United States of America v. AQUDRE QUAILES No. 23-2604 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 23-2533
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant
v.
AQUDRE QUAILES
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No. 23-2604
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant
v.
AYINDA HARPER
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Nos. 1:21-cr-00176-001; 1:21-cr-00236-001)

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District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 26, 2024
Before: KRAUSE, CHUNG, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 17, 2025)
William Glaser
United States Department of Justice
Criminal Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
Carlo D. Marchioli
Office of United States Attorney
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Sylvia H. Rambo United States Courthouse
1501 N 6th Street, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 202
Harrisburg, PA 17102
Counsel for Appellants
Frederick W. Ulrich
Office of Federal Public Defender
100 Chestnut Street, Suite 306
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Counsel for Appellee Aqudre Quailes

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Jonathan R. White
Dethlefs Pykosh and Murphy Law
2132 Market Street
Camp Hill, PA 17011
Counsel for Appellee Ayinda Harper
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
During the pendency of these appeals, we issued our en
banc opinion in Range v. Attorney General (Range II), holding
that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to
the felon in that case who had completed his sentence and filed
a declaratory judgment action seeking “protection from
prosecution under § 922(g)(1) for any future possession of a
firearm.” No. 21-2835, 2024 WL 5199447, at *8 (3d Cir. Dec.
23, 2024). We also held during the pendency of these appeals
that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to felons who have
not completed their sentences. United States v. Moore, 111
F.4th 266, 273 (3d Cir. 2024). Although the defendant in
Moore was on federal supervised release, Moore’s holding and
this Nation’s “history and tradition” of “disarming convicts
who are completing their sentences,” id., applies with equal
force to defendants who are on state supervised release—
including a sentence of parole or probation.
Here, Appellees Aqudre Quailes and Ayinda Harper
were separately charged with being felons in possession of a

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firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1), but the District Court
dismissed both indictments as unconstitutional under the
Second Amendment. That was an error. Because neither
Quailes nor Harper had completed service of their criminal
sentence, neither had “a Second Amendment right to possess a
firearm.” Id. We therefore will reverse the District Court’s
orders and remand the cases for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal concerns two cases that we have
consolidated because they raise the same issue. In 2020,
Appellee Harper was serving a sentence of Pennsylvania state
probation,1 as well as parole, when his probation officer
became aware of several photographs Harper posted on social
media in which Harper was holding firearms. Soon after,
several probation officers conducted a home visit to Harper’s
approved state parole address, during which Harper admitted
to possessing marijuana and drug paraphernalia in violation of
the conditions of his parole. After detaining Harper, the
officers discovered a semiautomatic pistol inside of a backpack
on the couch and found pictures of Harper holding the same
backpack and pistol on Harper’s cellphone.2 Harper, at the
time of this arrest, had thirteen prior felony convictions,
including five for armed robbery and four for drug trafficking.
1 Harper was serving a type of probationary sentence,
following his parole and probation violations, that
Pennsylvania calls “intermediate punishment.” See 42 Pa. Stat.
§ 9804(a); 204 Pa. Code § 303.12; Commonwealth v. Hoover,
231 A.3d 785, 793 (Pa. 2020) (explaining that “both county
and state intermediate punishment programs . . . fall under the
umbrella of probation”).
2 Harper consented to the search of his residence and cellphone.

