United States of America v. Carolyn Jackson

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
Nos. 23-2492, 23-3016, 23-2992, 23-2508
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CAROLYN JACKSON
Appellant in 23-2492, 23-2992
&
JOHN E. JACKSON
Appellant in 23-3016, 23-2508
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(District Court Nos. 2:13-cr-00290-001, 2:13-cr-00290-002)
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on
December 10, 2024
___________
Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

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(Filed: March 21, 2025)
Rubin M. Sinins
Herbert I. Waldman
Javerbaum Wurgaft Hicks Kahn Wikstrom
505 Morris Avenue
Suite 200
Springfield, NJ 07081
Counsel for Appellant Carolyn Jackson
Louise Arkel
Evan J. Austin
Carol Dominguez
David A. Holman
Office of Federal Public Defender
1002 Broad Street
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellant John E. Jackson
Mark E. Coyne
John F. Romano
Steven G. Sanders
Office of United States Attorney
970 Broad Street
Room 700
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellee

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____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
CHUNG, Circuit Judge.
Carolyn Jackson and her husband, John Jackson, were
convicted of horrific child abuse after a thirty-nine-day jury
trial. The original trial judge sentenced the Jacksons three
times—twice after remand from this Court. On each appeal,
we found the sentencing judge did not sentence the Jacksons in
a manner supported by the jury’s verdict and federal sentencing
law. The Jacksons’ sentences were vacated upon a third appeal
and were remanded for resentencing with instructions that their
cases be reassigned to a different judge. The Jacksons now
bring this appeal, challenging the sentences imposed by the
new judge. We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Because the facts have been reviewed at length in prior
cases, we do not revisit them here.1 Suffice it to say, this case
concerns serious child abuse inflicted by the Jacksons on three
1 For a full discussion of the facts, see United States v.
Jackson, 862 F.3d 365, 368-370 (3d Cir. 2017). This was the
first appeal, and we refer to it herein as “Jackson I.” The
second appeal was United States v. Jackson, 819 F. App’x 97,
99 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Jackson II”), and the third appeal was
United States v. Jackson, 2023 WL 2755578 (3d Cir. Apr. 3,
2023) (“Jackson III”).

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adopted children, Joshua, “C,” and “J,” all below the age of
four at the time of their abuse. The Jacksons were charged in
a fifteen-count superseding indictment with conspiracy under
N.J.S.A. § 2C:5-2 and several counts of endangering the
welfare of a child under N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4a.2 At a jury trial
overseen by Judge Katharine Hayden, John was found guilty
of Counts 1, 3-9, and 11-12, and Carolyn was found guilty of
Counts 1-12. Counts 2, 4, 7, 8, and 11, termed the “omission
counts,” charged the Jacksons’ with withholding food, water,
and/or medical care from the children. The other counts,
known as the “commission counts,” charged the Jacksons with
forcing the children to ingest substances such as hot sauce and
red pepper flakes, and physically assaulting them with various
objects.
While Jackson III was pending, Carolyn Jackson
completed serving her most recently imposed sentence.3
2 Although these were state law violations, the Jackson
were charged federally because these offenses occurred “on a
military installation under the special jurisdiction of the federal
government.” Jackson I at 387. New Jersey law was
accordingly “‘assimilated’ into federal law pursuant to the
Assimilative Crimes Act (‘ACA’).” Id. at 368, 387.
3 John Jackson does not explicitly concede that he had not
finished serving his third sentence before it was vacated. In his
opening brief, however, he indicates that he continued to serve
his third sentence through the same date that the Third Circuit
issued judgment in Jackson III. John Opening Br. at 65-66.
Whether or not he completed his sentence does not affect the
outcome of his appeal.

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In Jackson III, we vacated the Jacksons’ sentences and
remanded for resentencing. The case was reassigned to Judge
Susan Wigenton, who ordered that presentence reports (PSRs)
be prepared for each Appellant.4 After consideration of the
entire trial record, the PSRs, the sentencing submissions, and
the parties’ presentations at a sentencing hearing, Judge
Wigenton sentenced Carolyn Jackson to a term of
imprisonment of 140 months and John Jackson to a term of
imprisonment of 108 months.
The Jacksons timely appealed.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §
3231. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We
review findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Grier,
475 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2007). We review questions of law,
including whether the law of the case doctrine applies, de novo.
Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U.S. 68, 83 (2020) (questions of
law); PDX N., Inc. v. Comm’r New Jersey Dep’t of Lab. &
Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 881 n.10 (3d Cir. 2020) (law
of the case). We review the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009). However,
when a party did not object to an alleged error at sentencing,
4 Judge Hayden had directed the U.S. Probation Office
not to prepare offense level calculations for the Jacksons’
second and third resentencings.

