Stephanie Murrin v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE On Appeal from the United States Tax Court U.S.…

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________________
No. 24-2037
_________________
STEPHANIE MURRIN,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
_________________
On Appeal from the United States Tax Court
U.S. Tax Court No. 19-14614
Tax Court Judge: Patrick J. Urda
_________________
Argued: April 30, 2025
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES,
Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 17, 2025)
Michael A. Guariglia
McCarter & English
2 Tower Center Boulevard
24th Floor
East Brunswick, NJ 08816
Lawrence A. Sannicandro, Jr. [ARGUED]
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw & Pittman
31 W 52nd Street
New York, NY 10036
Counsel for Appellant Stephanie Murrin
Bryan Camp
Texas Tech University School of Law

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2
3311 18th Street
Mail Stop 0004
Lubbock, TX 79416
Amicus Bryan Camp in Support of Appellant
Caroline D. Ciraolo
Michael Waalkes
Kostelanetz
601 New Jersey Avenue NW
Suite 260
Washington, DC 20001
Counsel for Amicus American College of Tax Counsel
in Support of Appellant
Jacob E. Christensen [ARGUED]
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division, Appellate
Room 7525
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530
Anthony T. Sheehan
United States Department of Justice
Tax Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
P.O. Box 502
Washington, DC 20044
Counsel for Appellee Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
_________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge.
Typically, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) must
assess tax within three years from the date an individual

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taxpayer files her return. I.R.C. § 6501(a).1 An exception to
this statute of limitations exists, however. When there is “a
false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax,” the IRS
can assess tax “at any time.” Id. § 6501(c)(1). But whose
“intent” is required for this exception to the statute of
limitations to apply? That is the subject of this appeal.
Appellant Stephanie Murrin argues that only the taxpayer’s
intent matters. That is, the exception applies only if the
taxpayer herself intends to evade tax. And because Murrin’s
tax preparer prepared her taxes with an intent to evade tax
while she did not, the exception to the statute of limitations
does not apply. We understand Murrin’s frustration with the
IRS’s decision to assess tax beyond the statute of limitations
due to the wrongdoing of someone other than her. But we are
bound by the statute. And because the statute is agnostic about
who must intend to evade tax, we hold that taxpayer intent is
not required. Thus, we will affirm the judgment of the Tax
Court.
I. BACKGROUND
The material facts in this appeal are undisputed. Murrin
underpaid her taxes from 1993 to 1999 because her tax
preparer, Duane Howell, placed false or fraudulent entries on
Murrin’s tax returns with an intent to evade tax. But Murrin
did not cause the false or fraudulent entries, and she did not
intend to evade tax.
Over 20 years later, in 2019, the IRS issued a notice of
deficiency to Murrin regarding underpayments on her tax
returns between 1993 and 1999. Id. § 6212(a). Murrin filed a
petition in the Tax Court for a redetermination of the
deficiency. Id. § 6213(a). Murrin agreed with the IRS that she
underpaid $65,318 in tax, and she did not dispute the
application of an accuracy-related penalty of $13,064 for the
underpayment. Instead, Murrin argued that the IRS did not act
within the three-year statute of limitations. The Tax Court held
that § 6501(c)(1) applies because Howell prepared Murrin’s
false or fraudulent tax returns with an intent to evade tax, and
1 The “Code” refers to the Internal Revenue Code. See 26
U.S.C. § 1 et seq.