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In the second case, Appellee Quailes was also on parole
with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for one of his six
prior felony convictions when he was arrested outside of his
girlfriend’s apartment in 2021 for absconding from parole. At
the time, federal authorities were monitoring Quailes’ social
media posts, several of which depicted him brandishing
various firearms. After obtaining consent from Quailes’
girlfriend to search her apartment, authorities found, among
other things, two semiautomatic handguns and dozens of
rounds of ammunition.
In the summer of 2021, grand juries indicted Quailes
and Harper in separate cases, charging each with one count of
being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of
§ 922(g)(1). Quailes and Harper both moved to dismiss their
respective indictments, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violates the
Second Amendment as applied to them under New York Rifle
& Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and Range v.
Attorney General (Range I), 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023),
judgment vacated sub nom. Garland v. Range, 144 S. Ct. 2706
(2024). In opposition, the Government argued, among other
things, that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to these
defendants because state parolees and probationers do not have
a Second Amendment right to possess a firearm.3
The District Court acknowledged that Quailes and
Harper “may lawfully be stripped of a firearm” while on
“parole” or “probation” under state law and that each defendant
3 In response, each defendant argued that “his status as a state
parolee is irrelevant under the Bruen/Range analysis.” United
States v. Quailes, 688 F. Supp. 3d 184, 190 (M.D. Pa. 2023);
United States v. Harper, 689 F. Supp. 3d 16, 22 (M.D. Pa.
2023).

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“may have violated the conditions of [their] state parole by
possessing the firearm,” but it reasoned that this “does not
prove that [Quailes or Harper] did not have a Second
Amendment right to possess the firearm to begin with.” United
States v. Quailes, 688 F. Supp. 3d 184, 196 (M.D. Pa. 2023)
(emphasis added); United States v. Harper, 689 F. Supp. 3d 16,
29 (M.D. Pa. 2023) (emphasis added). It then held § 922(g)(1)
unconstitutional as applied to both defendants and dismissed
their indictments as inconsistent with this Nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation.
The Government timely appealed and reasserts its
argument that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to felons
who possess a firearm while on parole or probation.4
4 Appellees argue that summary reversal is inappropriate on
this ground because the Government forfeited the argument.
Not so. The argument was not forfeited because it was
presented to the District Court and advanced on appeal, and the
Government promptly supplemented its argument with a Fed.
R. App. P. 28(j) letter calling our attention to Moore soon after
it was published. This Court has not “adopt[ed] an unduly
narrow construction of Rule 28(j) or a rigid limitation on our
discretion to consider relevant new law,” Beazer E., Inc. v.
Mead Corp., 525 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2008), and regardless,
we may reach forfeited arguments that relate to an intervening
change in controlling case law that occurs while appeal is
pending, see id. at 263; Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther
Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining
that we can reach a “forfeited issue” when there is an
“intervening change in the law”).

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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under
18 U.S.C. § 3231, and this Court has jurisdiction under 18
U.S.C. § 3731. When reviewing a motion to dismiss an
indictment, we review the District Court’s legal conclusions de
novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States
v. Menendez, 831 F.3d 155, 164 (3d Cir. 2016); United States
v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2013).
III. Discussion
A. Second Amendment Framework
The Second Amendment mandates that “the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.
Const. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the
Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment “confer[s] an
individual right to keep and bear arms” for traditionally lawful
purposes, such as self-defense within the home. 554 U.S. 570,
595, 629 (2008). But “the right secured by the Second
Amendment,” the Court clarified, “is not unlimited.” Id. at
626. To that end, it cautioned that “nothing in [its] opinion
should be taken to cast doubt” on laws like § 922(g)(1) that
prohibit “the possession of firearms by felons.” Id. at 626–27
& n.26.5
5 The Court declared the “longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons” to be “presumptively
lawful.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27
& n.26 (2008). When the Supreme Court held that the Second
Amendment applies to the States in McDonald v. City of
Chicago, it “repeat[ed] those assurances,” 561 U.S. 742, 786