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we review only for plain error. United States v. Flores-Mejia,
759 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014).
III. DISCUSSION
John and Carolyn Jackson raise the following issues on
appeal.5 They argue that Judge Wigenton (1) violated their
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when she found facts at
sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence, (2) violated
their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by resentencing them
after they had finished serving their previously imposed
sentences, (3) violated the law of the case doctrine,
(4) imposed procedurally unreasonable sentences, and
(5) imposed substantively unreasonable sentences. We will
affirm.
A. Findings of Fact at Sentencing
Facts pertinent to sentencing need only be submitted to
a jury when such facts raise the applicable statutory maximum
or mandatory minimum sentence. Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (statutory maximums); Alleyne v.
United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013) (mandatory minimum
sentences). The Jacksons argue nonetheless that their Sixth
Amendment rights to trial by jury and their Fifth Amendment
rights to due process were violated when the District Court
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Jacksons’
5 Carolyn Jackson asserted all issues. John Jackson joins
the first two issues and appears to also join the third. John
Opening Br. at 3, 65-67. John and Carolyn each bring their
own procedural and substantive unreasonableness arguments.

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offenses caused “serious bodily injury” or involved a
“dangerous weapon.” Carolyn6 Opening Br. at 8. These
factual findings supported the District Court’s application of
the aggravated assault Guideline and resulted in higher
Guidelines range terms of imprisonment. The Jacksons argue
that the District Court’s application of the aggravated assault
Guideline makes them liable for committing aggravated
assault, a crime for which the jury did not convict them. They
also argue that the “‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely
on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant.” Carolyn Opening Br. at 14-15 (quoting
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis
omitted)). Therefore, they contend, the Sixth Amendment and
the Due Process Clause require these facts to have been found
by a jury rather than the sentencing judge. Id. at 11 (quoting
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496).
We have repeatedly rejected these arguments and held
that judicial findings of fact that increase the defendant’s
Guidelines range, but not the statutory maximum, do not
violate the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez,
905 F.3d 165, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Fisher,
502 F.3d 293, 305, 306 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, the District Court
sentenced both Jacksons to terms of imprisonment within the
statutory maximum term of imprisonment of ten years and the
6 To avoid confusion, we will sometimes refer to Carolyn
and John Jackson by their first names.

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Court’s factual findings did not increase that range.7
Consistent with our precedent, we conclude that the District
Court did not violate the Jacksons’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights by relying upon its own factfinding in applying the
aggravated assault Guideline.
B. Finality of Sentence
1. Fifth Amendment Right Against Double
Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend.
V. In the sentencing context, the double jeopardy right attaches
when a defendant has “a reasonable expectation of finality” in
his sentence. See Wilmer v. Johnson, 30 F.3d 451, 458 (3d
Cir. 1994). A defendant whose sentence is under appeal “has
no expectation of finality in his sentence until the appeal is
concluded or the time for appeal has expired.” Id. at 457
(quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136
(1980)); United States v. McMillen, 917 F.2d 773, 777 n.5 (3d
Cir. 1990) (“DiFrancesco teaches that the defendant can have
no expectation of finality of sentence until the government’s
statutory period for appeal has expired.”). Therefore, no
Double Jeopardy concern is implicated when a defendant is
7 For instance, Carolyn received a total sentence of 140
months, comprised of 120 months at Count One followed by
20 months on Counts Two through Twelve. Each crime of
conviction carried a maximum term of imprisonment of ten
years. Jackson I at 389; N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(2). None of Judge
Wigenton’s findings of fact raised those statutory maximums.