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thus the statute of limitations under § 6501(a) did not bar the
IRS’s notice of deficiency. Murrin appealed.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Tax Court had jurisdiction under I.R.C. §§ 6213(a)
and 7442. We have jurisdiction under I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1). We
exercise de novo review over the Tax Court’s interpretation of
the Code. Sunoco Inc. v. Comm’r, 663 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2011).
III. DISCUSSION
This appeal turns on our interpretation of § 6501.
Section 6501(a) states that “any tax imposed by [the Code]
shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed”—
that is, three years from the filing of “the return required to be
filed by the taxpayer.” Subsection (c) then includes twelve
exceptions to the three-year statute of limitations, one of which
is relevant here. Section 6501(c)(1) provides, in full, that “[i]n
the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade
tax, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for
collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any
time.”2 To determine whether taxpayer intent is necessary to
trigger the indefinite limitations period in § 6501(c)(1), we
2 Section 6501(c)(1) keys the statute of limitations to
“assessment.” A tax assessment is simply “what the taxpayer
is required to pay the Government.” Soni v. Comm’r, 76 F.4th
49, 54 n.1 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Chai v. Comm’r, 851 F.3d
190, 218 (2d Cir. 2017)). In other words, assessment operates
as a judgment against the taxpayer. United States v.
Farnsworth, 456 F.3d 394, 396 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006). But before
assessment, the IRS must first issue a notice of deficiency to
the taxpayer that tells the taxpayer what the IRS believes is
owed. I.R.C. §§ 6212(a), 6213(a). Once a taxpayer, like
Murrin, receives a notice of deficiency, she can challenge the
IRS’s position in the Tax Court. Id. § 6213(a). Only when the
taxpayer does not petition the Tax Court for a redetermination,
or when the taxpayer does so and the Tax Court’s judgment
becomes final, may the IRS issue a tax assessment. Id. In the
meantime, the IRS’s mailing of a notice of deficiency tolls the
statute of limitations. Id. § 6503(a).

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examine (1) the text of § 6501(c)(1), (2) the statutory context
of § 6501(c)(1), and (3) relevant precedent. All three reveal
that § 6501(c)(1) is not limited to a taxpayer’s intent. We
address each in turn.
A. Section 6501(c)(1)’s Plain Text Applies to
More Than Taxpayers
“Our analysis begins with the statutory text.”
Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161,
168 (2014) (citing Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376
(2013)). “We give the words of a statute their ‘ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning,’ absent an indication
Congress intended them to bear some different import.”
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000) (quoting Walters
v. Metro. Ed. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997)). “The
ordinary or natural meaning may be determined by looking to
dictionary definitions while keeping in mind the whole
statutory text, the purpose, and context of the statute, and
relevant precedent.” United States v. Brow, 62 F.4th 114, 120
(3d Cir. 2023).3 “We also are mindful that ‘[t]here is no canon
against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean.’” United States v. Lucidonio, 137 F.4th
177, 183 (3d Cir. 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting Koons
Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 63 (2004)).
Again, the question before us is whether the “intent to
evade tax” exception in § 6501(c)(1) requires taxpayer intent.
We conclude that it does not. Absent from § 6501(c)(1) is any
express or implied textual indication that the “intent to evade
tax” is cabined to the taxpayer. The structure of the statute
focuses on the presence of “a false or fraudulent return with the
intent to evade tax.” I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1). That is, an “intent to
3 “[O]ur job is to interpret the words consistent with their
‘ordinary meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the
statute.’” Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274, 277
(2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Perrin v. United States,
444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). Because § 6501(c)(1) dates to 1918,
we discuss definitions contemporaneous to that period. See
infra III.B. (discussing § 6501(c)(1)’s origin in the Revenue
Act of 1918).

