Third Circuit disposition — 24-2159

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 24-2159
In re: Promise Healthcare Group, LLC, et al., Debtors
ROBERT N. MICHAELSON, of Advisory Trust Group,
LLC, solely in his capacity as liquidating trustee and debtor
representative of the Promise Healthcare Group
Liquidating Trust,
Appellant
On Direct Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware
(Bankruptcy Court No.: 18-12491)
District Judge: Honorable Craig T. Goldblatt
_____________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on February 11, 2025
(Filed: March 3, 2025)
Before: RESTREPO, PORTER, and RENDELL, Circuit
Judges.
Matthew Sarna
DLA Piper
1201 N Market Street

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Suite 2100
Wilmington, DE 19801
Boris J. Mankovetskiy
Andrew H. Sherman
Sills Cummis & Gross
The Legal Center
One Riverfront Plaza
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellant
William A. Hazeltine
William D. Sullivan
Sullivan Hazeltine Allinson
919 N Market Street
Suite 420
Wilmington, DE 19801
Robert K. Hill
Seitz Van Ogtrop & Green
222 Delaware Avenue
Suite 1500, P.O. Box 68
Wilmington, DE 19801
Counsel for Appellee
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

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Promise Healthcare Group, LLC and its affiliates
(“Debtors”), the debtors in this appeal, operated various short
and long-term hospital and nursing facilities throughout the
country. Appellant Robert Michaelson (“Trustee”) filed this
direct appeal in his capacity as liquidating trustee and debtor
representative of the Promise Healthcare Group Liquidating
Trust. The Trustee takes issue with the Bankruptcy Court’s
allowance of a medical malpractice claim that Appellee Patrick
Wassmann filed during the Debtors’ Chapter 11 proceedings
based on his treatment at one of Debtors’ facilities between
March 15 and June 9, 2017. The Trustee urges that
Wassmann’s claim should not have been allowed because it is
time barred. That is so, the Trustee reasons, because even
though the claim was timely as of the petition date—November
5, 2018—it became untimely by the time the Trustee objected
to it and it was evaluated. He urges that the latter date, and not
the petition date, is the appropriate reference point for
evaluating a claim’s validity. The Trustee also urges that
Wassmann’s claim is barred because Wassmann failed to file
a timely state court complaint in addition to his Chapter 11
proof of claim.
Judge Goldblatt concluded, in a well-reasoned
memorandum opinion, that the Trustee’s arguments have no
basis in the Bankruptcy Code. We agree, and will therefore
affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s order.
I.
Debtors filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on
November 5, 2018, triggering an automatic stay of all actions
against them. The Bankruptcy Court set a bar date—that is, the
deadline for filing proof of claims—of May 31, 2019.
Wassmann filed a $10 million proof of claim on January 4,

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2019 based on allegedly negligent care he had received in one
of Debtors’ facilities between March 9 and June 15, 2017. The
Court entered an order confirming Debtors’ reorganization
plan on September 17, 2020, and the plan went into effect on
October 1, 2020.1 Wassmann had until November 1, 2020 to
proceed against Debtors in state court.2 He opted not to do so;
he seeks recovery in the Bankruptcy Court alone.
The Trustee filed a motion for summary judgment
asking the Bankruptcy Court to disallow Wassmann’s claim on
1 On June 13, 2019, the automatic stay notwithstanding,
Wassmann filed a complaint in state court. The Trustee and the
Bankruptcy Court agreed that this complaint was void because
it was filed in violation of the automatic stay. See Joint
Appendix (“J.A.”) 21 n.40; see also In re Myers, 491 F.3d 120,
127 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A]ctions taken in violation of the
[automatic] stay are void.”). While Wassmann raised
arguments below that his complaint was not void, as it was not
subject to the automatic stay, all parties now agree that the June
13, 2019 filing was essentially a nonevent for present purposes.
2 The parties agree that Wassmann’s medical malpractice claim
tied to his alleged injuries is subject to a two-year statute of
limitations under applicable Florida law. See Fla. Stat. Ann. §
95.11(4)(c) (2023). The parties also agree that, absent the
automatic stay, the limitations period would have expired
during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. But 11
U.S.C. § 108(c)(2) provides that a non-bankruptcy limitations
period that would have otherwise expired during Chapter 11
proceedings does not expire until 30 days after notice of the
termination or expiration of the automatic stay. Here, in
accordance with the plan, the automatic stay ended on the
plan’s effective date, October 1, 2020. Thus, if Wassmann