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resentenced after his sentence was vacated on appeal.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136; see also Bozza v. United States,
330 U.S. 160, 167 (1947) (lawful resentencing after vacatur
“did not twice put petitioner in [double] jeopardy” because
“[t]he sentence as corrected, imposes a valid punishment for an
offense instead of an invalid punishment for that offense”);
United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 948 (3d Cir. 1981)
(dictum) (“Nothing in the history or policy of the [Double
Jeopardy Clause] suggests that its purposes included protecting
the finality of a sentence and thereby barring resentencing to
correct a sentence entered illegally or erroneously.”); United
States v. Guevremont, 829 F.2d 423, 427 (3d Cir. 1987).
The Jacksons argue, though, that once a defendant
completes the sentence originally imposed, though under
appeal, he has a legitimate expectation of finality.8 Like the
District Court, we recognize that this is a matter of first
impression. See United States v. Jackson, 2023 WL 5994640,
at *5 n.6 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2023). The Supreme Court’s
seminal decision in DiFrancesco “did not address the
application of double jeopardy principles to a defendant whose
sentence has been fully served.” See United States v.
Arrellanos-Rios, 799 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing 449
U.S. 117 (1980)). Our Court’s decision in United States v.
McMillen also expressly left open the possibility that “a
defendant who has completely satisfied his sentence may have
a reasonable expectation of finality as to the completed
sentence.” 917 F.2d 773, 777 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing United
8 As noted above, John Jackson’s continued to serve his
sentence through the day Jackson III was issued. Whether or
not he completed his sentence while his appeal was pending is
irrelevant to the outcome of this appeal.

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States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065, 1068–69 (2d Cir.
1990)). Today’s decision forecloses it.
To support their argument, the Jacksons cite cases that
they either misconstrue or that are readily distinguishable from
their situation. For instance, some cited cases confirm that a
district court judge can impose a new sentence without
violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.9 Other cited cases are
inapposite because they explain that a defendant’s completed
sentence on two counts cannot be adjusted after conviction on
a third count was reversed10 or that a prior sentence cannot be
amended after the time for appeal has passed11 or where the
government never appealed the sentence.12 And many of these
9 See Busic, 639 F.2d at 947-48 (“There is nothing in the
history or the policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause that
justifies the denial of resentencing when the sentence has been
spread erroneously over counts that have been declared
invalid.”); United States v. Silvers, 90 F.3d 95, 99 (4th Cir.
1996) (finding that resentencing on reinstated conviction did
not violate Double Jeopardy because the defendant was simply
placed in the position he would have been in had there been no
error).
10 United States v. Arrellano-Rios, 799 F.2d 520, 524 (9th
Cir. 1986).
11 United States v. Daddino, 5 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir.
1993).
12 Smith v. State, 334 So. 3d 377, 378, 379 n.4 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2022); State v. Houston, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS

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cases state that a legitimate expectation of finality requires that
the time for appeal has passed, or the appeal is completed,13
even when the defendant has served his sentence.14
1546, *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2010) (comparing the facts
before it to a case where “the State sought review of the
defendant’s discharges from probation by timely writs of
certiorari to the supreme court” and noting that “[h]ere, the
State never timely challenged the order discharging [the
defendant] from probation”).
13 United States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065, 1068 (2d Cir.
1990) (“So long as a sentence can be increased on appeal,
defendant has no expectation of its finality” (citing
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 134-136, 139)); McMillen, 917 F.2d
at 777 (“McMillen ‘is charged with knowledge of the statute
and its appeal provisions, and has no expectation of finality in
his sentence until the appeal is concluded or the time to appeal
has expired’” (quoting DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136)).
14 State v. Lehman, 308 Kan. 1089, 1097 (2018) (“[T]he
view that the district court cannot correct an illegal sentence
after the sentence expires and the direct appeal has been
completed (or the time to appeal has lapsed) is more in keeping
with the purpose of double jeopardy protection, allowing a
person to move on with his or her life after having paid the debt
to society without wondering whether the government will
come back to extract further punishment.”); People v.
Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198, 217 (2010) (“Even where a
defendant’s sentence is illegal, there is a legitimate expectation
of finality once the initial sentence has been served and the
direct appeal has been completed (or the time to appeal has

