United States of America v. Carlos Alberto Cuevas-Almonte

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 24-3013
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CARLOS ALBERTO CUEVAS-ALMONTE,
Appellant
_____________
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
(D.C. No. 3:19-cr-00076-002)
District Judge: Hon. Robert A. Molloy
_____________
Argued April 29, 2025
Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, McKEE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 14, 2025)
Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III [ARGUED]
MARGULIS G ELFAND DIRUZZO & LAMBSON
401 E Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
Counsel for Appellant

-- 1 of 23 --

2
Delia L. Smith
Adam Sleeper [ARGUED]
U.S. D EPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
O FFICE OF U NITED STATES A TTORNEY
5500 Veterans Drive
United States Courthouse, Suite 260
St. Thomas, VI 00802
Counsel for Appellee
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge
Carlos Alberto Cuevas-Almonte was arrested on the
high seas and charged in the District of the Virgin Islands with
multiple drug trafficking offenses under the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), 46 U.S.C. § 70501 et seq.
In a flurry of pretrial motions, Cuevas-Almonte sought to have
his case dismissed for improper venue, arguing that the
MDLEA’s “any district” venue provision was
unconstitutional, and that proper venue laid in the District of
Puerto Rico. See 46 U.S.C. § 70504(b)(2). He also requested
a pretrial evidentiary hearing on venue and the issuance of
subpoenas for ten Coast Guard witnesses. After the District
Court denied the motions, Cuevas-Almonte entered into a
conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal, among

-- 2 of 23 --

3
other things, the District Court’s venue determination and its
refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on venue.
On appeal, Cuevas-Almonte renews his constitutional
challenge to Section 70504(b)(2) and challenges the District
Court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on venue. As we
explain below, his constitutional challenge fails under the plain
text of the Constitution and binding Supreme Court precedent.
For that reason, and because the District Court did not abuse
its discretion in denying him a pretrial evidentiary hearing on
venue, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Cuevas-Almonte is arrested and charged.
On October 24, 2019, a United States Customs and
Border Protection air unit detected a “go-fast” vessel in
international waters some 75 nautical miles south of Cabo
Rojo, Puerto Rico. Upon interdiction by the United States
Coast Guard (“USCG”) Cutter Diligence, the vessel remained
in international waters and displayed no indicia of nationality.
When the vessel’s two occupants—later identified as Carlos
Alberto Cuevas-Almonte and his co-defendant—became
aware of the Coast Guard’s pursuit, they began jettisoning
bales overboard and failed to comply with orders to heave to.1
After agents fired warning shots, the vessel died in the water
33 nautical miles south of Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico, where the
Coast Guard then established control. When questioned, both
1 “[T]he term ‘heave to’ means to cause a vessel to
slow, come to a stop, or adjust its course or speed to account
for the weather conditions and sea state to facilitate a law en-
forcement boarding.” 18 U.S.C. § 2237(e)(2).

-- 3 of 23 --

4
men claimed to be in charge of the vessel, yet neither asserted
a nationality. The Coast Guard recovered ten bales from the
water that together contained about 306 kilograms of cocaine.
Six days later, the Diligence transferred Cuevas-Almonte and
his co-defendant to the USCG Cutter Charles David Jr., which
transported them to St. Thomas in the U.S. Virgin Islands.
According to the government, the defendants were never
brought to Puerto Rico—a fact Cuevas-Almonte disputes.
On November 21, 2019, a grand jury in the District of
the Virgin Islands returned a three-count indictment charging
Cuevas-Almonte and his co-defendant with committing these
offenses while “upon the high seas”: (1) conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute a controlled substance while on board
a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; (2)
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
while on board of a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States and aiding and abetting; and (3) destroying,
attempting to destroy, or conspiring to destroy property subject
to forfeiture under Section 511(a) of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.2 Nearly a year
later, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment—
striking the original Count One, renumbering the remaining
charges as Counts One and Two, and adding as Count Three a
failure to heave to charge in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
2237(a)(1) and (2).
2 See 46 U.S.C. §§ 70502(c)(1)(A); 70503(a)(1)–(2);
70504(b)(2); 70506(a), (b), and (d).