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February 17, 2023. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion
on April 20, 2023. The Trustee filed the instant appeal on May
4, 2023.3
In denying the Trustee’s motion, the Bankruptcy Court
reasoned that (1) the claims allowance process set forth under
11 U.S.C. § 502 asks whether a claim was allowable as of the
petition date, and (2) a creditor who has filed a timely proof of
claim need not also file a timely non-bankruptcy complaint to
preserve its claim. Because Wassmann filed a proof of claim
that was not time-barred as of the petition date, the Bankruptcy
Court rejected the Trustee’s contention that Wassmann’s claim
should be barred as untimely.
wished to pursue a state court action, he would have had to do
so before November 1, 2020.
3 One week later, the Trustee filed an objection to the claim in
Bankruptcy Court. On June 9, 2023, Judge Goldblatt issued an
order explaining that, because Wassmann’s claim is a personal
injury claim, 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(O), (b)(5) require it to be
“tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is
pending, or in the district court in the district in which the claim
arose, as determined by the district court in which the
bankruptcy case is pending,” id., unless the parties consent to
having the dispute proceed before the bankruptcy court, J.A.
113–14 (citing In re Trib. Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 394 (3d
Cir. 2018)). The parties responded that they did not consent to
having the dispute proceed before Judge Goldblatt. Thus,
should we affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying the
Trustee’s motion for summary judgment, Wassmann’s claim
will be tried in district court.

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The Trustee then moved for leave to appeal the
Bankruptcy Court’s interlocutory order directly to this Court.
The District Court granted the motion and certified the
Bankruptcy Court’s Order for appeal to this Court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i) and (iii), concluding that the
question of “[w]hether the determination of a claim’s validity
is made as of the petition date” “‘involves a question of law as
to which there is no controlling decision of’ the Third Circuit
or Supreme Court” and “‘may materially advance the progress
of the case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken,’” given
that reversal would “end[] any further litigation of
[Wassmann’s] large and complex personal injury claim.” J.A.
162–63 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i)–(ii)).
We granted Debtors’ petition for leave to appeal and
asked the parties to focus exclusively on (1) whether
“unenforceability” under § 502(b) is to be determined as of the
petition date, or as of the time an objection is lodged; and (2)
whether, to protect his claim, a claimant has an affirmative
obligation to bring a separate tort suit against the debtor before
the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.
II.4
“When a debtor declares bankruptcy, each of its
creditors is entitled to file a proof of claim—i.e., a document
providing proof of a ‘right to payment,’ 11 U.S.C.
4 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1334(b) and 157. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A). We review the Bankruptcy Court’s
legal determinations de novo. In re Trump Ent. Resorts, 810
F.3d 161, 166–67 (3d Cir. 2016).

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§ 101(5)(A)—against the debtor’s estate.” Travelers Cas. &
Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 449
(2007). Section 502(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that
each such claim “is deemed allowed” unless a party in interest
objects. 11 U.S.C § 502(a). If a party in interest objects,
§ 502(b) provides, “the court, after notice and a hearing, shall
determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the
United States as of the date of the filing of the petition, and
shall allow such claim in such amount,” id., unless certain
circumstances are present, including if “such claim is
unenforceable against the debtor . . . under any agreement or
applicable law,” id. § 502(b)(1).
In Travelers, the Supreme Court clarified that
§ 502(b)(1) “is most naturally understood to provide that, with
limited exceptions, any defense to a claim that is available
outside of the bankruptcy context is also available in
bankruptcy.” 549 U.S. at 450. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court
should not have allowed Wassmann’s claim if it was untimely
under Florida’s two-year statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 95.11(4)(c) (2023).
The Trustee urges that Wassmann’s claim should have
been disallowed because at the time the Bankruptcy Court
assessed the claim’s allowance, the statute of limitations had
expired, and Wassmann had not filed a timely complaint in
state court. This argument rests on two propositions: (1)
bankruptcy courts should assess whether a claim is allowed as
of their evaluation date, rather than the date the petition was
filed; and (2) a creditor must file a timely non-bankruptcy
action prior to the expiration of the limitations period to protect
its bankruptcy claim. We conclude that a plain read of the
Bankruptcy Code belies both of the Trustee’s positions. Thus,