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Despite the vast number of cases the Jacksons cite, all
support the proposition that a defendant has no legitimate
expectation of finality in their sentence while that sentence is
under appeal.15 We decline to break from this precedent. To
do otherwise would allow the Jacksons to avoid legal sentences
expired).”); State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 312 (2012) (same);
Lanier v. State, 270 So. 3d 304, 310 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018)
(“[W]e hold that a trial court loses jurisdiction to correct an
illegal sentence once that sentence expires and the direct appeal
has been completed or the time to appeal has lapsed and that a
trial court’s correcting an illegal sentence after the expiration
of that sentence violates principles of double jeopardy.”);
People v. Velez, 19 N.Y.3d 642, 649 (2012) (“[W]e [have] held
that, where a sentence is no longer subject to appeal, the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal Constitution forbids a
resentencing … after the original sentence is completed.”
(quoting Williams, 14 N.Y.3d at 217 (2010)).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Radmall, 340 F.3d 798, 801
(9th Cir. 2003) (when defendant’s sentence for multiple counts
reflects “his overall offense conduct rather than separate and
independent sentences on each count,” the defendant cannot
have an expectation of finality on one part of his sentence when
another part of the sentence is appealed); United States v.
Foumai, 910 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1990) (defendant had “a
legitimate expectation of finality in his reversed conviction”
because time for appeal had passed); Jones v. Thomas, 491
U.S. 376, 387 (1989) (concluding after appeal, that “[t]he
Missouri court’s alteration of respondent’s sentence to a single
term for felony murder with credit for time served provided
suitable protection of his double jeopardy rights.”).

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and “provide [them an] unjustified windfall[,]” simply because
they received such erroneously short sentences. Jones, 491
U.S. at 387 (“[N]either the Double Jeopardy Clause nor any
other constitutional provision exists to provide unjustified
windfalls.”). Because the Jacksons’ sentences were under
appeal, they had no reasonable expectation of finality in their
sentences, completed or not, and their double jeopardy rights
did not attach.
2. Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process
The Jacksons also argue that, even if their resentencings
did not violate double jeopardy, their general Fifth Amendment
due process rights were violated because they had a legitimate
expectation of finality upon completion of their sentences
while Jackson III was pending. Quoting from United States v.
Davis, they argue that “[a] defendant’s due process rights may
be violated ‘when a sentence is enhanced after the defendant
has served so much of his sentence that his expectations as to
its finality have crystallized.’” 112 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir.
1997) (quoting United States v. Lundien, 769 F.2d 981, 987
(4th Cir. 1985)). But Davis clarified that “[a] defendant …
does not automatically acquire a vested interest in a shorter, but
incorrect sentence.” Id. (citing DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d
32, 35 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1032 (1994)).
Davis also does not apply here because it addresses a
defendant’s legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence
when a habeas proceeding is pending, Davis, 112 F.3d at 123,
and had no impact on DiFrancesco’s holding that a defendant
has no reasonable expectation of finality in his sentence until
the time for appeal has passed or the appeal is completed.
The Jacksons assert two other reasons their
resentencings were fundamentally unfair and violated due

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process. First, they rely upon cases that are easily
distinguished and do not support concluding a due process
violation occurred here.16 Second, the Jacksons argue that the
fragmented manner in which they have been sentenced means
that due process would be violated if they were resentenced.
We have now made clear, however, that there is no reasonable
expectation of finality while an appeal is pending. We decline
to impose a different rule when serial appeals are involved.
While the fragmented nature of the proceedings here may be
undesirable, it does not violate due process and certainly does
not weigh in favor of rewarding the Jacksons the windfall of
serving sentences that this Court has found to be erroneous.
C. Law of the Case
The law of the case is a prudential rule that “holds that
a rule of law announced in a case should later be applied to the
same issues in subsequent stages in the litigation. Law of the
case may counsel against, but does not prevent, a district court
from reconsidering its prior rulings.” Saint-Jean v. Palisades
Interstate Park Comm’n, 49 F.4th 830, 836 (3d Cir. 2022)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Carolyn Jackson
16 See United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 199, 202 (2d
Cir. 2009) (concluding that a fifteen-year delay between
remand and sentencing violated due process); DeWitt v.
Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that
reinstatement of a defendant’s life sentence violated due
process where the state had reopened a “final unappealed
decision”).