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evade tax” must attach to the “false or fraudulent return.”4 But
neither requirement facially includes any indication that the
taxpayer must be the actor who intends to evade tax.
First, the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase
“intent to evade tax” reveals no taxpayer-only limitation.
Neither “intent” nor “to evade” cabin the phrase “intent to
evade tax” to a taxpayer because nothing about either term is
restricted to certain individuals.5 The only constituent part of
“intent to evade tax” that does bear a connection to taxpayers
is the term “tax.” That is because “tax[es]” are “portions of the
property of the citizen, demanded and received by the
government, to be disposed of to enable it to discharge its
functions.” Tax, Black’s Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1910); see
Tax, Webster’s Home, School, and Office Dictionary (1916)
(“[A] rate or duty on income or property[.]”). As a result, taxes
4 Section 6501(c)(1)’s two requirements are joined by “with,”
establishing that “the intent to evade tax” must join the “false
or fraudulent return.” See, e.g., With, Concise Oxford
Dictionary of Current English (7th ed. 1919) (explaining that
“with” is a preposition meaning, among other things, “having,
carrying, possessed of, characterized by”); see also With,
Webster’s Home, School, and Office Dictionary (1916)
(“[D]enoting nearness or connection.”).
5 “Intent” refers to a “[p]urpose; formulated design; a resolve
to do or forbear a particular act; aim; determination.” Intent,
Black’s Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1910). Said otherwise,
“intent” is “the exercise of intelligent will, the mind being fully
aware of the nature and consequences of the act which is about
to be done, and with such knowledge, and with full liberty of
action, willing and electing to do it.” Id. Accord Intent,
Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (7th ed. 1919)
(“Intention, purpose, esp. with [intent] to defraud [et]c.”
(cleaned up)); Intent, Webster’s Home, School, and Office
Dictionary (1916) (explaining that, when used as a noun,
“intent” means “purpose; aim”). Evade means to “escape” or
“avoid.” Evade, Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current
English (7th ed. 1919); Evade, Webster’s Home, School, and
Office Dictionary (1916); cf. Evasion, Black’s Law Dictionary
(2d ed. 1910) (“A subtle endeavoring to set aside truth or to
escape the punishment of the law.”).

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refer to duties necessarily owed by an individual or entity. See
Tax, Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (7th ed.
1919) (“Contribution levied on persons, property, or business,
for support of government[.]”). But reading the whole phrase
together, an “intent to evade tax” means that someone planned
to avoid duties owed by an individual or entity to the
Government. So, while an “intent to evade” does concern the
taxes a taxpayer owes, the plain meaning of the words does not
imply a specific actor.
Second, Congress’s decision to use passive voice in
§ 6501(c)(1) further evinces that the statute does not depend on
a taxpayer’s intent. Congress drafted § 6501(c)(1) by focusing
“on an event that occurs without respect to a specific actor, and
therefore without respect to any [specific] actor’s intent or
culpability.” Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009).
And by wording it this way, without listing who must intend to
evade tax, “Congress was agnostic about who” did so.
Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U.S. 69, 76 (2023) (cleaned up)
(quoting Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 81 (2007)).6
Murrin responds with a few textual arguments. We
begin with the strongest—that because the tax evaded is that
owed by the taxpayer, the plainest reading of “intent to evade
tax” must refer to a taxpayer’s conduct. Any other reading,
Murrin stresses, would unnaturally interpret the statute
contrary to any commonsense interpretation of it. Cf. United
States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012)
(explaining that “we should ‘presume[] that the legislature
intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid
[absurd]’ results” (alterations in original) (quoting Gov’t of the
V.I. v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1979))). This is
because the “plainest reading of section 6501(c)(1) is that the
statute refers to the intent of the person with the legal duty to
file the tax return and pay the tax: the taxpayer.” Opening Br.
24.
6 “It is true, of course, that context can confine a passive-voice
sentence to a likely set of actors.” Bartenwerfer, 598 U.S. at
76. But as we explain below, context here confirms that
Congress’s use of passive voice in § 6501(c)(1) was
purposeful. See infra.