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The Court “made the constitutional standard endorsed
in Heller more explicit” in Bruen by announcing a new two-
step analytic framework for analyzing Second Amendment
challenges to firearm regulations. 597 U.S. at 31. Courts must
first determine whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text
covers an individual’s conduct.” Id. at 17. If it does, the
Second Amendment “presumptively protects that conduct,”
and courts must proceed to Bruen’s second step, where “the
government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent
with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
Id. If the government satisfies its burden, the firearm
regulation passes constitutional muster.
In United States v. Rahimi, the Court clarified that “the
appropriate analysis” under Bruen’s second step “involves
considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent
with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” 602
U.S. 680, 692 (2024) (emphasis added). Under Rahimi’s
principles-focused approach to analogical reasoning, we
(2010) (plurality opinion), as it has continued to do in its most
recent Second Amendment case, see United States v. Rahimi,
602 U.S. 680, 699 (2024); see also New York Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 72 (2022) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (explaining that Bruen does not “disturb[]
anything that we said in Heller or McDonald about restrictions
that may be imposed on the possession or carrying of guns”
(citation omitted)); id. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., joined by Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons.” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27)); id.
at 129–30 (Breyer, J., joined by Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ.,
dissenting).

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evaluate challenged regulations at a higher level of generality
than whether “those regulations [are] identical to ones that
could be found in 1791.” Id. Rather than seeking out a perfect
statutory analogue, “dead ringer,” or “historical twin,” id.
(quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30), we draw on “relevantly
similar” historical regulations to derive “principles underlying
the Second Amendment” and then ask if the modern-day
regulation “comport[s] with th[ose] principles” in terms of
“why and how it burdens the Second Amendment right,” id. at
692, 698.
Applying this framework in Range II, we held that the
petitioner, who had completed his sentence and brought an as-
applied challenge in the form of a declaratory judgment action,
was entitled to “protection from prosecution under § 922(g)(1)
for any future possession of a firearm.” 2024 WL 5199447, at
*8. In Moore, on the other hand, we rejected an as-applied
challenge by a convict who had not completed his sentence and
nonetheless possessed a gun while on federal supervised
release. We recounted how felons at the Founding were
disarmed while completing their sentences, Moore, 111 F.4th
at 270–71, whether their sentence was served inside or outside
of prison, id. at 272 (citing a Virginia law imposing sentence
of “forced labor on a ship” and a North Carolina law sentencing
non-violent convicts to service at direction of the local sheriff),
and concluded that “[a] convict completing his sentence on
supervised release does not have a Second Amendment right
to possess a firearm,” id. at 273.
In both opinions, we recognized that some Founding-
era forfeiture laws disarmed a felon for a wide range of crimes
but still allowed him to “[re]acquire arms after completing his
sentence and reintegrating into society.” Range II, 2024 WL
5199447, at *8; see Moore, 111 F.4th at 269–71 (observing that

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certain forfeiture laws required convicts to forfeit their
weapons through at least the end of their sentences). These
Founding-era laws, as we explained in Moore, “yield[ed] the
principle that a convict may be disarmed while he completes
his sentence,” and this principle justified applying § 922(g)(1)
to a convict on supervised release. 111 F.4th at 272. We
likened the “historical practice of disarming a convict during
his sentence” to “disarming a convict on supervised release”
because supervised release is also part of a criminal sentence.
Id. at 271. Thus, together, Moore and Range II teach that our
Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation supports
disarming a convict who has not “complete[d] his sentence and
reintegrate[d] into society,” including, as we addressed in
Moore, convicts who are serving a term of federal supervised
release after release from incarceration. Moore, 111 F.4th at
272; see Range II, 2024 WL 5199447, at *8. We did not have
occasion to address in Moore, and do today, whether that
extends to a sentence of state parole or probation, even if not
preceded by imprisonment.
B. Section 922(g)(1) is Constitutional as Applied to
Parolees and Probationers
Under Bruen’s first step, we conclude that Quailes and
Harper, as adult citizens, are among “the people”
presumptively protected by the Second Amendment, Range II,
2024 WL 5199447, at *5, and that § 922(g)(1) punishes
“quintessential Second Amendment conduct”—possession of
a firearm, Moore, 111 F.4th at 269. But they possessed a
firearm while on state parole, and Harper was also serving a
probationary sentence of intermediate punishment. Because
offenders on parole or probation are “completing [a] sentence,”
neither Quailes nor Harper had “a Second Amendment right to
possess a firearm” at the time of their § 922(g)(1) offenses. Id.