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argues that three of Judge Wigenton’s sentencing decisions17
impermissibly contradicted Judge Hayden’s earlier, law-of-
the-case decisions.
The law of the case doctrine does not apply here. We
vacated the October 15, 2021, sentencing order of Judge
Hayden and remanded for sentencing. Jackson III, at *3, 5.
When a sentence is vacated, the defendant is rendered
unsentenced. United States v. Mitchell, 38 F.4th 382, 388 (3d
Cir. 2022). Judge Wigenton thus had a clean slate on which
there was no law of the case for sentencing. See Pepper v.
United States, 562 U.S. 476, 507-08 (2011). This applies
equally to the dangerous weapons enhancement, even in light
of this Court’s Jackson II ruling that Judge Hayden had not
clearly erred when finding that various objects used by the
Jacksons were not “‘dangerous weapons[.]’” Jackson II at 101
n.10. That ruling neither concluded that Judge Hayden’s
finding was affirmatively correct, nor bound the resentencing
court to find the same.
D. Procedural and Substantive
Unreasonableness
District courts follow a three-step process to sentence a
defendant. United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir.
2011). “At step one, the court calculates the applicable
Guidelines range which includes the application of any
sentencing enhancements. At step two, the court considers any
17 These are: Judge Wigenton’s decision to calculate the
Jacksons’ sentence using eleven groupings, to use the assault
and aggravated assault Guideline for the omission counts, and
to apply the dangerous weapon sentencing enhancement.

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motions for departure and, if granted, states how the departure
affects the Guidelines calculation. At step three, the court
considers the recommended Guidelines range together with the
statutory factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determines
the appropriate sentence, which may vary upward or
downward from the range suggested by the Guidelines.” Id.
(internal citations omitted). The Jacksons argue that their
sentences were procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
As noted above, we review the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of discretion
standard. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. When a party appeals an
error to which they did not object at sentencing, we review only
for plain error. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 255.
1. Carolyn Jackson’s Procedural
Unreasonableness Arguments
“When a defendant alleges procedural error, we must
ensure that the district court did not fail to calculate (or
miscalculate) the Guidelines range; treat the Guidelines as
mandatory; gloss over the Section 3553(a) factors; choose a
sentence based on a clearly erroneous fact; or inadequately
explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Jumper, 74
F.4th 107, 114 (3d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Carolyn did not object to the alleged errors at
sentencing, so we review only for plain error. Flores-Mejia,
759 F.3d at 255.18 Carolyn urges us to find that the sentencing
18 Although Carolyn characterizes this as a substantive
unreasonableness argument, it is better analyzed for procedural
unreasonableness because she challenges the judge’s factual
findings as erroneous.

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judge abused her discretion by relying on inaccurate
information, preventing the judge from giving “rational and
meaningful consideration” to the Section 3553(a) factors.
Grier, 475 F.3d at 571. Specifically, she argues that the
sentencing court failed to recognize that: Carolyn expressed
remorse; used corporal punishment to punish all of her
children, not just her adopted children; and “C” and Joshua had
injuries the defendants did not cause. She further argues that
the sentencing court erroneously blamed Carolyn for Joshua’s
death, called the corporal punishment torture, and did not
consider Carolyn’s positive post-sentence conduct. Carolyn
Opening Br. at 50-58. We cannot conclude that the District
Court plainly erred.
First, Judge Wigenton did recognize Carolyn’s
expression of remorse and found a marginal acceptance of
responsibility. She was not required to agree with Judge
Hayden’s finding that Carolyn Jackson fully accepted
responsibility. Similarly, Judge Wigenton recognized that
Carolyn abused all of her children, and accurately noted that
she abused her adopted children more severely. Furthermore,
Judge Wigenton stated she did not impose the sentence as
means to punish the Jacksons for Joshua’s death, did not depart
upward based on her view that the children suffered torture,
and explained why she found the children’s various injuries
were caused by the defendant’s abuse.19 Finally, there is no
19 This is consistent with Jackson I in which we stated, “It
defies common sense to believe that the jury found that
Defendants physically assaulted their adopted children,
withheld sufficient nourishment and water from them, and
forced them to ingest hot sauce, red pepper flakes, and raw

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basis to conclude that, when Judge Wigenton stated that she
hopes Carolyn will do things differently, she did not consider
Carolyn’s post-sentence conduct. Those statements were made
in the context of analyzing the Section 3553(a) factors (e.g.,
the nature of the offense and the need for the sentence imposed
to reflect the seriousness of the offense) and recognizing the
lifelong harm inflicted upon the children. We perceive no plain
error.
2. John Jackson’s Procedural
Unreasonableness Argument
John Jackson argues that Judge Wigenton’s application
of the assault Guideline to the omission counts was procedural
error.20 We need not decide whether the District Court erred
because to the extent there was any error, such error was
harmless in light of the District Court’s imposition of a valid
alternative sentence.
Procedural errors at sentencing, which include
onion—but that such conduct did not cause the marks and
bruises, the malnourishment, the hypernatremia, and the
children’s other injuries and medical issues.” Jackson I at 397.
20 Because no Guideline has been expressly promulgated
for the state offenses of conviction, the sentencing court
applies the “most analogous” offense Guideline pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1. Jackson I at 371. In Jackson I, we held that
the elements-based test applies to determine which Guideline,
if any, is most analogous to the convicted offense. Id. at 376.
John argues that the District Court failed to apply an elements-
based test when determining that the assault Guideline applied
to the omission counts.