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Murrin’s argument is a fair one. And it certainly is true
that § 6501(c)(1) applies when a taxpayer intends to evade tax.
That much is beyond debate. But the plainest and most
straightforward reading of § 6501(c)(1) is that it simply
requires an “intent to evade tax” attached to a “false or
fraudulent return,” and whether a taxpayer, accountant, lawyer,
or tax preparer evinced such intent is beside the point. And
while Murrin contends such a view is nonsensical, the Code
establishes that Congress knows how to limit statutes to
taxpayers when it intends to do so. See infra III.B. (detailing
why §§ 6161(b)(3), 6663(c), 6664(c)(1), and 7454(a) establish
this conclusion). That only strengthens our bottom-line view
that were § 6501(c)(1) limited to a taxpayer’s intent, we would
expect to see evidence of that in the statute.
Next, Murrin contends that because § 6501(a) explains
that the “return” at issue is the taxpayer’s, “the fraudulent
intent referenced in section 6501(c)(1) is by implication
limited to fraud by the taxpayer.” Opening Br. 23–24. Not so.
As the Tax Court explained, “[t]he specification of whose tax
or return is at issue does not suggest, much less dictate, who
had to intend to evade tax.” App. 10. Moreover, Congress
expressly used the term “taxpayer” in § 6501(a) to define what
return is at issue but declined to use the same qualifier in
§ 6501(c)(1). And “[w]hen Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it from a
neighbor, we normally understand that difference in language
to convey a difference in meaning.” Bittner v. United States,
598 U.S. 85, 94 (2023).
Murrin also argues that the Tax Court’s interpretation
focuses only on the “false or fraudulent return” and thus
renders “intent to evade tax” superfluous. We recognize that
we must “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of
a statute,” but our interpretation of § 6501(c)(1) renders
nothing superfluous in this statute. Montclair Twp. v.
Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883); see also Arlington Cent.
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 299 n.1 (2006)
(“[I]t is generally presumed that statutory language is not
superfluous.”). As the Tax Court correctly explained, “[t]he
obvious construction of the statutory text is that the intent to
evade tax must be present in a false or fraudulent return,
irrespective of who possesses that intent.” App. 10 (quoting

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BASR P’ship v. United States, 795 F.3d 1338, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Prost, C.J., dissenting)). But that construction of
§ 6501(c)(1) still requires an act (a “false or fraudulent return”)
and a mental state (“with the intent to evade tax”). As a result,
we fail to see why our interpretation of § 6501(c)(1) somehow
excises “the intent to evade tax” from the statute.7
B. Section 6501(c)(1)’s Statutory Context Shows
That Congress Knows How to Limit Statutes
to Taxpayers but Did Not Do So Here
We turn next to the statutory context of § 6501(c)(1).
“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the
words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view
to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” West Virginia
v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022) (quoting Davis v. Mich.
Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)); see also Davis,
489 U.S. at 809 (“[S]tatutory language cannot be construed in
a vacuum.”). And the statutory context shows that Congress
knows how to limit statutes to taxpayer conduct when it wants
to do so. For example, § 6663(a) authorizes the IRS to impose
a fraud penalty when “any part of any underpayment of tax
required to be shown on a return is due to fraud.”
I.R.C. § 6663(a). But the fraud penalty does not apply when
“the taxpayer acted in good faith” and had “reasonable cause.”
Id. § 6664(c)(1). Nor does it apply for a joint return filed by a
7 We pause to mention Murrin’s remaining argument that is
adjacent to § 6501(c)(1)’s text—that our interpretation is
unworkable. By not limiting § 6501(c)(1) to a taxpayer’s
intent, Murrin argues that we would offend basic due process
and fairness principles by not defining whose intent might
matter. We need not determine the outer bounds of how an
“intent to evade tax” applies in every context, however,
because Murrin stipulated that her tax preparer intended to
evade her taxes. But to the extent that Murrin suggests that
courts are simply unable to address whether other third parties’
intent to evade tax can trigger § 6501(c)(1), the Tax Court has
proven capable of doing so. See, e.g., Browning v. Comm’r,
102 T.C.M. (CCH) 460, at *13–16 (2011) (conducting a
detailed factual finding separately as to a taxpayer and his
accountant for purposes of whether § 6501(c)(1) applied to the
taxpayer).

