration statutes. The majority determines where
Castillo’s removal proceedings “t[ook] place” by referring to
administrative regulations, considering where “administrative
venue vested” under § 1003.20(a) and whether it was subse-

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2
quently changed under § 1003.20(b). Maj. Op. 12, 13. But the
immigration statutes independently identify where removal
proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a take place. As part of a
notice to appear (“NTA”) for removal proceedings, the gov-
ernment is required to inform aliens of “[t]he time and place at
which the proceedings will be held.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) (emphasis added). Castillo’s NTA
“ordered” him “to appear before an immigration judge” in
Cleveland. A.R. 502. Subsequently, the immigration statutes
permit the government to change the place of removal pro-
ceedings. In that event, the government is required to inform
aliens in writing of “the new time or place of the proceedings.”
§ 1229(a)(2)(A)(i). This kind of notice is dubbed a notice of
hearing (“NOH”). See, e.g., Campos-Chaves v. Garland, 144
S. Ct. 1637, 1643 (2024). Castillo received NOHs for each
subsequent hearing conducted under § 1229a. Several of these
NOHs directed Castillo to appear at “new time[s]” for removal
proceedings. § 1229(a)(2)(A)(i). But none of the NOHs
directed him to appear at a “new . . . place” other than
Cleveland. Id. Castillo does not argue that his NTA or NOHs
failed to notify him of the “place” of his removal proceedings
or were otherwise deficient under § 1229(a). For these reasons,
I agree with the majority that Castillo’s removal proceedings
took place in Cleveland.1 But for future petitions, our
1 The majority misunderstands the narrow basis for my partial
concurrence. It faults me for not discussing the meaning of
“completed,” but I agree that the Immigration Judge completed
the proceedings where they took place, regardless of her
physical location. I disagree with the majority’s reasoning for
why Castillo’s proceedings took place in Cleveland, which
does not depend on the meaning of “completed.” Moreover,
my partial concurrence does not depend on whether

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3
approaches may yield different results—if the “place”
specified in the NTA and NOHs differs from administrative
venue under § 1003.20.
II
I also write separately because the majority concludes
that we are inherently empowered to transfer Castillo’s peti-
tions to the Sixth Circuit. There is no statutory authority for a
circuit court to transfer a case over which it has jurisdiction but
for which venue lies elsewhere. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631,
federal courts may transfer cases where “there is a want of
jurisdiction,” not where there is jurisdiction but venue lies
elsewhere. Federal district courts, but not circuit courts, may
transfer cases where there is jurisdiction but venue lies else-
where. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Because we lack statutory
authority to transfer Castillo’s petitions, we directed the parties
to submit supplemental briefs as to whether we have inherent
power to do so. After reviewing the supplemental briefs, I am
not convinced that we have such a power.
A
The Constitution vests “the judicial Power of the United
States” exclusively in the federal courts. U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 1. “[A]t the core of the judicial power” is “the authority to
“proceedings” refers only to removal hearings. Castillo’s NTA
and NOHs tell us where his removal proceedings took “place,”
§§ 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) and 1229(a)(2)(A)(i), regardless of
whether “proceedings” refers to removal hearings or the
removal process more generally. I agree with the majority that
we need not resolve the latter issue.

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4
determine the facts and the law in an individual case, and to
render a final, binding judgment based on those
determinations.” Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 487 (2023).2
The Supreme Court has identified a few narrow limits on
Congress’s authority to control this core case-deciding func-
tion. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219
(1995) (forbidding Congress from “retroactively commanding
the federal courts to reopen final judgments”); Patchak v.
Zinke, 583 U.S. 244, 250 (2018) (Congress may not pass “a
statute that says, ‘In Smith v. Jones, Smith wins.’” (quoting
Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212, 225 (2016))).
Aside from these limits, the Constitution vests Congress
with significant power over the operation of the federal courts.
Congress has the power to “make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8. This “horizontal” aspect of the Necessary and
Proper Clause expressly empowers Congress to pass laws for
carrying into execution the federal judicial power. See Wayman
v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 22 (1825) (entertaining “no doubt
whatever” that Congress is empowered under the Necessary
and Proper Clause “to make laws for carrying into execution
all the judgments which the judicial department has power to
pronounce”); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)
(“[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system
2 In addition to the authority to issue binding judgments, the
judicial power is often distinguished from the executive and
legislative powers as “includ[ing] the power to authorize dep-
rivations of private rights, such as through a criminal convic-
tion or a finding of liability.” William Baude, Adjudication
Outside Article III, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1522 (2020).

