Lynn A. Padgett v. JAMES PETTI, Commander Bradford County Pennsylvania State Police Barracks

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 24-1332
__________
LYNN A. PADGETT,
Appellant
v.
JAMES PETTI, Commander Bradford County Pennsylvania State Police Barracks;
ROBERT B. MCGUINESS, Former Bradford County District Attorney &
Prothonotary/Clerk of Courts; DANIEL J. BARRETT, Bradford County District
Attorney & Prothonotary/Clerk of Courts; JEFFREY A. SMITH, Senior Judge – Court of
Common Pleas of Bradford County
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-01764)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 2, 2024
Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed November 18, 2025)
___________
OPINION*
___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM
Pennsylvania state prisoner Lynn Padgett appeals pro se from the District Court’s
decision dismissing his civil-rights complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm that judgment.
I.
In 1997, Pennsylvania state trooper James Petti arrested Padgett for sex offenses
that Padgett had committed in his Bradford County home against multiple minors.
Padgett confessed that same day, and he later pleaded guilty in the Bradford County
Court of Common Pleas (“the BCCCP”) to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. See
Case No. CP-08-CR-0000768-1997. The day after Padgett confessed, Petti received a
report that Padgett had sexually abused another minor, who lived in neighboring
Lycoming County. Padgett was later charged in the BCCCP with several counts
stemming from his abuse of the Lycoming County victim. See Case No. CP-08-CR-
0000888-1997 [hereinafter Case II]. Ultimately, Padgett pleaded guilty in Case II to one
of those counts — rape. Between the two BCCCP cases, Padgett received an aggregate
prison sentence of 15 to 30 years. His efforts to attack his convictions and sentence have
been unsuccessful.
In 2011, Padgett filed a pro se civil-rights complaint in the District Court against
Petti, the Bradford County District Attorney’s Office, former Bradford County District
Attorney Robert McGuinness1 (who was the District Attorney when Padgett was charged
1 The case caption for this appeal, which mirrors the District Court’s case caption, spells
this defendant’s name “McGuiness.” However, we use the spelling used by this

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in Case II), and the defense attorney who had represented Padgett in Case II. See M.D.
Pa. Civ. No. 4:11-cv-00434, at Dkt. No. 1. That complaint included claims related to the
investigation in, and litigation of, Case II. In May 2011, the District Court dismissed that
complaint with prejudice pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Padgett did not appeal from that judgment.
In 2023, Padgett filed another pro se civil-rights complaint in the District Court,
once again raising various claims related to Case II,2 and seeking injunctive relief and
damages. This time, Padgett named the following defendants: Petti, McGuinness, Daniel
Barrett (who became the Bradford County District Attorney sometime after
McGuinness), and the judge who sentenced Padgett in Case II (Judge Jeffrey A. Smith).
A United States Magistrate Judge issued a report recommending that the District
Court dismiss Padgett’s 2023 complaint with prejudice pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Magistrate Judge
explained that the complaint failed because, inter alia, the claims against Petti,
McGuinness, and Barrett were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and the claims
against Judge Smith were barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. The Magistrate
Judge also explained that amendment of the complaint would be futile. On January 23,
defendant in his brief.
2 Although Padgett’s 2023 complaint is not a model of clarity, it is evident that this
pleading indeed relates to Case II. For example, this pleading appears to take issue with
the fact that Case II was litigated in Bradford County instead of Lycoming County, and it
appears to claim that the defendants perpetrated some grand conspiracy against Padgett in
connection with that case. To the extent that Padgett argues that his 2023 complaint is
not related to Case II, this argument is unpersuasive.

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2024, the District Court overruled Padgett’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report,
adopted the report, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. This timely appeal
followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of
the District Court’s January 23, 2024 decision is plenary, see Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th
217, 223 (3d Cir. 2023), and we may affirm that decision on any basis supported by the
record, see Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
We see no reason to disturb the District Court’s decision. For substantially the
reasons set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s report, which the District Court adopted,
Padgett’s claims against Petti and McGuinness are barred by the doctrine of res judicata,3
and Padgett’s claims against Judge Smith are barred by the doctrine of judicial
immunity.4 Furthermore, assuming for the sake of argument that the claims against
3 Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, applies when there is “(1) a final
judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and
(3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.” Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621
F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008)).
This doctrine “bars not only claims that were brought in a previous action, but also claims
that could have been brought.” Id. (quoting In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d at 225). There is
no merit to Padgett’s argument that one or more of his claims against Petti and
McGuinness did not accrue until years after his 2011 case ended.
4 Generally, “[a] judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity
from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.” Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302,
303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Although the doctrine of judicial immunity does not
apply when a judge “has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction,” Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978), Padgett has not established that this exception
applies here. Contrary to his argument, the fact that Case II was tried in Bradford County
instead of Lycoming County does not mean that Judge Smith “acted in the clear absence

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Barrett are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, those claims were still subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim. Although Padgett’s 2023 complaint appears to
claim that Barrett violated Padgett’s rights by joining the other defendants’ conspiracy
plot against Padgett and not putting a stop to that conspiracy, Padgett has failed to allege
any plausible, non-conclusory facts to support those claims,5 and we cannot conclude that
the District Court erred in concluding that amendment of his complaint would be futile.
See LaSpina v. SEIU Pa. State Council, 985 F.3d 278, 291 (3d Cir. 2021) (explaining that
“leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
We have considered the various arguments contained in Padgett’s briefing and
conclude that none has merit. Accordingly, and in view of the above, we will affirm the
District Court’s decision to dismiss Padgett’s complaint with prejudice.6 Padgett’s
of all jurisdiction.” See Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066, 1074 (Pa. 2003)
(“[A]ll courts of common pleas have statewide subject matter jurisdiction in cases arising
under the Crimes Code.”). Furthermore, although “absolute judicial immunity extends
only to claims for damages,” Larsen v. Senate of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 1998),
injunctive relief is not available in this context “unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Padgett has not shown that this
exception to the unavailability of injunctive relief applies to his case.
5 To survive dismissal, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face” by alleging facts that “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citation to quoted case
omitted). A pleading that merely “tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual
enhancement” is insufficient. Id. at 678 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
6 We need not address the alternative bases for dismissal that were included in the
Magistrate Judge’s report and adopted by the District Court.

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“Request for Judicial Notice” contained in his opening brief is denied.7 To the extent that
he seeks any other relief from us, that relief is denied, too.
7 As some of the appellees note in their response brief, “the items sought by [Padgett] to
be judicially noticed include a legal conclusion, two statements apparently delineating the
scope of [his] claims, and a disputable claim regarding [his] discovery of the evidence
allegedly supporting his action.” 3d Cir. Dkt. No. 22, at 15. None of those items
warrants our taking judicial notice. See generally Werner v. Werner, 267 F.3d 288, 295
(3d Cir. 2001) (“A court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact if that fact is not
subject to reasonable dispute.”).

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