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married couple “unless some part of the underpayment is due
to the fraud of such spouse.” Id. § 6663(c). And “[i]n any
proceeding involving the issue whether the petitioner [that is,
the taxpayer] has been guilty of fraud with intent to evade tax,”
Congress required the IRS to carry the burden of proof on that
issue. Id. § 7454(a).
A few important lessons flow from the Code’s fraud
provisions in §§ 6663, 6664, and 7454. The first is that the
fraud penalty in § 6663(a) simply says it applies when an
underpayment is “due to fraud,” but Congress’s express
reference to a taxpayer’s conduct three times in §§ 6663(c),
6664(c)(1), and 7454(a) make clear that the “fraud” in
§ 6663(a) refers to that of a taxpayer and not a third party’s
fraud. Missing from the “intent to evade tax” in § 6501(c)(1)
is any such contextual limitation, confirming that “intend to
evade tax” includes no implied limitation. The second is that
§§ 6663(c), 6664(c)(1), and 7454(a) demonstrate Congress’s
knowledge about how to limit statutes to taxpayers.8 As a
result, we find it difficult to believe that despite Congress
limiting provisions elsewhere by reference to a taxpayer’s
conduct or allegations directed against the taxpayer, Congress
included a limitation within “a false or fraudulent return with
the intent to evade tax” despite not saying so. Id. § 6501(c)(1).
Murrin disagrees with our view of the Code for two
reasons, but neither persuades. First, Murrin contends that the
fraud penalty under § 6663(a) cuts against our interpretation.
Because “due to fraud” in § 6663(a) and “intent to evade tax”
in § 6501(c)(1) both are written in the passive voice, Murrin
suggests that § 6663(a)’s limitation to a taxpayer’s conduct
must carry over to § 6501(c)(1). As support, Murrin explains
that both provisions date to the Revenue Act of 1918, and in
that Act the phrase “intent to evade tax” described both the
fraud penalty and statute-of-limitations exception. See
Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, §§ 250(b), 40 Stat.
1057, 1083 (applying fraud penalty when an “understatement
is false or fraudulent with intent to evade the tax”); id. § 250(d),
8 Congress likewise knows how to limit statutes to third parties
like tax preparers. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6694(a) (penalizing tax
preparers for, among other things, taking unreasonable tax
positions).

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40 Stat. at 1083 (applying exception to statute of limitations
“in the case of false or fraudulent returns with intent to evade
the tax”).
Murrin’s argument implicates the statutory canon of
construction of in pari materia—the axiom that “a legislative
body generally uses a particular word with a consistent
meaning in a given context.” Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409
U.S. 239, 243 (1972). But identical words “may be variously
construed, not only when they occur in different statutes, but
when used more than once in the same statute or even in the
same section.” Env’t Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561,
574 (2007) (quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United
States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)). “Thus, the ‘natural
presumption that identical words used in different parts of the
same act are intended to have the same meaning’” is not
inexorable, and it “readily yields whenever there is such
variation in the connection in which the words are used as
reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed
in different parts of the act with different intent.’” Id. (quoting
Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 286 U.S. at 433).
Looking past the fact that the modern-day fraud penalty
differs in text from the historical analogue, Murrin points to the
Revenue Act of 1918, which includes the same contextual
limitations present in the Code today. Section 250(b), housing
the fraud penalty now codified as § 6663(a), included various
limitations that referenced taxpayers, their actions, and intent,
but § 250(d), housing the statute-of-limitations exception now
codified as § 6501(c)(1), did not. See Revenue Act of 1918,
Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 250(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1083 (exempting
application of fraud penalty “if the return is made in good faith
and the understatement of the amount in the return is not due
to any fault of the taxpayer” or imposing a smaller penalty for
understatements “due to negligence on the part of the taxpayer,
but without intent to defraud”). Thus, Murrin’s emphasis on
history only proves the same point reached by reference to the
Code. Congress has never limited the scope of the statute-of-
limitations exception despite doing so in the fraud penalty.9
9 Murrin makes the same argument related to § 7454(a), which
shifts the burden of proof to the IRS when it alleges “the
petitioner [that is, the taxpayer] has been guilty of fraud with