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we will affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying the
Trustee’s motion for summary judgment.
A. “Unenforceability” under § 502(b) is determined as
of the petition date.
First, the Trustee urges that the Bankruptcy Court
should have assessed 11 U.S.C § 502(b)(1) “unenforceability”
as of its evaluation date (April 20, 2023), rather than the
petition date (November 5, 2018). Wassmann urges that the
plain text of § 502 suggests that § 502(b) unenforceability
should be determined as of the petition date, as it states that the
court “shall determine the amount of such claim . . . as of the
date of the filing of the petition” and “shall allow such claim .
. . except to the extent that . . . such claim is unenforceable.”
11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (emphasis added). The Trustee urges that a
better reading of the statute is that courts are to assess the
amount of claims as of the petition date, and the validity of
claims as of the evaluation date. These differing interpretations
are consequential because it is clear from the record that
Wassmann’s claim was timely as of the petition date and
untimely as of the evaluation date. Neither the Supreme Court
nor this Court has spoken to whether § 502(b) unenforceability
is to be determined as of the petition date, or as of the date at
which the court evaluates the claim. We now clarify that the
petition date is the proper reference point.
Wassmann’s position is better supported by the
Bankruptcy Code and persuasive authority. First, as the
Bankruptcy Court explained, the plain text of § 502(b)
supports Wassmann’s position. Section 502(b) provides that,
where an objection is made to a claim, the court “shall
determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the
United States as of the date of the filing of the petition, and

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shall allow such claim” except where, among other situations,
“such claim is unenforceable against the debtor” under non-
bankruptcy law, 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1), or where “such claim
is for unmatured interest,” id. § 502(b)(2). The Supreme Court
has long interpreted § 502(b)(2) as a “general rule disallowing
postpetition interest.” United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 373 (1988). Thus,
“such claim” as it is used in § 502(b)(2) must refer to the claim
as it existed on the petition date—otherwise, as the Bankruptcy
Court explained, “a claim for interest that matured between the
petition date and the date of the resolution of the claim
objection would be allowed,” which directly contravenes the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 502(b)(2). J.A. 16. It
follows, a fortiori, that § 502(b)(1) likewise instructs courts to
assess whether “such claim[s]” are enforceable against the
debtor as of the petition date, rather than the date at which the
court considers claim allowance. See United States v.
Norwood, 49 F.4th 189, 207 (3d Cir. 2022) (“It is a ‘standard
principle of statutory construction . . . that identical words and
phrases within the same statute should normally be given the
same meaning.’” (quoting G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist.
Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 617 (3d Cir. 2015))).
The text of other § 502 provisions also supports
Wassmann’s read. Unlike § 502(b), several provisions of § 502
direct courts to view claims with reference to times other than
the petition date, indicating that unless otherwise specified, the
petition date is the relevant reference point. For instance,
§ 502(e) provides that a court should disallow a claim for
reimbursement or contribution that “is contingent as of the time
of allowance or disallowance of such claim.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(e) (emphasis added). Section 502(f) provides that a
claim arising “after the commencement of the case but before

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the earlier of the appointment of a trustee and the order for
relief shall be determined as of the date such claim arises.” Id.
at § 502(f) (emphasis added). If Congress wanted bankruptcy
courts to assess claim enforceability as of the evaluation date,
not the petition date, it presumably would have said as much in
§ 502(b). Cf. In re Eriksen, 647 B.R. 192, 195–96 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2022) (“Where Congress deemed post-petition
developments relevant to the claims allowance process, it
enacted provisions to address such situations. . . .”).
This interpretation accords with principles underlying
the Code. Bankruptcy law generally presumes that the petition
date “fixes the moment when the affairs of the bankrupt are
supposed to be wound up.” Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339,
344 (1911) (Holmes, J.); see also Douglas G. Baird, The
Elements of Bankruptcy 84 (7th ed. 2022) (explaining that a
key concept underlying the Bankruptcy Code is that, as of the
petition date, each creditor’s non-bankruptcy right to the
debtor’s estate is “transformed” into a bankruptcy claim). As
the Bankruptcy Court explained, “[t]he petition date is, in
essence, a ‘day of reckoning,’ consolidating the debtors’
present and future obligations into one moment for prompt
resolution.” J.A. 19.
We also observe that the Trustee’s read of § 502(b) as
applied to this case contravenes the purpose of statutes of
limitations: to ensure that parties do not sit on their rights and
then “unfair[ly] surprise” defendants with “stale claims.”
Coello v. DiLeo, 43 F.4th 346, 351–52 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting
Kreiger v. United States, 539 F.2d 317, 322 (3d Cir. 1976)).
Here, the claimant did not sit on his rights, and there is no risk
of unfair surprise: Wassmann filed his proof of claim by the
bar date, and within the limitations period.