-- 4 of 23 --

5
B. Cuevas-Almonte moves to dismiss for improper
venue.
After the initial indictment, but before the superseding
indictment, Cuevas-Almonte moved to dismiss for improper
venue.3 In that motion, he raised a “manufactured venue”
theory that alleged the government manufactured venue by
bypassing Puerto Rico, despite the vessel’s proximity to its
territorial waters, and instead transported him “past the cities
of Ponce, Salina [sic], Guayma [sic], and the islands of Vieques
and Culebra” en route to the U.S. Virgin Islands. SA16. There,
he argued, defendants face substantially longer sentences for
drug trafficking—a claim he sought to substantiate through
testimonial evidence at a requested evidentiary hearing. The
government opposed the motion, disputing his manufactured
venue theory on several grounds and invoking 46 U.S.C. §
70504(b)(2) to support venue in the Virgin Islands.
Section 70504(b)(2) provides that a person who is
charged with drug trafficking under the MDLEA “may be tried
in any district” if the offense “was begun or committed upon
the high seas, or elsewhere outside the jurisdiction of any
particular State or district.” In his reply, Cuevas-Almonte
argued that he was, in fact, first brought within Puerto Rico’s
territorial waters, citing the transfer of the recovered narcotics
from the Diligence to the Drug Enforcement Agency before he
was transferred to the Charles David Jr. On that basis, he
claimed that under 18 U.S.C. § 3238, venue properly lay in the
3 Cuevas-Almonte also moved, in the alternative, to
transfer venue under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure but expressly waived any challenge to the denial of
that motion in his plea agreement.

-- 5 of 23 --

6
District of Puerto Rico because he was first brought into its
territorial waters.4
Separately, Cuevas-Almonte moved to declare 46
U.S.C. § 70504(b)(2) unconstitutional, asserting that its venue
provision violates both Article III of the Constitution and the
Sixth Amendment. Framing his challenge as both facial and
as-applied, he argued that prosecution in the Virgin Islands was
unconstitutional because he was first brought to Puerto Rico.
After the return of the superseding indictment, Cuevas-
Almonte reasserted his constitutional challenge and amended
his motion to dismiss for improper venue. While otherwise
identical to the original filing, the amended motion also sought
dismissal of the failure to heave to count, asserting that venue
for that charge—governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3238—was also
improper because he was first brought to Puerto Rico.
The District Court agreed with the government and
collectively denied Cuevas-Almonte’s motions addressing
venue. It held that 46 U.S.C. § 70504(b)(2) was constitutional
and provided venue in the Virgin Islands for the MDLEA
charges. As to the failure to heave to charge, the court
determined venue was proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3238, finding
that the Virgin Islands was where Cuevas-Almonte was first
brought, and that—even assuming he transited Puerto Rico’s
territorial waters—such passage, without landing, did not
constitute being “first brought” into that district under the
statute. The court also rejected his manufactured venue claim,
4 Section 3238 provides that “[t]he trial of all offenses
begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the
jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the
district in which the offender . . . is arrested or is first brought
. . . .”

-- 6 of 23 --

7
finding he failed to raise a colorable argument that the
government routed him to the Virgin Islands to secure a
harsher sentence.
C. Cuevas-Almonte moves to subpoena Coast Guard
witnesses.
In advance of an omnibus hearing, Cuevas-Almonte
filed an ex parte motion seeking a certificate under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1825(a)(2) and an order directing the United States Marshal
to serve trial subpoenas on five USCG personnel to testify at
the hearing and at trial. In an ex parte order, the Magistrate
Judge denied the motion, finding that Cuevas-Almonte flouted
Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(b). After the omnibus hearing was
rescheduled, Cuevas-Almonte renewed the ex parte motion,
attaching proposed subpoenas for ten Coast Guard witnesses.
The District Court denied Cuevas-Almonte’s motion for failure
to comply with the Department of Homeland Security’s
applicable Touhy Regulations, 6 C.F.R. §§ 5.41, et seq. In
response, Cuevas-Almonte moved to declare DHS’s Touhy
Regulations inapplicable, or in the alternative, to declare their
enabling statute, 5 U.S.C. § 301, unconstitutional and
invalidate the regulations. The District Court denied the
motion, and we dismissed his interlocutory appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction. United States v. Cuevas-Almonte, No.
23–1300, 2024 WL 3886667, at *1 (3d Cir. Mar. 15, 2024) (“In
a criminal case, appellate review is generally prohibited until
after convicted and imposition of sentence.”).
D. Cuevas-Almonte enters into a conditional plea
agreement.
Ultimately, Cuevas-Almonte entered a conditional
guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his venue