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Second, Murrin points to another provision,
§ 6161(b)(3), as support for why our interpretation is
incongruous with the Code. That provision disallows
extensions of time for payments of tax when a “deficiency is
due to negligence, to intentional disregard of rules and
regulations, or to fraud with intent to evade tax.” I.R.C.
§ 6161(b)(3). Section 6161(b)(3) is drafted like § 6501(c)(1),
meaning nothing in § 6161(b)(3) suggests any limitation to its
application when a third party intends to evade tax. Murrin
argues that it is absurd to think that Congress would allow a
third party to impact a taxpayer’s ability to seek an extension
of time, further establishing the unreasonableness of our
interpretation of § 6501(c)(1).
We disagree with Murrin. Section 6161(b)(3)
establishes yet another piece of evidence supporting our
interpretation of § 6501(c)(1) and the Code. Sections
6161(b)(3) and 6501(c)(1) deal with the IRS’s receipt of
accurate payments of tax, and their provisions are not limited
to a taxpayer’s intent. Sections 6663(c), 6664(c)(1), and
7454(a) deal with the imposition of fraud penalties on top of
what taxes might be owed, and those provisions are limited to
a taxpayer’s intent. Read together, Congress treats the
payments of tax and the imposition of penalties differently.
And it makes sense that Congress would “impose penalties on
the taxpayer only when the taxpayer intended to evade the tax,
while at the same time allowing the IRS to collect taxes based
on an understated fraudulent return at any time.” BASR, 795
F.3d at 1360 (Prost, C.J., dissenting); see also Asphalt Indus.,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 384 F.2d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 1967) (explaining
that the fraud penalty under § 6663(a) not only gathers revenue
but also operates as a “civil sanction” that “bears a close
resemblance to criminal liability”).
intent to evade tax.” Murrin suggests any case involving an
intent to evade tax relates to a taxpayer. But § 7454(a) is yet
another example of how Congress meant what it said and said
what it meant; were § 6501(c)(1) limited to a taxpayer’s intent
to evade tax, it could have drafted it precisely like § 7454(a) by
specifying to whom the statute applies.

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C. Precedent Likewise Supports Our View
Finally, we examine the relevant precedent. The
Supreme Court’s recent analysis of Congress’s use of passive
voice also confirms our reading of § 6501(c)(1). In
Bartenwerfer, the Supreme Court analyzed a provision of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), specifying that
debt is not dischargeable when money is “obtained by . . .
fraud.” 598 U.S. at 74. Because Bartenwerfer did not know
about the fraud committed by her partner, she argued that the
judgment was dischargeable in bankruptcy. Id. at 75.
Bartenwerfer reasoned that “the statute is most naturally read
to bar the discharge of debts for money obtained by the
debtor’s fraud,” as the passive voice of the statute “hides the
relevant actor in plain sight.” Id. The Supreme Court
unanimously disagreed because the statute’s “[p]assive voice
pull[ed] the actor off the stage,” meaning that all the
Bankruptcy Code required was that “debt must result from
someone’s fraud.” Id. at 75–76.
Section 6501(c)(1)’s “intent to evade tax” language is
like the “obtained by fraud” language at issue in Bartenwerfer.
Neither identifies who must intend to evade tax or who must
obtain property by fraud. But like the language in
Bartenwerfer, § 6501(c)(1) focuses on an event without regard
to an actor—that is, Congress focused on a “false or fraudulent
return with the intent to evade tax” without saying who must
act. By pulling the taxpayer off the stage, Congress made its
reasoning clear. The statute of limitations does not apply when
someone intends to evade tax in the filing of a false or
fraudulent return, taxpayer or not.10
10 The Supreme Court also discussed common law fraud
because while Bartenwerfer “paint[ed] a picture of liability
imposed willy-nilly on hapless bystanders,” common law fraud
principles establish that “innocent people are sometimes held
liable for fraud they did not personally commit.”
Bartenwerfer, 598 U.S. at 82–83. Murrin argues this fact
makes Bartenwerfer inapposite because “tax-return preparers
are not agents” and, thus, common law fraud’s application to
this case would differ. Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1017
(D.C. Cir. 2014). But even were that true, Bartenwerfer’s more
general view that a passive-voice phrase, “on its face,” “pulls

