Frederick of the Family Gonora v. PATRICIA RISCH Frederick Gonora

233266np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit26 mars 2024

Texte intégral

ALD-083 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 23-3266
___________
FREDERICK OF THE FAMILY GONORA
v.
PATRICIA RISCH
Frederick Gonora,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(Civil Action No. 3-23-cv-00893)
District Judge: Honorable Robert Kirsch
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 7, 2024
Before: HARDIMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 26, 2024)
_________
OPINION*
_________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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2
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Frederick Gonora appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of
his civil rights claims. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District
Court’s judgment.
In February 2023, Gonora filed a civil rights action in the District Court pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, bringing claims against Patricia Risch, the Director of the Office of
Child Support Services (“OCSS”) for the State of New Jersey. He alleged that his wages
had been illegally garnished and that he suffered various damages pursuant to child
support judgment orders entered by family court judges in Monmouth County, New
Jersey between 2016 and 2023.1 He appeared to argue that the judges lacked jurisdiction
to enter these orders and that because the judges should be considered to be acting under
the direction and supervision of OCSS, OCSS should be liable for damages resulting
from the orders they issued. Gonora brought several federal constitutional claims
stemming from these allegations against OCSS. On Risch’s motion, the District Court
dismissed Gonora’s complaint with prejudice. Gonora timely appealed.2
1 This is not Gonora’s first lawsuit regarding the issue of his wage garnishment; we
previously affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of an earlier case he brought against
OCSS, Monmouth County, and others, based on similar allegations. See Frederick of
Fam. Gonora v. Off. of Child Support Servs., 783 F. App’x 250, 251 (3d Cir. 2019) (per
curiam).
2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Gonora’s claims. See Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009). Dismissal is appropriate “if,
accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that [the] plaintiff’s claims lack facial
plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).

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The District Court properly dismissed Gonora’s claims. Gonora made no factual
allegations about Risch in his complaint; he specifically stated that he sought to hold her
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior in her capacity as a supervisor and made
sweeping, conclusory statements about her oversight responsibilities for OCSS. But “[a]
defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs;
liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Gonora did not allege any facts
suggesting that Risch “established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which
directly caused [him] constitutional harm.” See Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist.,
882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989); cf. Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 331 (3d Cir.
2016) (“To presume that [unconstitutional] practices arose from [a defendant’s] policies
merely because of his position . . . is to rely on respondeat superior.”).
Gonora also did not include factual allegations of any actions Risch took in the
administration of the orders entered against Gonora, or of any personal knowledge she
had about those specific orders. See A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr.,
372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A] supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983
if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them,
or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’
We may summarily affirm a district court’s decision if an appeal fails to present a
substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).

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4
violations.”). Under these circumstances, his complaint was appropriately dismissed.3
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.4
3 Gonora has not clarified his allegations in any of his other District Court filings or his
filings on appeal to suggest that he could offer additional factual allegations to overcome
these barriers to relief. Under these circumstances, and considering Gonora’s past
litigation history involving similar claims, granting Gonora leave to amend his complaint
would have been futile and dismissal with prejudice was appropriate. See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
4 Gonora’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d
147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993).

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