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at 273. So under Bruen’s second step, we conclude that
§ 922(g)(1), as applied to Quailes and Harper, “comport[s]
with the principles underlying the Second Amendment.”
Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692.
This Nation’s history demonstrates a longstanding and
uninterrupted tradition of disarming convicts still serving a
criminal sentence. Colonial and Founding-era estate forfeiture
laws, which “stand for the proposition that convicts could be
disarmed while serving their sentences,” serve as relevantly
similar historical analogues to § 922(g)(1) as applied to a felon
who possessed a firearm during the period of his sentence.6
6 Under Bruen, the government bears the burden of proving
that disarming Quailes and Harper is consistent with the
principles behind our regulatory tradition. Bruen, 597 U.S. at
19. Appellees argue that the Government has not met this
burden because these forfeiture laws were not considered by
the District Court. They are wrong twice over. The
Government and Appellees brought to our attention the
Founding-era forfeiture laws we rely on today, and as Bruen
explains, courts are “entitled to decide a case based on the
historical record compiled by the parties”—including any
historical commentaries, statutes, or cases introduced by the
parties or amici on appeal. 597 U.S. at 25 n.6; see id. at 31–70
(considering a broad range of historical sources proffered by
the parties and their amici). Moreover, Rahimi and Bruen
allow “courts [to] engage in historical research” based on the
historical record provided by the parties. United States v.
Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 645 n.2 (6th Cir. 2024); see also
United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 468 (5th Cir. 2024)
(conducting its “own research” to corroborate and supplement

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Moore, 111 F.4th at 271 n.3. These laws, which were
ubiquitous at the Founding, stripped felons of their entire estate
upon conviction—including any firearms and all other goods
and chattels. See Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines
Clause, 102 Cal. L. Rev. 277, 332 & nn.275–76 (2014)
(collecting statutes).7 As we explained in Moore, felony
“the government’s evidence” regarding the Nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation). At a minimum, we have the
discretion to conduct independent legal research and consider
past laws and judicial decisions—regardless of whether they
were raised below. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 60; Wolford v.
Lopez, 116 F.4th 959, 976 (9th Cir. 2024) (“With respect to
legal sources . . . we may . . . consider laws and other legal
sources whether or not the parties have focused on those
specific laws or judicial decisions.”). So this Court may rely
on historical principles derived in past cases, such as Moore,
and the historical analogues underlying those principles.
7 See also Moore, 111 F.4th at 270–71 (collecting Founding-
era forfeiture laws that “disarmed citizens who had committed
a wide range of crimes . . . until they had finished serving their
sentences”); United States v. Goins, 118 F.4th 794, 802 (6th
Cir. 2024) (collecting forfeiture laws and explaining that
“forfeiture of the estate, goods, or chattels upon conviction was
common during the founding era”); Diaz, 116 F.4th at 468
(observing that colonies and states “routinely made use of
estate forfeiture as punishment” for felony offenses); see, e.g.,
Acts of Feb. 1788, reprinted in 2 Laws of the State of New York
Passed at the Sessions of the Legislature 1785-1788, at 632–
33, 664–66 (1886) (establishing death penalty and estate
forfeiture for crimes such as robbery and counterfeiting); Act
of May 5, 1777, reprinted in 9 Statutes at Large; Being a