-- 7 of 23 --

8
motions only insofar as the order rejected his argument that the
Virgin Islands was an improper venue. The written agreement
also conditionally preserved his right to appeal the orders
denying his Touhy motion and his second renewed subpoena
motion. Specifically, the parties agreed that those orders were
“only material and would only provide a basis for withdrawing
from the plea agreement” if we determined on appeal that “the
District Court erred in not holding a pretrial hearing on one of
the other motions” and that error was not harmless. JA136.
“[A]bsent such a determination, any error in denying [those
motions] was harmless[,]” so we need not reach the issue. Id.
Cuevas-Almonte pleaded guilty to Count One of the
superseding indictment and was sentenced to 46 months’
imprisonment. He then filed this timely appeal.
II. DISCUSSION5
A. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in
denying a pretrial evidentiary hearing on venue.
We begin by considering the District Court’s order
denying a pretrial evidentiary hearing regarding the propriety
of venue. Generally, we review a district court’s denial of an
evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 2010). We see no reason to
depart from this standard in the context of a motion to dismiss
for improper venue. See United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855,
865 (11th Cir. 2010) (reviewing for abuse of discretion the
denial of an evidentiary hearing to challenge venue that would
5 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction un-
der 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

-- 8 of 23 --

9
amount to “essentially, a bench trial”). “A district court abuses
its discretion if its decision rests on an incorrect legal standard,
a clearly erroneous factual finding, or a misapplication of the
law to the facts.” Benezet Consulting LLC v. Sec’y
Commonwealth of Pa., 26 F.4th 580, 584 (3d Cir. 2022)
(quoting TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir.
2019)).
Below, Cuevas-Almonte generally argued that venue
was improper in the Virgin Islands because he was first
brought to Puerto Rico. Yet his factual account of the transfer
shifted repeatedly across his moving papers. In his initial
motion to dismiss for improper venue, he asserted that he was
taken to the Virgin Islands instead of Puerto Rico, with the
vessel passing “the cities of Ponce, Salina [sic], Guayma [sic],
and the islands of Vieques and Culebra.” SA16. He tied this
account to his “manufactured venue” theory. Two weeks later,
in his motion to declare 46 U.S.C. § 70504(b)(2)
unconstitutional, he alleged a different sequence: the first
Coast Guard vessel transported him to Puerto Rico’s territorial
waters, where he was then transferred to the vessel that brought
him to the Virgin Islands.
Nearly two months after that, he offered yet another
account, claiming the first vessel brought him into Puerto
Rico’s territorial waters while delivering the cocaine to the
Drug Enforcement Agency. Nearly a year after his initial
motion to dismiss, he contradicted himself in consecutive
pages of his amended motion, stating he was first brought to
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Neither party disputes that
Cuevas-Almonte was transferred between government vessels
during the voyage from the high seas to the Virgin Islands; the
only question Cuevas-Almonte posed was where.

-- 9 of 23 --

10
The District Court denied Cuevas-Almonte’s venue-
related motions without a hearing, concluding that 46 U.S.C. §
70504(b)(2) was constitutional and therefore laid proper venue
in the Virgin Islands for the MDLEA counts. As to the failure
to heave to charge, the District Court held venue was proper
under 18 U.S.C. § 3238, explaining that Cuevas-Almonte was
first brought to the Virgin Islands, and that—even assuming he
transited Puerto Rico’s territorial waters—such passage,
without landing, did not constitute being “first brought” into
that district under the statute. On appeal, Cuevas-Almonte
contends a pretrial evidentiary hearing on venue was necessary
to resolve what he characterizes as a factual dispute over
whether he was “first brought” to Puerto Rico. Yet in his
moving papers below, the only articulated purpose of such a
hearing was to present testimonial evidence that the
government’s choice of venue was manufactured with intent to
expose him to allegedly harsher drug-trafficking sentences.
Only now, after the District Court rejected that claim, does he
recast his request as necessary to resolve where on his voyage
the government transferred him between vessels—a purported
factual dispute said to bear on the district into which he was
“first brought.”
In denying Cuevas-Almonte’s motion to dismiss for
improper venue, the District Court rejected his contention that
he was first brought to Puerto Rico. It explained that Cuevas-
Almonte offered “no legal authority for the proposition” that
being transported through Puerto Rican territorial waters meant
he was first brought there. United States v. Ramos–Guerra,
No. 3:19–CR–0076, 2023 WL 1778338, at *4 n.5 (D.V.I. Feb.
6, 2023). Finding no “evidence demonstrating or suggesting
that [he was] first brought or arrested in Puerto Rico,” the