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5
(augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with
it congressional power to make rules governing the practice
and pleading in those courts[.]”); John Harrison, Enumerated
Federal Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 78 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1101, 1121 (2011) (“[T]he so-called horizontal
Necessary and Proper Clause . . . gives Congress power to
carry into execution the judicial and executive powers.”).
The Constitution does not expressly empower the fed-
eral courts to develop rules helpful for executing their case-
deciding function. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural
Common Law, 94 Va. L. Rev. 813, 846 (2008) (“The
Constitution does not, on its face, grant federal courts power
over procedure.”). Nevertheless, federal courts have consist-
ently asserted that they possess inherent powers to regulate
their own operations, even without congressional authoriza-
tion. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991)
(noting that a “court may bar from the courtroom a criminal
defendant who disrupts a trial” or “may dismiss an action on
grounds of forum non conveniens” as examples of inherent
judicial powers).
We have observed that “the notion of inherent [judicial]
power has been described as nebulous[.]” Eash v. Riggins
Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). In
Eash, we grouped inherent powers into tiers of descending
importance. Id. at 562–64. Some inherent powers are those of
“strict functional necessity” to the core case-deciding function,
such as the contempt power. Id. at 562–63. Others are
“necessary only in the practical sense of being useful[,]” such
as the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Id. at 563–64. We
upheld a district court’s inherent power “to sanction errant
attorneys financially . . . for conduct not rising to the level of
contempt.” Id. at 566. We did not clarify whether this power is

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6
strictly necessary to the court’s case-deciding function or
merely useful. Id. at 564 (“Courts rarely have explained exactly
what kind of authority they mean to invoke when using an
inherent power to sanction an attorney.”). But we suggested
that the power is “reasonably necessary to deter abuse of the
judicial process.” Id. at 567. And while the particular sanction
in Eash was not of “ancient origin,” Link v. Wabash R. Co.,
370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962), we emphasized that it was related to
“several species of sanctions on those who abuse the judicial
process” with established roots in the federal court system,
Eash, 757 F.2d at 561.
B
The inherent power that the majority recognizes is dif-
ferent from the power recognized in Eash for two important
reasons. First, the inherent power to transfer because venue lies
elsewhere is not essential (or even beneficial) to our case-
deciding function. If we lack the inherent power to transfer, we
must either retain jurisdiction over Castillo’s petitions or
dismiss them without prejudice. Neither option impairs our
case-deciding function. If we retained jurisdiction over
Castillo’s petitions and reached their merits, we would be
exercising our case-deciding function to its fullest extent.
Immigration law is federal law and therefore is identical in the
Third and Sixth Circuits, so we are competent to adjudicate
Castillo’s petitions even if venue lies elsewhere.3 Alter-
3 Of course, we may interpret the immigration statutes differ-
ently than the Sixth Circuit. See Maj. Op. 5 (discussing a dif-
ference in interpretation relevant to Castillo’s petitions). But
courts cannot change statutes by interpreting them. See John
Harrison, Federal Judicial Power and Federal Equity Without

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7
natively, we may be required to dismiss Castillo’s petitions
without prejudice. As discussed below, federal courts tradi-
tionally dismissed cases over which they had jurisdiction but
not venue, so this outcome would not have been understood to
conflict with our case-deciding function. Ultimately, the power
recognized by the majority is arguably beneficial only in a
broader sense—in effectuating Congress’s intent for Castillo’s
petitions to be heard in the Sixth Circuit. But commentators
have criticized the use of inherent powers that are not strictly
necessary for issuing binding judgments in cases over which
courts have jurisdiction. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, The
Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 743 (2001) (“As the early
Justices recognized . . . , the Necessary and Proper Clause
authorizes Congress alone to determine whether or not to
bestow beneficial powers.”). We are not clearly authorized to
assert such powers, but Congress is clearly authorized to confer
them upon us, so I fear that we may be “aggrandizing . . . power
at the expense of another branch.” Freytag v. Comm’r, 501
U.S. 868, 878 (1991).
Second, the power the majority recognizes is incon-
sistent with the historical practices of federal courts. The first
congressional authorization for change of venue was included
in the Judicial Code of 1948. See Brainerd Currie, Change of
Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 405, 407
(1955). Federal courts previously had no power to transfer
cases due to improper venue. See 17 Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 111App.101 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) (“Unlike the present
rule enacted by the Judicial Code in 1948, . . . [n]o machinery
existed to transfer cases.”). Instead, “if a defendant made a
Federal Equity Powers, 97 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1911, 1915
(2022) (“[T]he law is external to the courts.”).