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Finally, while no binding precedent dictates the
outcome of this appeal, out-of-circuit case law supports
Wassmann’s position. In In re Racing Servs., Inc., the Eighth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel suggested that a defense
that became available post-petition would not render a claim
unenforceable, because “[a] plain reading of § 502(b) suggests
that the bankruptcy court should determine whether a
creditor’s claim is enforceable against the debtor as of the date
the bankruptcy petition was filed.” 619 B.R. 681, 688 (B.A.P.
8th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added).
Similarly, in In re Flanagan, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit rejected an argument that a post-petition
settlement agreement, which included mutual releases of
claims, rendered claims unenforceable in the bankruptcy
proceeding. 503 F.3d 171, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2007). The
Flanagan court reasoned that § 502(b)’s instruction that courts
“determine the amount of such claim . . . as of the date of the
filing of the petition” is best read to mean that bankruptcy
courts should assess claim allowance as of the petition date. Id.
at 179 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (emphasis in original)). See
also In re Brown, 606 B.R. 40, 46 n.6 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2019)
(“Taken together, [§§ 502 and 558] establish that ‘[p]ost-
petition conduct . . . cannot justify disallowing a proof of
claim.’ . . . The post-petition running of the statute of
limitations should not be the basis for disallowance of a valid
prepetition claim . . . .” (quoting Sears v. Sears (In re Sears),
863 F.3d 973, 978 (8th Cir. 2017))); In re Ricks, No. 09-00215-
JDP, 2010 WL 4257598, at *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho Oct. 27, 2010)
(“Section 502(b)(1) requires a determination of the allowance
and amount of a claim as of the date of the filing of the
petition.” (quotation marks omitted)).

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Appellant cites Melikian Enters., LLLP v. McCormick,
863 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2017), for the proposition that courts
may consider post-petition events when assessing the
allowance of claims under § 502. Without passing upon
whether Melikian was rightly decided, we observe that it dealt
with a factual scenario that is not analogous here.
The relevant law in Melikian was Arizona’s anti-
deficiency law, which requires creditors to file a deficiency
action within 90 days of a foreclosure sale in order to have a
right to recover a deficiency.5 Id. at 807. The creditor, Melikian
Enterprises, LLLP (“Melikian”), had commenced a deficiency
action on August 2, 2012, prior to the August 29, 2012 petition
date and prior to the October 9, 2012 foreclosure sale. Id. at
804. Following the post-petition sale, where Melikian
purchased the property at issue, Melikian did not perfect
service of its deficiency suit, and the Arizona court dismissed
the suit on January 30, 2013. Id. Because Melikian did not file
a deficiency action within 90 days of the trustee’s sale, and
because the August 2 deficiency suit was dismissed, the
Melikian court concluded that Melikian’s claim was
disallowed. Id. at 806–08. As the Trustee points out, it appears
5 The relevant law provided:
If no action is maintained for a deficiency
judgment within the time period prescribed in
subsections A and B of this section, the proceeds
of the sale, regardless of amount, shall be
deemed to be in full satisfaction of the obligation
and no right to recover a deficiency in any action
shall exist.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-814(D).