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forfeiture laws “disarmed citizens who had committed a wide
range of crimes . . . until they had finished serving their
sentences.” 111 F.4th at 271. Under these regimes, convicts
could potentially reacquire arms, but only upon successfully
serving their sentence and reintegrating into society. Until
then, an offender subject to complete estate forfeiture remained
disarmed for the entire time that he “was serving out his
sentence, not only while he was physically in prison.” Id. at
272.
Practices into the 19th century provide “confirmation of
[what the Founding-era laws] established.”8 Bruen, 597 U.S.
Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, from the First Session
of the Legislature 302–03 (William W. Henning ed., 1821)
(punishing forgery with estate forfeiture, whipping, and up to
seven years’ service on an armed vessel); Act of Apr. 1715,
reprinted in 1 Laws of Maryland 79 (Virgil Maxcy ed., 1811)
(punishing with estate forfeiture anyone convicted of corruptly
“altering any will or record” in a way that resulted in injury to
another’s estate or inheritance); Act of Apr. 5, 1790, reprinted
in 13 Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, at
511–12 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1908)
(providing that “every person convicted of robbery, burglary,
sodomy or buggery . . . shall forfeit to the commonwealth all
. . . the lands . . . goods and chattels whereof he or she . . .
possessed at the time the crime was committed and at any time
afterwards until conviction and be sentenced to undergo a
servitude of any term . . . not exceeding ten years”).
8 Where, as here, post-enactment history is consistent with and
enhances our understanding of the Second Amendment’s
original public meaning, it remains a valuable resource for

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at 37. Although estate forfeiture laws began disappearing by
the early 1800s, see Folajtar v. Att’y Gen., 980 F.3d 897, 905
(3d Cir. 2020), “[d]isarming convicts as part of their sentences
continued into the 19th century,” Moore, 111 F.4th at 271.
This post-ratification history and tradition, which is consistent
with Founding-era laws, is further probative of the principles
underlying the Second Amendment. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 35; see
Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 738 (Barrett, J., concurring) (observing
that “postenactment history can be an important tool”); id. at
725 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (same). Our Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation thus provides us with
the “principle that a convict may be disarmed while he
completes his sentence,” Moore, 111 F.4th at 272, whether that
sentence is being served inside or outside of prison.
Consistent with this principle, modern firearm
regulations, such as § 922(g)(1), may disarm convicts “on
parole, probation, or supervised release.” United States v.
Goins, 118 F.4th 794, 802 (6th Cir. 2024). Federal supervised
release, like parole and probation, represents a phase of the
criminal sentence where the convict is on supervised release
and must observe special restrictions on their liberty.9 Parole,
delimiting the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections.
See Lara v. Comm’r Pa. State Police, No. 21-1832, 2025 WL
86539, at *10 & n.19 (3d. Cir. Jan. 13, 2025); see also Bruen,
597 U.S. at 35; Heller, 554 U.S. at 605.
9 Due to the similarity between parole, probation, and
supervised release, courts often treat parolees, probationers,
and supervisees as indistinguishable for constitutional
purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 902, 909
(3d Cir. 1992) (holding there is “no constitutional difference

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like federal supervised release, “is an established variation on
imprisonment of convicted criminals” where a prisoner is
“release[d] from prison, before the completion of [their]
sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain
rules during the balance of the sentence.”10 Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972); see also Pa. Bd. of
Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998).
Likewise, federal and state convicts may be sentenced to a term
of probation where the convict avoids imprisonment but is
instead supervised and subject to restrictive conditions in his
community for the duration of his sentence. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3561; 42 Pa. Stat. § 9721(a)(1). In other words,
between probation and parole for purposes of the fourth
amendment”); United States v. Garcia-Avalino, 444 F.3d 444,
446 n.5 (5th Cir. 2006) (“We do not distinguish between
parolees and those on supervised release for the purpose of
determining their constitutional rights.”); United States v.
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 817 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Our cases
have not distinguished between parolees, probationers, and
supervised releasees for Fourth Amendment purposes.”);
United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 361–62 & n.4 (4th Cir.
1996) (collecting cases).
10 While parole has been around for centuries, federal
supervised release is a relatively modern creation. Congress
largely abolished federal “parole” and replaced it with the
nearly identical system of federal “supervised release” in 1984.
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 696–97 (2000);
Moore, 111 F.4th at 272; United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873,
881 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Supervised release and parole are
virtually identical systems. Under each, a defendant serves a
portion of a sentence in prison and a portion under supervision
outside prison walls.”).