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Bartenwerfer’s analysis about the use of passive voice
in statutes also aligns with the Supreme Court’s last opinion
interpreting § 6501(c)(1). See Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S.
386 (1984). Badaracco concerned a dispute about whether the
statute of limitations is suspended under § 6501(c)(1) if an
amended non-fraudulent tax return is filed to correct a
previously filed fraudulent one. Id. at 388. Because
§ 6501(c)(1) allows a tax assessment “at any time,” the
Supreme Court held that nothing in the statute’s “unqualified
language” could “be construed to suspend its operation in the
light of a fraudulent filer’s subsequent repentant conduct.” Id.
at 393. And the Supreme Court explained that a statute of
limitations like § 6501(c)(1) “must receive a strict construction
in favor of the Government.” Id. at 391 (quoting E.I. Dupont
de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924)).11 The
taxpayers’ position in Badaracco was similar to Murrin’s, who
advocates for a position unsupported by the statute’s generally
applicable language—language that we must read in the IRS’s
favor. Thus, we see nothing in the text of § 6501(c)(1) or in
case law from the Supreme Court supporting Murrin’s
preferred interpretation; instead, we see case law supporting
the opposite conclusion.
Moving past Badaracco and Bartenwerfer, Murrin
responds that we are bound to adopt her interpretation because
of this Court’s holding in Asphalt Industries, 384 F.2d at 229.
But Murrin misreads Asphalt. The president of Asphalt
embezzled money and thus caused the corporation to file false
or fraudulent tax returns. Id. at 231. We held that the
the actor off the stage” would remain. 598 U.S. at 75. So too
would our view of § 6501(c)(1).
11 Murrin suggests that this Court does not construe statutes of
limitations in the IRS’s favor when the taxpayer does not act
fraudulently. Opening Br. 46 (citing Lauckner v. United
States, 68 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 1995)). We said no such thing in
Lauckner, and the next year interpreted § 6501 with reference
to the Supreme Court’s direction in Badaracco to strictly
construe it in a light favorable to the IRS. Bachner v. Comm’r,
81 F.3d 1274, 1279 (3d Cir. 1996). And regardless, strict
construction or not, Murrin’s argument runs counter to
§ 6501(c)(1)’s text and context.

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president’s embezzlement was not imputed to the corporation
for purposes of § 6501(c)(1) in part because the tax fraud was
simply a “subordinate element in [the president’s] need to
conceal his embezzlement.” Id. at 235. We did not consider
whether a party other than the taxpayer could independently
satisfy § 6501(c)(1). And no one argued that the president’s
embezzlement constituted an intent to evade tax owed by
Asphalt. Instead, we assumed “for present purposes” that “the
meaning of fraud” is the same under both § 6501(c)(1) and
§ 6663(a) and held that the record was insufficient for
§ 6501(c)(1) to apply. Id. at 232. Thus, Asphalt does not
answer the interpretive question before the Court today.
Murrin argues that affirming the Tax Court would
“reject[] 100 years of tax jurisprudence,” but that is not so.
Opening Br. 2. As Murrin explains, it appears that the IRS first
opined that § 6501(c)(1) applies in situations other than where
a taxpayer intended to evade tax in 2001. IRS Field Service
Advisory 200126019, 2001 WL 729653 (issued June 29,
2001). The Tax Court then held that § 6501(c)(1) applied in
situations beyond when a taxpayer intends to evade tax. See
Allen v. Comm’r, 128 T.C. 37 (2007) (applying § 6501(c)(1)
because of a tax preparer’s intent to evade tax). Following
Allen, the Tax Court has applied § 6501(c)(1) in the context of
a non-taxpayer’s intent on several occasions, including on
returns prepared by the same tax preparer Murrin used. See
Finnegan v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2016-118, at *7–9 (2016)
(finding Howell’s intent to evade tax rendered § 6501(c)(1)
applicable); see also Ames-Mechelke v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M.
(CCH) 77, at *7 (2013) (finding § 6501(c)(1) applied because
of a tax preparer). Our holding today therefore does not reject
a century’s worth of tax jurisprudence; instead, we continue the
well-trod ground laid by the Tax Court.
We do acknowledge, however, that our holding today
departs from the Federal Circuit’s opinion that the IRS is
limited “to the three-year limitations period unless the taxpayer
possessed the intent to evade tax.” BASR, 795 F.3d at 1350
(majority opinion).12 The Federal Circuit, in a decision
12 Murrin contends that the Fifth Circuit in Payne v. Comm’r,
224 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2000), came to the same view as the
Federal Circuit. The Fifth Circuit, in an appeal about whether