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from the Melikian court’s reasoning that post-petition events
were relevant to the court’s claim allowance determination. For
instance, if Melikian had perfected service and pursued its
deficiency action in October 2012 (after the August 29, 2012
petition date), it seems that the court would have considered
those post-petition events and allowed the claim.6 See id. at
804–06.
Melikian does not undermine our conclusion here. First,
the question presented before the Melikian court was whether
“the Bankruptcy Code—specifically 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 and
502—impliedly preempts Arizona[’s anti-deficiency] law.” Id.
at 806.7 While the court insinuated that post-petition events
were relevant to its claim allowance determination, it did not
6 The court “f[ou]nd it unnecessary to address” Melikian’s
argument that the automatic stay made it impossible to comply
with the state law’s 90-day time limit. Melikian, 863 F.3d at
807. It reasoned that, even if the automatic stay prevented
Melikian from filing a deficiency action within 90 days of the
sale, Melikian still needed to file such an action after the stay
was lifted in accordance with § 108’s time limits. Id. at 808.
Because he did not do so, he failed to comply with the state
anti-deficiency law. Here, too, the court appeared willing to
consider post-petition events in its claim allowance decision.
7 The court concluded that it did not, citing the “general
presumption against finding implied preemption,” Melikian,
863 F.3d at 806 (quoting Mo. Bd. of Exam’rs for Hearing
Instrument Specialists v. Hearing Help Express, Inc., 447 F.3d
1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2006)), and the Supreme Court’s
instruction to “consult state law in determining the validity of
most claims,” id. at 807 (quoting Travelers, 549 U.S. at 450).

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squarely consider whether such events are invariably relevant
to the claim allowance process. See id. at 808–09.
Next, Melikian at most suggests that it may be
appropriate to consider post-petition events where the
applicable law requires that a claim be accompanied by a
separate action or event, and that separate action or event was
or should have been commenced post-petition. This reading
comports with the Bankruptcy Court’s discussion of In re
Benanti, No. 15-71018, 2018 WL 1801194 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
Apr. 13, 2018). Benanti reasoned that “in determining whether
[a claim is] contingent, it is appropriate to consider all facts and
circumstances—not just those in existence on the petition date”
because “ignor[ing] the realities of a situation simply because
they did not exist at the time of the petition would be
unconscionable.” Id. at *7; cf. In re Rappaport, 517 B.R. 518,
537–42 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) (considering post-petition events
in its estimation of a contingent, unliquidated claim). Under
this reasoning, a court should not allow a bankruptcy claim
where the creditor recovered the amount owed by the debtor in
a post-petition foreclosure sale or where, as in Melikian, after
the petition date, the creditor failed to comply with state
procedures for recovering a deficiency judgment. On the
whole, even if Melikian’s holding finds support in the
Bankruptcy Code, it does not guide our decision here. Unlike
in Melikian, Wassmann’s claim, and its enforceability under
state law, was not dependent on any post-petition events.
Melikian does not move the ball here; there is no reason we
would not evaluate Wassmann’s claim as of the petition date.
Similarly, the Trustee’s citation to In re Ernst, 382 B.R.
194 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), is of no moment. The Ernst court
concluded that “[w]hile section 502 requires that the amount of
a claim be determined as of the date of the filing of th[e]

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petition, there is nothing in [section 502] that requires a court
to ignore that the claim is no longer valid under state law.” Id.
at 199. The Ernst court then explained that a claim was
disallowed where, after the petition date, a state court decision
altered the applicable law such that the claim was no longer
permitted under state law. Id. at 198–99. But as the Bankruptcy
Court explained here, Ernst does not compel courts to consider
post-petition facts in claim allowance decisions. Ernst merely
“stands for the unremarkable proposition that judicial decisions
are generally given retroactive effect.” J.A. 23.
All in all, the Bankruptcy Code and persuasive authority
support the Bankruptcy Court and Wassmann’s read of
§ 502(b). The Bankruptcy Court correctly determined that, as
of the petition date, Wassmann’s claim was timely, and so it
was allowed.
B. There is no requirement that a creditor who has filed
a proof of claim bring a separate, timely suit against
the debtor to protect its claim.
The Trustee also urges that Wassmann should have filed
a state court complaint before November 1, 2020 to protect his
bankruptcy claim, as “timely filing a proof of claim is a
necessary but insufficient step to preserve that claim where a
statute of limitations subsequently expires.” Appellant’s Br.
12. The Trustee contends that this reading must be correct
because § 108(c)(2) would be rendered superfluous if filing a
proof of claim obviates any need to file a timely complaint
outside of bankruptcy proceedings. Not so.
Section 108(c)(2) provides that a limitations period that
would otherwise expire during the automatic stay imposed in a
bankruptcy proceeding shall not expire until “30 days after