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“[p]robation”—like incarceration, parole, or federal
supervised release—“is ‘a form of criminal sanction imposed
by a court upon an offender’” that is simply “one point . . . on
a continuum of possible punishments.” United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (quoting Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)); see Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (noting that parole is “on
the continuum of state-imposed punishments” (internal
quotation omitted)); Mont v. United States, 587 U.S. 514, 524
(2019) (“Supervised release is a form of punishment that
Congress prescribes along with a term of imprisonment as part
of the same sentence.”). Because parolees and probationers—
like convicts on federal supervised release—are still serving
their sentences, the Second Amendment affords them no
protection.
Here, Harper and Quailes were both serving sentences
under state supervision at the time of their § 922(g)(1) offenses.
Harper was serving a sentence of probation, and both felons
were on state parole when they possessed a firearm. Under
Pennsylvania law, probation, including “intermediate
punishment,” is an explicitly authorized criminal “sentence”
that a court may impose, 42 Pa. Stat. §§ 9721(a)(1), 9754(a),
9804(a), 9806(a)(4); 37 Pa. Code §§ 451.1(2), 451.52(a), and
“[a] person . . . on parole . . . is in fact still serving out his
sentence,” United States v. Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526, 532 (3d Cir.
2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Frankenhauser, 375 A.2d
120, 122 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)). Section 922(g)(1) is thus

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constitutional as applied to Harper and Quailes.11 See Moore,
111 F.4th at 271 n.3, 273.
11 Even before Moore and today’s extension of Moore to state
parole and probation, nearly all district courts in this circuit to
consider the issue correctly determined that § 922(g)(1) was
constitutional as applied to state parolees and probationers.
See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 704 F. Supp. 3d 616, 622
(E.D. Pa. 2023) (“Because [defendant’s] right to bear arms had
been ‘suspended’ as a condition of his probation . . . he could
not have been engaged in protected ‘Second Amendment
conduct’ at the time that he was arrested.” (quoting Kanter, 919
F.3d at 461 (Barrett, J., dissenting))); United States v.
Hedgepeth, 700 F. Supp. 3d 276, 281 (E.D. Pa. 2023)
(“[Defendant] was on probation at the time that he was found
possessing a firearm and thus had already forfeited his Second
Amendment right.”); United States v. Birry, No. 3:23cr288,
2024 WL 3540989, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2024)
(“[D]efendant[s] are not engaged in protected Second
Amendment conduct when they possess guns while on
probation or parole.”); United States v. Campbell, No. CR 23-
141, 2024 WL 2113474, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2024) (“18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) . . . is not unconstitutional . . . as applied to
defendants . . . on parole or probation.”); United States v.
Ladson, No. CR 23-161-1, 2023 WL 6810095, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 16, 2023) (Ҥ 922(g)(1) remains constitutional as-applied
to those defendants who possess a firearm while on parole even
if its application would become unconstitutional once parole
ends.”); United States v. Terry, No. 2:20-CR-43, 2023 WL
6049551, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2023) (“[P]robationers and
parolees . . . are not engaged in protected Second Amendment
conduct.”); United States v. Oppel, No. 4:21-CR-00276, 2023

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Section 922(g)(1), insofar as it prohibits felons who are
completing their criminal sentences from possessing firearms,
“fits neatly within” the principles underlying the Second
Amendment. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698. We thus join our sister
circuits in holding that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied
to convicts on parole or probation. See, e.g., Goins, 118 F.4th
at 801–02 (holding that “our nation’s historical tradition of
forfeiture laws . . . supports disarming those on parole,
probation, or supervised release”); United States v. Gay, 98
F.4th 843, 847 (7th Cir. 2024) (concluding that “parolees lack
the same armament rights as free persons” because “[p]arole is
a form of custody” that simply allows a convict to “serve some
of his sentence[] outside prison walls”).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District
Court’s orders dismissing the indictments and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WL 8458241, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2023); United States v.
Hilliard, No. 2:23-cr-110, 2023 WL 6200066, at *1 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 21, 2023).

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