United States of America v. Jose Torres

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 23-2916
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOSE TORRES,
Appellant
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D. C. No. 2:20-cr-00418-001)
District Judge: Honorable Brian R. Martinotti
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Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on September 11, 2025
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PORTER and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 17, 2026)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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ROTH, Circuit Judge
A jury convicted Jose Torres of four counts of knowingly persuading, inducing,
and enticing four women to travel from out of state to New Jersey to engage in
prostitution, in violation of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a).1 The District Court
sentenced him to 311 months’ imprisonment. Torres appeals his conviction and sentence.
We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND2
Federal authorities began investigating Torres in 2018. The investigation
uncovered the following pattern of conduct: Torres contacted commercial sex workers
online using fake names, false references, and more than 400 phone numbers to evade the
sex worker community’s blacklist; solicited women to travel to New Jersey by promising
substantial payment; and when they arrived, forced them to engage in unprotected
intercourse, did not pay them as promised, and, in some cases, assaulted and raped them.
Investigators interviewed at least thirty women who described similar experiences,
though Torres’s online payment account listed over 160 women who had never received
payments, and investigators found that he had booked more than 250 one-night hotel
stays near his residence.
1 “Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to
travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the
United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any
person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a).
2 We write primarily for the parties, so we recite only the facts essential to our decision.

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In February 2020, the government arrested Torres and charged him with violations
of the Mann Act.3 The District Court denied his repeated applications for bail. It also
rejected Torres’s claim that the prosecuting Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA)
had a conflict of interest based on her prior employment with a firm that later represented
some of Torres’s victims pro bono.
While represented by counsel, Torres filed a series of pro se submissions accusing
the AUSA, her former firm, and other government officials of conspiring to manufacture
evidence against him, coerce false testimony, and fabricate information to keep him
detained. The District Court struck those filings, explaining that Torres was not entitled
to hybrid representation and had to proceed through counsel.
Torres continued filing anyway, expanding his accusations against the AUSA. In
response, the government sought a limited filing injunction that would require Torres’s
filings to be pre-screened before public docketing.
At a January 6, 2023 hearing, the District Court considered an August 2022
motion by Torres to proceed either under hybrid representation or pro se. The court
treated the motion as seeking to proceed pro se, again explaining that Torres was not
entitled to hybrid representation. After conducting a full colloquy under Faretta,4 the
court warned Torres that continued failure to comply with court orders could result in the
loss of his right to self-representation. The court thereafter struck and sealed Torres’s
3 The Second Superseding Indictment initially charged Torres with six counts under §
2422. After the government dismissed two counts and struck the words “coercion” and
“coerce” from the remaining counts, the operative indictment proceeded on four counts.
4 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).

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improper filings, denied hybrid representation, and enjoined further pro se filings pending
a ruling on his request to proceed pro se. Days later, Torres refiled the sealed materials in
a parallel civil action.
On February 22, 2023, the District Court permitted Torres to proceed pro se but
imposed safeguards because of his repeated disregard of court orders. It appointed a
Special Master to screen his filings for compliance and warned that continued violations
could result in revocation of his pro se status. The Special Master reviewed more than
forty submissions totaling over 500 pages and recommended that numerous filings be
rejected for violating the court’s orders while others be docketed only after redaction or
removal of improper material.
At a May 8, 2023 status conference, the Special Master reported that Torres had
submitted an additional 31 filings since the court had permitted him to proceed pro se,
fewer than half of which complied with prior orders. Concluding that Torres’s conduct
was “outrageous,” burdened the docket, and bordered on contempt, the District Court
revoked his right to self-representation and reinstated standby counsel.5
The case went to trial in October 2023. Four victims testified that Torres located
their advertisements online, solicited commercial sex from them, and asked them to travel
to New Jersey in exchange for substantial payment. Upon their arrival, he forced them
into unwanted and unprotected sex and did not pay them. The jury found him guilty on
all counts, and the District Court denied his motion for acquittal.
5 SAppx 881-82.

