Benjamin T. Collins v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA On Petition for Review of a Final Order…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 24-1155
_____________
BENJAMIN T. COLLINS,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________
On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
No. A029-749-216
Immigration Judge: Jason L. Pope
____________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on
September 17, 2024
Before: RESTREPO, PHIPPS, McKEE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 13, 2024)
_____________________
OPINION
______________________
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Benjamin T. Collins petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
decision affirming the denial of his application for deferral of removal under the
Convention Against Torture.1 We will deny the petition for review.2
I.
We review the agency’s legal determinations de novo and factual findings for
substantial evidence.3 The deferential substantial evidence standard means that “[t]he
agency’s ‘findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.’”4 While we primarily review the BIA’s opinion,
our review also comprises any portions of the IJ’s opinion that the BIA adopts or
substantially relies upon.5
II.
To succeed on a CAT claim, an applicant must demonstrate a probability of torture
in her home country.6 Collins’s main argument centers on J.P.B., another Liberian
1 The facts of this case are known to the parties and are recounted only to the extent
necessary to explain the disposition of this case.
2 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
3 Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020); Kang v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 163 (3d
Cir. 2010).
4 Nasrallah, 590 U.S. at 584 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
5 See Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that “[o]nly the
decision by the BIA is a final order of removal” subject to federal court review, except
that “where . . . the BIA adopts the findings and reasoning of the IJ, the IJ’s opinion
forms the substance of the final order” and is reviewable) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted).
6 Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017).

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national seeking CAT relief. According to Collins, J.P.B. may face retribution for having
“provided information to the United States government about [former Liberian President
George] Weah’s involvement in a drug trafficking conspiracy.”7 Collins asserts that the
same forces would also cause Collins to be targeted because he is J.P.B.’s relative.
The record undercuts this theory. As the BIA explained, Collins’s mother and
cousins, who also are relatives of J.P.B., returned to Liberia from the United States and
did not face torture. Collins’s mother in particular was raised by J.P.B.’s parents and
calls J.P.B.’s father her “adopted father.”8 If family ties to J.P.B. were a basis for torture
in Liberia, she presumably would have been a target.
Collins disputes the relevance of these facts, noting that unlike his mother and
cousins, he would be a criminal deportee to Liberia who escaped child conscription. But
Collins fails to explain why being J.P.B.’s relative would subject Collins to torture only
when combined with his status as a criminal deportee who escaped child conscription.
Collins contends that remand to the BIA nonetheless is required due to
developments in J.P.B.’s own immigration proceeding. While the IJ did consider J.P.B.’s
proceeding, the BIA did not. Nor did the BIA adopt the IJ’s reasoning in this respect.
We therefore do not review the IJ’s analysis of this issue.9 In any event, the BIA’s
conclusions are unaffected by J.P.B.’s immigration proceeding. Even if J.P.B. were to
7 Pet’r’s Br. 1.
8 A.R. 1059.
9 See Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 189.

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show that he himself faces torture, this would not undermine the BIA’s conclusion that
the evidence does not show a risk to J.P.B.’s extended family (i.e., Collins).10
III.
Collins points to other potential sources of harm—the fact that he escaped from
child-soldier conscription decades ago; his status as an American criminal deportee—and
contends that the BIA failed to properly consider these sources in the aggregate.
The aggregation principle requires courts to evaluate whether “the cumulative
probability of torture” from multiple independent sources is greater than fifty percent.11
The IJ did conduct a thorough aggregation analysis, explaining that while the record
showed “some risk of harm—but less than a fifty percent chance—from each possible
source of torture,” the aggregated risk from all sources remained less than fifty percent.12
The BIA reiterated this analysis, noting that while Collins disagreed with the conclusion,
he had not identified any flaw in the IJ’s analysis. We agree. Collins’s theories of harm
all rely on “unsupported suppositions.”13
10 The government contends that Collins failed to exhaust this issue by not mentioning
J.P.B.’s immigration proceeding in his brief to the BIA, although the government
acknowledges that such failure would not raise a jurisdictional bar to our review. See
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 416 (2023). Because the merits of J.P.B.’s
CAT claim have no impact on the BIA’s disposition of Collins’s claim, we need not
resolve whether Collins adequately raised this argument before the BIA.
11 Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 214 (3d Cir. 2005).
12 A.R. 43.
13 A.R. 3. These suppositions include that “his alleged persecutors would now be
motivated to seek to harm him when they have not searched or threatened him since

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IV.
Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Collins does
not establish a likelihood of future torture, his CAT claim fails. We therefore need not
reach the issue of acquiescence.14
For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
1990”; that “his alleged persecutors would individually or collectively identify him as
their target,” where Collins points to no evidence that he would be identifiable as the
individual who escaped child-soldier conscription in 1990; that “President Weah knows
or would find out about [Collins’s] familial relationship with [J.P.B.]” and target him;
and that any mistreatment Collins could face from any of his identified sources of harm
would rise to the level of torture. A.R. 44. Collins does not show that any of the
potential sources of harm subject him to a likelihood of torture at all. It follows that
Collins has not shown that these risk factors, in aggregate, suggest that it is more likely
than not that he would face torture.
14 INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25–26 (1976) (holding no requirement “to arrive at
purely advisory findings and conclusions as to statutory eligibility” for immigration relief
when application fails for other reasons); Rehman v. Att’y Gen., 757 F. App’x 180, 187
(3d Cir. 2018) (declining to review issue of acquiescence because petitioner “has not met
his initial burden” of showing a likelihood of torture).

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