United States of America v. Jerome Brown, a/k/a Jerome F Brown

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 23-3184
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JEROME BROWN, a/k/a Jerome F Brown,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 2:21-cr-00374-001)
District Judge: Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan
__________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on February 3, 2025
Before: RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and
SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 11, 2025)

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Donovan J. Cocas
Laura S. Irwin
OFFICE OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Western District of Pennsylvania
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellee
Ray Kim
Renee Pietropaolo
OFFICE OF FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
Western District of Pennsylvania
1001 Liberty Avenue
1500 Liberty Center
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Appellant
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
A plea agreement is a negotiated contract between the
Government and a defendant.1 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure governs criminal pleas and expressly
1 United States v. Cruz, 95 F.4th 106, 110 (3d Cir. 2024)
(citing United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361
(3d Cir. 1989)).

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forbids judicial participation in plea negotiations.2 But
improper judicial participation is not enough to vacate a plea.
A defendant must also show that he “would have exercised his
right to go to trial.”3 Although the District Court improperly
intervened in the parties’ plea negotiations, we will affirm
because Brown cannot show a violation of his substantial
rights.
I.
Jerome Brown was indicted for drug trafficking and
illegally possessing a firearm after law enforcement raided his
car, home, and storage unit as part of a drug-trafficking
investigation near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Police found over
13 kilos of fentanyl, a handgun, and ammunition, as well as
$136,000 in cash. Shortly after his arrest, Brown confessed.
Instead of going to trial, Brown entered into plea negotiations
with the Government.
The parties presented two different stipulated plea
agreements to the District Court. In the first plea agreement,
the parties negotiated the mandatory minimum sentence of 180
months’ imprisonment. But the District Court rejected the
plea, finding the sentence to be inconsistent with the
guidelines4 and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). So,
Brown withdrew his plea.
2 FED . R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“The court must not participate in
[plea agreement] discussions.”).
3 United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 612 (2013) (“Davila
I”).
4 Given Brown’s criminal history and the charges, his
Sentencing Guidelines range was 292–365 months
imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of 180 months’
imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(c)(2), 4B1.1(b).

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The parties went back to the drawing board to negotiate
a second plea agreement. The new agreement proposed a
sentence of 198 months—18 months longer than the original
deal. Instead of simply rejecting the plea as permitted under
Rule 11,5 the District Court proposed its own “sentence [of] no
greater than 235 months.”6 Brown postponed his scheduled
change-of-plea and filed a supplemental memorandum to
address the District Court’s continued concerns. But the
District Court remained doubtful and reiterated its proposed
sentence of 235 months.
The Government and Brown proceeded to request a
sentence of 198 months, noting Brown’s early cooperation and
acceptance of responsibility. Ultimately, the District Court
rejected the second plea and presented Brown with three
options: (1) try to renegotiate a third plea agreement; (2) enter
an open guilty plea with the promise of a sentence not less than
235 months; or (3) go to trial. After discussing the options with
his attorney, Brown chose to proceed directly to an open plea
with the understanding of the District Court’s position.7 His
plea was knowing and voluntary, and he ultimately received a
sentence of 235 months’ imprisonment followed by ten years
of supervised release. This appeal followed.
5 See FED . R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3), (5).
6 JA 140.
7 JA 180 (“Mr. Brown is prepared to proceed with a change of
plea without a plea agreement today in light of the Court’s, I
guess, preliminary ruling on the plea agreement and proceed
without a plea and just do an open plea to Counts One and
Two of the indictment.”).

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II.8
Brown argues that the District Court’s promise of a
sentence of not less than 235 months violated Rule 11(c)(1),
which should result in a vacatur of his plea. To resolve this
issue, we must decide two questions: First, did the District
Court violate Rule 11(c)(1)? If so, can Brown show substantial
prejudice because of the violation? Because he failed to raise
the objection below, we review for plain error.9
Rule 11’s mandate against judicial participation in plea
negotiations is clear: “The court must not participate in these
discussions.”10 Such interference raises concerns for coerced
guilty pleas and strips the process of judicial neutrality. The
Supreme Court has recognized that the prohibition was
adopted “out of concern that a defendant might be induced to
8 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231,
and this Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
9 See United States v. Davila, 749 F.3d 982, 993 (11th Cir.
2014) (“Davila II”) (finding that plain-error review applies
when a defendant fails to contemporaneously object to a Rule
(11)(c)(1) violation); see also United States v. Brown, 595
F.3d 498, 519 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To succeed under this standard
of review, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the asserted
violation of Rule 11(c)(1) was error, (2) the error was plain,
and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights; if
these three conditions are met, then a court may exercise its
discretion to notice the forfeited error, but only if (4) the error
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” (internal quotation and citations
omitted)).
10 FED . R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (emphasis added).

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plead guilty rather than risk displeasing the judge who would
preside at trial.”11
The District Court unquestionably violated Rule
11(c)(1)’s bright-line rule prohibiting judicial interference.
Here, the violation is straightforward: the court engaged in plea
negotiations and induced Brown to accept a plea of not less
than 235 months. On more than one occasion, the District
Court proposed its own sentence and therefore “took the lead
in orchestrating the plea agreement ultimately entered into by
[Brown] and the government”12—a point the Government
concedes.13 But the District Court’s error alone is not enough
to vacate Brown’s plea,14 as he suggests. Brown must also
show that “but for the [District Court’s] exhortations, [he]
would have exercised his right to go to trial.”15 He fails to meet
this burden.
Instead, the record demonstrates Brown’s consistent
intent to plead guilty. From the outset, Brown admitted the
drugs belonged to him, reaffirming that admission under oath
at his guilty plea. Before the District Court rejected the second
plea agreement, both parties made it clear that Brown intended
to plead guilty. Brown’s attorney told the District Court, “He
intends to plead guilty today. He intends to, like he did on the
day of his arrest, to accept full responsibility for his actions and
11 Davila I, 569 U.S. at 606.
12 United States v. Harrell, 751 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir.
2014).
13 See Appellee’s Br. at 23 (“[T]he United States believes that
the court’s Rule 11(c)(1) violation in Brown’s case is
obvious.”).
14 See Davila I, 569 U.S. at 609–10.
15 Davila I, 569 U.S. at 612.

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he understands the gravity of this offense . . . .”16 Likewise,
the prosecutor urged the District Court to accept the below-
guideline sentence due to Brown’s “very early”17 cooperation:
“[W]ithin six months of this all happening, Mr. Brown said,
I’ll plead guilty, I’ll go away with the plea agreement for 15
years.”18 The parties shared a mutual understanding from the
beginning, one that Brown did not refute: “it was relatively
clear this would be a plea, that Mr. Brown was not really going
to fight this.”19 Because the record unequivocally
demonstrates that Brown never intended to go to trial, we must
affirm despite the District Court’s violation of Rule 11(c)(1).
III.
Alternatively, Brown also argues that his plea must be
vacated because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. But
we need not address this argument, because our precedent is
clear: Ҥ 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to convicts on
parole or probation”20 and “[a] convict completing his sentence
on supervised release does not have a Second Amendment
right to possess a firearm.”21 Because Brown was on probation
at the time of the offense, he does not have a Second
Amendment right to possess a firearm.
16 JA 157.
17 JA 173.
18 JA 174.
19 JA 177.
20 United States v. Quailes, 126 F.4th 215, 224 (3d Cir. 2025).
21 United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266, 273 (3d Cir. 2024).

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IV.
The District Court erred by violating Rule 11(c)(1) when
participating in plea negotiations. But the error did not affect
Brown’s substantial rights, so we will affirm.

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