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The court sentenced Torres to 311 months’ imprisonment. Torres appeals his
conviction and sentence.
II. DISCUSSION6
Torres first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his Mann Act
convictions because paying sex workers who advertised their services cannot constitute
“persuasion,” “inducement,” or “enticement” under § 2422(a). He further contends that
the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because the Mann Act has
historically targeted forced prostitution and trafficking, not so-called johns—customers
who pay adult sex workers. We disagree and will uphold Torres’s convictions because §
2422(a) clearly proscribes his conduct.7
Torres admitted at trial that he offered large sums of money to four women to
travel across state or international lines to have sex with him; that they did in fact travel;
and that the sole purpose of their travel was prostitution.8 Each woman testified that
Torres’s financial offers prompted her decision to travel, noting that in some instances,
his offers far exceeded their ordinary rates and included additional financial incentives.
6 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
7 “We exercise plenary review over a district court’s ruling on a Rule 39 motion.” United
States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 201 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). We review
the sufficiency of the evidence by asking whether any rational juror could find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government. Id. We also exercise plenary review over whether a challenged statute is
unconstitutionally vague as applied. Id. at 199-200.
8 There is no dispute that the four women “travel[ed] in interstate or foreign commerce.”
18 U.S.C. § 2422(a). Three of them traveled interstate from New York to New Jersey,
and the fourth traveled internationally from Canada to New Jersey.

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On this record, a rational jury could conclude that Torres persuaded, induced, or enticed
each woman to travel for prostitution.
Contrary to Torres’s assertions, nothing in § 2422(a)’s text limits the statute to
traffickers, excludes johns, or turns on whether the traveler was already predisposed to
engage in commercial sex. The terms “persuades,” “induces,” and “entices” carry their
ordinary meanings and encompass conduct that influences or brings about another
person’s decision.9 By the statute’s plain terms, the traveler’s consent or predisposition is
irrelevant.10 Nor does the statute’s text give johns a get-out-of-jail free card.11 Torres
asks us to graft limitations onto the statute based on the Mann Act’s legislative history
and enforcement patterns. We will not do so. The Supreme Court has already held that
courts may not narrow the Mann Act based on its original focus where the enacted text is
broader.12
9 United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 473 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding § 2422(b) is
not unconstitutionally vague, and recognizing the same terms, as used in § 2422(b), “have
a plain and ordinary meaning that does not need further technical explanation”) (quoting
United States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557, 561-62 (9th Cir. 2004)). See also, e.g., Batsell v.
United States, 403 F.2d 395, 399 (8th Cir. 1968) (finding “no ambiguity in the terms of
[the Mann Act]” and explaining “[t]he word ‘induces’ in § 2422 is one of common usage
and meaning and requires no explanation or definition”).
10 See Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 530 (1960) (observing the “consent of [the]
woman [is] immaterial in [a] prosecution under [18 U.S.C. § 2422]”); Gebardi v. United
States, 287 U.S. 112, 121 (1932) (“Congress set out in the Mann Act to deal with cases
which frequently, if not normally, involve consent and agreement on the part of the
woman to the forbidden transportation.”). See also, e.g., United States v. Waqar, 997
F.3d 481, 485-86 (2d Cir. 2021) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that if someone is
already “inclined to do something, she wouldn’t need to be persuaded”).
11 Section 2422(a) authorizes prosecution of “[w]hoever” commits the offense. Congress
did not limit the statute’s reach to traffickers, pimps, or procurers.
12 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490-91 (1917) (holding that courts cannot
use the Mann Act’s original legislative history to override the statute’s plain meaning).

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Torres’s vagueness challenge fails for the same reason. Section 2422(a) uses
common terms that courts have already held are not unconstitutionally vague.13 The
relative novelty of prosecuting a john under § 2422(a) does not mean Torres did not have
fair notice that his conduct was unlawful.14 Offering substantial financial incentives to
secure interstate travel for sex fits squarely within the statute’s text. The evidence
adduced at trial was thus more than sufficient to sustain Torres’s § 2422(a) convictions.
Torres next argues that the District Court violated his Sixth Amendment right to
self-representation by revoking his pro se status based on his pretrial conduct. He
portrays himself as a respectful litigant who merely filed too many motions and contends
that the court acted without adequate justification. The record shows otherwise.15
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to represent himself, but
that right is not absolute.16 A defendant may not disregard court orders, disrupt
proceedings, or use self-representation as a tool for delay,17 and courts may revoke pro se
status when a defendant, after clear warnings, refuses to comply with court rulings.18
13 See, e.g., Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 473.
14 Cf. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266-67 (1997) (“[D]ue process bars courts
from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute
nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope.”).
15 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusion that the
defendant waived by conduct his Sixth Amendment right to proceed pro se. See United
States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2002). We review the facts establishing the
defendant’s conduct for clear error. Id.
16 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
17 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1970).
18 See United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1101 (3d Cir. 1995).