-- 10 of 23 --

11
District Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3238 allowed for the case
to be tried in the Virgin Islands. Id. at *4.
Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that all “defects in the institution of the
prosecution” be raised by pretrial motion, but evidentiary
hearings on such motions are not granted as a matter of course.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c) (providing that district courts “may”
schedule a motion hearing). Although Rule 12 does not specify
when a defendant is entitled to a pretrial evidentiary hearing,
we have held that a defendant’s moving papers must
demonstrate a “colorable claim” for relief. United States v.
Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1067 (3d Cir. 1993). A “colorable” claim
requires more than “mere bald-faced allegations,” it must
present “issues of fact material to the resolution of the
defendant’s . . . claim.” Id. That is, a defendant may receive
an evidentiary hearing only if the moving papers are
“sufficiently specific, non-conjectural, and detailed to enable
the court to conclude that . . . there are disputed issues of
material fact that will affect the outcome of the motion.”
United States v. Fattah, 858 F.3d 801, 810 (3d Cir. 2017)
(quoting Hines, 628 F.3d at 105) (emphasis added). The
purpose of a hearing “is not to assist the moving party in
making discoveries that, once learned, might justify the motion
after the fact.” Hines, 628 F.3d at 105.
Although the District Court addressed only one of
Cuevas-Almonte’s several speculative theories regarding his
transfer from the high seas to the Virgin Islands, it nonetheless
rejected the general proposition that mere presence in Puerto
Rico’s territorial waters was legally sufficient to have been
“first brought” there. The factual accounting now emphasized
on appeal—that he was transferred to another government
vessel while in Puerto Rican territorial waters—likewise would

-- 11 of 23 --

12
not alter the outcome of his motion under the District Court’s
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3238. Each of his factual
accounts share the same underlying theory—that entering a
district’s territorial waters on a Coast Guard ship, without ever
landing or stepping foot in the district, means he was first
brought there.
In that light, Cuevas-Almonte’s contention that the
District Court abused its discretion could only succeed were
we to find as a threshold matter it rested on an incorrect legal
standard. We do not. In explaining that mere transit through a
district’s territorial waters is not enough to render a defendant
“first brought” there, the District Court cited a First Circuit
case addressing the issue. See Chandler v. United States, 171
F.2d 921, 933 (1st Cir. 1948) (finding that defendant was not
brought into a district when he flew through its airspace
because “[i]n the analogous situation of transit through the
territorial waters of a district, without landing, the cases say
that such district is not the district into which the accused was
‘first brought’”). This issue would be one of first impression
for this Court, but it is not properly teed up for resolution here.
That said, the standard applied by the District Court is
supported by the sparse case law on the issue.6 Accordingly,
6 See, e.g., Pedersen v. United States, 271 F. 187, 189–
90 (2d Cir. 1921) (holding venue was proper in the Southern
District of New York where defendants had been brought by
ship and arrested because “a temporary stop [at a quarantine
station] did not constitute a bringing into the Eastern [D]istrict
of New York”); United States v. Arwo, 86 U.S. 486 (1873)
(holding a defendant could be tried in the Southern District of
New York despite being held in irons for five days aboard a
ship anchored within the Eastern District).