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miscalculations of the Guidelines, are subject to harmless error
review. United States v. Raia, 993 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir.
2021). “In the context of a Guidelines calculation error,
harmless error means that the record must demonstrate that
there is a high probability that the sentencing judge would have
imposed the same sentence under a correct Guidelines range,
that is, that the sentencing Guidelines range did not affect the
sentence actually imposed.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
The sentencing judge can demonstrate the requisite high
probability by “explicitly stat[ing] that [she] would have
imposed the same sentence even under the correct Guidelines
range.” Id. “However, even an explicit statement that the same
sentence would be imposed under a different Guidelines range
is insufficient if that alternative sentence is not also a product
of the entire three-step sentencing process.” Id. at 196.
John Jackson argues that any error was not harmless
because the District Court only made a general statement that
it would impose the same sentence without “reveal[ing] any
consideration of the omission counts as untethered to the
guidelines.” John Opening Br. at 43-44. He argues,
essentially, that if the District Court had declined to apply the
assault Guidelines to the omission counts, it would have found
that there was no applicable Guidelines section21 and that the
appropriate sentence for these counts would have been
determined solely by the Section 3553(a) factors. Thus, the
21 As noted above, because no Guideline has been
expressly promulgated for the state offenses of conviction, the
sentencing court applies the “most analogous” offense
Guideline. If none are sufficiently analogous, the sentencing
court relies upon the Section 3553(a) factors in imposing a
sentence.

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argument goes, although Judge Wigenton addressed the
Section 3553(a) factors, the alleged error is not harmless
because she did not explicitly state that this analysis applied in
the absence of a Guidelines range.
We disagree. We conclude that the District Court issued
a valid alternative sentence that was a product of the three-step
sentencing process. Raia, 993 F.3d at 196. The District Court
explained she would accept the arguments of defense counsel,
that is, a Guidelines range of seventy-to-eighty-seven months
predicated on the conclusion that there was no Guidelines
section applicable to the omission counts. She then explained
that she would vary upwards to reach the sentence of 108
months based upon the facts, the history, and the circumstances
of the charged offenses. Those facts and that history were
already greatly detailed in her consideration of the
Section 3553(a) factors. Having explicitly referenced them,
the District Court need not have restated her analysis. In sum,
the District Court’s process satisfies us “that there is a high
probability that [Judge Wigenton] would have imposed the
same sentence under a correct Guidelines range.” Raia, 993
F.3d at 195 (internal quotations omitted). Any procedural error
is therefore harmless.
3. Substantive Unreasonableness
Arguments
Carolyn and John Jackson also argue that their
sentences are substantively unreasonable. “[D]efendants bear
a heavy burden to show that a sentence within the applicable
Guidelines range was substantively unreasonable.” United
States v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir. 2020) (cleaned
up). If a sentence is procedurally sound, we assume that it is
reasonable and “affirm unless we believe that no reasonable

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court would have imposed that sentence for the reasons
provided.” Jumper, 74 F.4th at 114 (internal quotations
omitted). “As long as a sentence falls within the broad range
of possible sentences that can be considered reasonable in light
of the § 3553(a) factors, we must affirm.” United States v.
Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008).
John Jackson argues that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable because Judge Wigenton did not adequately
consider John’s history of abuse and military service as a
mitigating factor. However, “a district court’s failure to give
mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends they
deserve does not make a sentence substantively unreasonable.”
Seibert, 971 F.3d at 402 (internal quotations omitted).
Carolyn and John Jackson’s sentences are substantively
reasonable. “[T]he record as a whole reflects rational and
meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 399-400. We cannot conclude that
no reasonable court would have imposed the sentences in light
of the egregious conduct here.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons presented above, we will affirm.

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