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predating Bartenwerfer, reached this conclusion because it
found the statute’s text revealed little and instead relied heavily
on context, congressional intent, and legislative history. See,
e.g., id. at 1343–45. Because we find that § 6501(c)(1)’s text
and statutory context include no requirement that an “intent to
evade tax” must come from a taxpayer, we respectfully part
ways. Accord id. at 1358 (Prost, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he
obvious construction of the statutory text is that the intent to
evade tax must be present in a false or fraudulent return,
irrespective of who possesses that intent.”).
* * * * *
Murrin faces financial pain. According to the notice of
deficiency, Murrin owes $65,318 in underpayments of tax and
$13,064 in accuracy-related penalties. And applying the
normal rate of interest to these deficiencies, she may be
charged with owing an estimated $250,000 in interest.13 All
the Tax Court properly found that a taxpayer intended to evade
tax under § 6501(c)(1), described how the IRS had to show
evidence “from which fraudulent intent on the part of the
taxpayer can be properly inferred.” Id. at 421 (emphasis
omitted). The Fifth Circuit described the case in those terms
because the actor at issue was the taxpayer. But nowhere did
that court discern the meaning and scope of § 6501(c)(1) for a
third party’s actions.
The only other Circuit that confronted this issue aligns with our
view. City Wide Transit, Inc. v. Comm’r, 709 F.3d 102 (2d Cir.
2013). The Second Circuit, citing the Tax Court’s post-Allen
precedent, stated: “we conclude that the limitations period for
assessing [the taxpayer’s] taxes is extended if the taxes were
understated due to fraud of the preparer.” Id. at 107. But the
Second Circuit then explained how the issue before it was a
“narrow” one because the taxpayer conceded that if the tax
preparer filed taxes with an intent to evade, § 6501(c)(1)
applied. As a result, while City Wide Transit appears to bolster
our view, we are uncertain whether the Second Circuit’s
statement concerning § 6501(c)(1) is cabined to the taxpayers’
concessions on appeal and, thus, do not rely on it.
13 We emphasize that Murrin’s accuracy-related penalties and
interest on the deficiencies are not before us. Murrin stipulated

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date to tax returns from decades ago. Murrin finds this patently
unfair because her tax preparer caused the underpayments of
tax. We understand her perspective. But we are bound to
“consider . . . whether the policy [Murrin] favor[s] is that which
Congress effectuated by its enactment of § 6501.” Badaracco,
464 U.S. at 398. And while Congress has limited imposing
fraud penalties against a taxpayer without a taxpayer’s intent,
§ 6501(c)(1)’s text, context, and precedent establish that
Congress was agnostic about whether the taxpayer intended to
evade tax for purposes of the IRS’s full and accurate
assessment of taxes.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the
judgment of the Tax Court.
to the IRS’s proper determination of the accuracy-related
penalties. Because the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to
adjudicate issues relating to interest imposed on
underpayments by § 6601(a), so do we. See Comm’r v.
McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 6–7 (1987); Sunoco Inc. v. Comm’r, 663
F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2011). And in the normal course, even
where the statute-of-limitations exception in § 6501(c)(1)
applies, taxpayers are free to challenge accuracy-related
penalties and interest. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (rendering
the accuracy-related penalty and fraud penalty inapplicable
when the taxpayer had a “reasonable cause” for the tax position
and “acted in good faith”). Thus, nothing in this opinion
should be read to foreclose any challenge to the assessment of
interest in a future proceeding.

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