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notice of the termination or expiration of the stay.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 108(c)(2). So, the argument goes, there must be a
requirement to file a timely, non-bankruptcy complaint in
addition to filing a timely proof of claim; otherwise,
§ 108(c)(2) would be meaningless.
In support of this argument, the Trustee relies on
Rhodes v. C&G Excavating, Inc., No. CIV.A.98-6274, 1999
WL 820204 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1999). In C&G, as here, a
claimant filed a proof of claim without filing a separate state
court complaint. Id. at *1. The C&G court disallowed the
claim, citing no precedent and reasoning that “[i]f, as [the
claimant] suggests, a complaint is irrelevant following the
filing of a proof of claim, then § 108(c) is purely statutory
surplusage.” Id. Therefore, the C&G court concluded, § 108(c)
required the claimant to file a separate action in district court.
Id.
Like the Bankruptcy Court, we find the C&G court’s
reasoning unpersuasive. To demonstrate the flaws in the C&G
court’s reasoning, the Bankruptcy Court offered the following
hypothetical:
Consider a claim against an individual chapter 7
debtor that would be nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(2) on the ground that the debtor had
defrauded a lender into extending credit. Such a
creditor may recover its pro rata share out of the
bankruptcy estate by filing a timely proof of
claim. To the extent the creditor seeks and
obtains a determination from the bankruptcy
court that the debt is nondischargeable, however,
the creditor would typically be left to proceed
outside of bankruptcy to obtain or enforce a

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judgment against the debtor to recover on the
balance of the claim out of the debtor’s post-
bankruptcy assets. But without relief from the
stay, that action could not be brought until after
the conclusion of the chapter 7 case. The work
done by § 108(c) is that, if the statute of
limitations would otherwise expire during the
bankruptcy case, this extension of time permits
the creditor to wait until after the bankruptcy
case has concluded before bringing that non-
bankruptcy litigation.
J.A. 29–30. This hypothetical demonstrates that § 108(c) plays
an important role where a debt has been determined to be
nondischargeable. For that reason, the Trustee is wrong that
§ 108(c) has no applications if the “requirement” he proposes
does not exist.
The Trustee also cites to Mamer v. Apex R.E. & T., 59
F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995), Bennett v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 64 F.3d
62 (2d Cir. 1995), and McKinney v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 925
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1991), in support of his contention that a
creditor must file a separate timely action in addition to a proof
of claim. But each of those cases involved a non-bankruptcy
action that was dismissed as untimely, as it was not filed within
the applicable limitations period, including the period allotted
by § 108(c). See Mamer, 59 F.3d at 781, 783; Bennett, 64 F.3d
at 66–67; McKinney, 925 F.2d at 6. Mamer, Bennett, and
McKinney do not stand for the proposition that one needs to
file a separate, timely action in addition to filing a proof of
claim. Rather, they stand for the proposition that if one chooses
to file a separate action, it must be brought in the time allotted
under § 108(c).

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As these cases demonstrate, § 108(c) does its primary
work with respect to claims not resolved through the
bankruptcy process—for instance, claims disallowed (for non-
merits reasons) or not discharged, or claims arising during the
proceedings that can still be pursued after the bankruptcy
proceedings are concluded. And, as with the cases relied upon
by the Trustee, § 108(c)’s import lies in the principle that if a
party chooses to bring a claim after the automatic stay is lifted,
she must adhere to § 108(c)’s time limit, rather than a principle
that she must file an action after the automatic stay is lifted. But
Wassmann has not pursued a separate action post-
confirmation. Section 108(c) is not relevant to the instant
dispute.
III.
In sum, the Bankruptcy Court was correct in assessing
the enforceability of Wassmann’s claim with reference to the
petition date. The Bankruptcy Court was also correct in
concluding that Wassmann was not obligated to file a separate
tort suit after the stay was lifted. Accordingly, we will affirm
the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying the Trustee’s motion.

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