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8
proper and timely objection to improper venue of an action, the
district court, if it sustained the objection, had no alternative
but to dismiss as to the objecting defendant.” Id. (collecting
cases). Thus, if a court had jurisdiction but lacked venue, there
were two possible outcomes. If the defendant objected to
venue, the court dismissed the action. But if the defendant
waived his objection to venue by entering an appearance on the
merits, the court exercised its jurisdiction and reached the
merits. See Interior Constr. & Improv. Co. v. Gibney, 160 U.S.
217, 219 (1895) (describing venue as “a matter of personal
privilege, which the defendant may insist upon, or may waive,
at his election”). Transfer to a proper venue was not an option.
We recognized this principle in Schoen v. Mountain
Producers Corp., 170 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1948). There, the
District Court dismissed because of improper venue. Id. at 709.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the District Court erred in
finding venue improper. Id. at 710. We recognized that 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a) allowed district courts to transfer actions
where they had jurisdiction but not proper venue. Id. at 713.
But § 1406(a) was not in force when “the judgment here under
review was entered.” Id. Absent § 1406(a)’s authority to
transfer, “the nonresident defendants were entitled, under the
law as it then stood, to the dismissal of the complaint as to
them.” Id. “Moreover the court then had no power to transfer
the case even if it had been asked to do so.” Id. (emphasis
added). Thus, Schoen expressly rejected the possibility that
courts have an inherent power to transfer where they have
jurisdiction but not proper venue.4
4 The majority criticizes my reliance on the “much earlier”
Schoen, but Schoen’s reasoning is fully consistent with the
modern understanding of how venue works. Maj. Op. 17 n.13.

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9
More recently, as the majority recognizes, circuit courts
have uniformly asserted the beneficial power to transfer cases
where they have jurisdiction but not proper venue. See, e.g.,
Even before Congress’s enactment of the Judicial Code of
1948, courts accurately distinguished between venue and
jurisdiction. See Neirbo Co. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
308 U.S. 165, 168, 169 (1939) (recognizing that jurisdiction
limits a court’s “power to adjudicate” while venue is a “liti-
gant’s convenience” that “may be lost by failure to assert it
seasonably”); Indus. Addition Ass’n v. Comm’r, 323 U.S. 310,
313 (1945) (“Want of jurisdiction, unlike want of venue, may
not be cured by consent of the parties; but when the court has
jurisdiction, it has power to decide the case brought before it,
even though the court having venue is one sitting in another
circuit.”). Our decision in Schoen adverted to this distinction,
noting that “venue is a matter of personal privilege which a
defendant may . . . waive at his election,” 170 F.2d at 713,
unlike jurisdiction, which “involves a court’s power to hear a
case, can never be forfeited,” and “require[s] correction” sua
sponte, United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)
(citing Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908)). Thus, the Judicial Code of 1948’s “provision . . . that
improper venue is a waivable matter, not jurisdiction, and is
waived unless timely and sufficient objection is made” is
merely “declaratory of prior law.” 17 Moore’s Federal
Practice § 110App.103[3] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) (emphasis
added) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b)). The basis for the uniform
rule before the Judicial Code of 1948—that “a court was
always required to dismiss an action where there was a mere
defect in venue”—was not an antiquated conflation of juris-
diction and venue. Hohensee v. News Syndicate, Inc., 286 F.2d
527, 529 (3d Cir. 1961).

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10
Yang You Lee v. Lynch, 791 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 2015)
(“Federal circuit courts have inherent power to transfer a case
over which they have jurisdiction but lack venue.”); Sorcia v.
Holder, 643 F.3d 117, 122 (4th Cir. 2011) (same); Dornbusch
v. Comm’r, 860 F.2d 611, 613–14 (5th Cir. 1988) (collecting
cases). To my knowledge, the first decision recognizing this
power was Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 272
F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1958). But the D.C. Circuit did not cite to
any legal authority to justify its recognition of this power. It
simply asserted that “we think that court had inherent power
based on sound principles of judicial administration to transfer
the case to this court[.]” Id. at 511. And as a subsequent panel
of the Fifth Circuit recognized, the D.C. Circuit’s ipse dixit is
inconsistent with historical practice. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fed.
Power Comm’n, 330 F.2d 824, 825 (5th Cir. 1964) (“At
common law an objection as to venue goes in abatement[.]”);
see also Hyman v. City of Gastonia, 466 F.3d 284, 287 (4th
Cir. 2006) (“At common law, abatement is the equivalent of a
dismissal, and it results from the defendant raising some
procedural or formality error in the plaintiff’s action.”).
Altogether, I dissent from the majority’s recognition of
an inherent power to transfer. Between retaining jurisdiction
over Castillo’s petitions or dismissing them, I lean towards
dismissal. Traditionally, courts dismissed cases when venue
was improper and defendants objected to venue, without any
express statutory authority to dismiss other than the venue
statute itself. Gibney, 160 U.S. at 219. A venue statute was
understood as creating a legal privilege for defendants not to
defend against lawsuits in certain courts. Id. Understood in this
way, § 1252(b)(2) gives the Attorney General the privilege of
responding to an alien’s petition in the circuit court where the
Immigration Judge completed removal proceedings. He has a

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11
corollary privilege not to respond to the petition in the other
circuit courts. Here, venue is proper in the Sixth Circuit and the
Attorney General objected to venue, thereby invoking his
privilege not to respond to Castillo’s petitions in the Third
Circuit. As a result, we should enforce the Attorney General’s
statutory venue privilege as federal courts traditionally
enforced such privileges—by dismissing Castillo’s petitions,
not by transferring them or by retaining jurisdiction and
reaching their merits.
* * *
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dis-
sent in part.

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