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Before the District Court permitted Torres to proceed pro se, he had already shown
a pattern of disregard for court orders.19 He repeatedly filed motions while represented
by counsel despite explicit prohibitions on hybrid filings, characterizing the court’s
orders as mere “recommendation[s].”20 Even so, the court allowed him to represent
himself, but only after warning him that further violations would result in revocation of
that right. Torres confirmed he understood the court’s conditions, but then repeatedly
violated them by filing numerous non-compliant submissions, relitigating resolved issues,
and disregarding filing and sealing restrictions. His behavior required appointment of a
Special Master, and even then, his conduct did not improve. The District Court, having
exhibited ample patience, reasonably determined that Torres’s conduct flouted court
orders, caused delay, and left it with no confidence that he would abide by court rules.
We are more than satisfied that this record supports the District Court’s decision.21
Torres additionally argues that the lead prosecutor should have been disqualified
because of her prior employment at a firm that later represented some of his victims pro
bono. His conflict-of-interest claim holds no water.22
19 Torres has continued his pattern of hybrid filings before this Court. We have
repeatedly warned him that represented parties may not file motions or other documents
pro se. Accordingly, we do not consider his pro se submissions.
20 SAppx 498.
21 Because we conclude the court properly found waiver by conduct on this record, we
need not decide whether Torres’s conduct also rose to the level of forfeiture. United
States v. Barkers-Woode, 136 F.4th 496, 503 (3d Cir. 2025) (“Waiver by conduct is
triggered by ‘conduct less severe than sufficient to warrant a forfeiture.’”) (quoting
Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101)).
22 We review the District Court’s finding for abuse of discretion, provided the court
makes a reasoned, non-arbitrary determination based on a developed record. See United
States v. Shah, 43 F.4th 356, 362 n.4 (3d Cir. 2022).

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The prosecutor’s prior firm did not begin representing Torres’s victims until after
she had left. The United States Attorney’s Office assigned the prosecutor to the case only
after she had disclosed to her supervisor her prior connection to the firm. And, apart
from baseless accusations, Torres provided no evidence of any continuing financial or
personal relationship between the prosecutor and the firm. His own counsel conceded
that there was none. Moreover, the government obtained an authorization letter from the
Department of Justice concluding that the prosecutor could continue to participate in
Torres’s matter and designated another prosecutor to handle communications with the
firm and its clients. The District Court’s conclusion that not even an appearance of a
conflict existed, let alone an actual one, was well-supported and not an abuse of
discretion.23
Finally, Torres argues that the District Court violated his Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial when it calculated a base offense level according to U.S.S.G. §
2G1.1(c)(1)’s cross-reference to § 2A3.1 for conduct involving criminal sexual abuse.
Again, we disagree.24 We have “repeatedly rejected [such] arguments,” holding that
“judicial findings of fact that increase the defendant’s Guidelines range, but not the
statutory maximum, do not violate the Constitution.”25 Indeed, “[f]acts pertinent to
23 See id. at 364 & n.7 (affirming denial of disqualification motion with no evidentiary
hearing because record was detailed and defendant “presented nothing to” contradict the
government’s submissions).
24 Because Torres did not preserve his claim at sentencing regarding applying the cross-
reference in U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(c)(1) based on a preponderance standard, we review for
plain error. United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).
25 United States v. Jackson, 132 F.4th 266, 273 (3d Cir. 2025).

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sentencing need only be submitted to a jury” when they “raise the applicable statutory
maximum or mandatory minimum sentence.”26 Here, the District Court sentenced Torres
to terms of imprisonment within the statutory maximum for each count of conviction, and
the court’s factual findings did not increase the statutory penalties authorized by the
jury’s verdict.27 Consistent with our precedent, we conclude that the District Court did
not plainly err by applying the sexual abuse cross-reference.28
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
26 Id. See also Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 114-16 (2013).
27 Torres received a total sentence of 311 months’ imprisonment, comprised of 240
months on three of the four enticement counts, to run concurrently, followed by 71
months on the remaining enticement count. Each conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a)
carried a statutory maximum sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment. None of the
court’s factual findings increased the statutory maximum sentence Torres faced on any
count of conviction.
28 Torres’s reliance on Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), is also misplaced.
Erlinger involved a statutory enhancement that increased the statutorily prescribed
minimum and maximum penalties. Id. at 825 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). It did not
concern the advisory Guidelines.

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