-- 12 of 23 --

13
the District Court’s conclusion did not rest on an erroneous
view of the law and we perceive no abuse of discretion.
Given the absence of any precedent supporting Cuevas-
Almonte’s legal position even if he proved his factual account,
we conclude the District Court reasonably denied a hearing that
would not affect the outcome of his motion to dismiss. What
is more, his moving papers were non-specific and conjectural,
and the “hearing would only assist [him] in making discoveries
that, once learned, might justify the motion after the fact.”
Hines, 628 F.3d at 105. Accordingly, we hold that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the novel
evidentiary hearing on venue.7
Under Cuevas-Almonte’s plea agreement, any error in
the District Court’s denial of his subpoena motions would only
provide a basis for withdrawal if we also found error in its
refusal to hold a pretrial venue hearing. Because we find no
such error, we need not address those orders.
7 Cuevas-Almonte also contends that the District Court
improperly shifted the burden of proof on venue onto him in
violation of his due process rights. This argument lacks any
merit. At this pretrial stage, the District Court merely declined
a hearing because it determined Cuevas-Almonte’s moving pa-
pers failed to raise a factual dispute that would affect the out-
come of his venue motion. This discretionary determination
had no effect on the burden of proof at trial, where the Govern-
ment would have borne the burden of establishing venue by a
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Heatherly,
985 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2021).

-- 13 of 23 --

14
B. The District Court did not err in rejecting Cuevas-
Almonte’s constitutional argument that venue in the
Virgin Islands is improper.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss an indictment,
including one challenging venue, we exercise plenary review
over a district court’s legal conclusions and review factual
findings for clear error. United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257,
264 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Shenandoah, 595
F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 2010)). We exercise plenary review
over the district court’s determination as to the constitutionality
of the challenged statute. United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28,
29 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273,
275 (3d Cir. 1996)).
Count One charged Cuevas-Almonte with drug
trafficking under Section 70503 of the MDLEA. Under the
conditional plea agreement, he preserved the right to appeal the
District Court’s rejection of his argument that venue is
improper because the MDLEA’s venue provision, which
provides for venue in “any district,” is unconstitutional, both
facially and as-applied.8 46 U.S.C. § 70504(b)(2). On appeal,
Cuevas-Almonte renews his argument that the “text, history,
8 We need not review the District Court’s rejection of
Cuevas-Almonte’s venue argument as to Count Three because
we conclude it was not preserved in his conditional plea agree-
ment. Cuevas-Almonte pled guilty only to Count One and pre-
served his right to appeal the order rejecting his venue motions
“only insofar as the order rejects [his] argument that the U.S.
Virgin Islands is an improper venue.” JA136. Thus, we review
the District Court’s order only insofar as it rejects his argument
that venue is improper as to the count he pled guilty to.

-- 14 of 23 --

15
and tradition of the venue provisions of the Constitution, and
the attendant statutory provisions” render Section 70504(b)(2)
unconstitutional. Appellant’s Br. at 17. He urges us to apply
the historical approach employed by the Supreme Court in
certain other contexts to his unprecedented challenge.9 That
type of historical analysis, he argues, would reveal that “any
district is so expansive” that “it stretches Art. III, §2 cl. 3 and
the Sixth Amendment beyond their respective breaking
points.” Id.
In seeking to persuade this Court to invalidate a federal
statute, Cuevas-Almonte invokes “the gravest and most
delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.” Blodgett
v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).
“Proper respect for a coordinate branch of the government
requires that we strike down an Act of Congress only if the lack
of constitutional authority to pass the act in question is clearly
demonstrated.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567
U.S. 519, 538 (2012) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). We begin with the premise that “[e]very legislative
act is to be presumed to be a constitutional exercise of
legislative power until the contrary is clearly established.”
Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466, 475 (1883).
A facial challenge attacks a statute’s constitutionality
based on its text alone, without consideration of the facts or
circumstances of a particular case. United States v.
Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770 n.11
(1988)). That is, in asserting his facial challenge, Cuevas-
9 See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Inc. v. Bruen,
597 U.S. 1 (2022); Hemphill v. New York, 595 U.S. 140 (2020);
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).

-- 15 of 23 --

16
Almonte must establish “that no set of circumstances exists
under which the [statute] would be valid, i.e., that the [statute]
is unconstitutional in all of its applications.”10 Id. (quoting
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S.
442, 449 (2008)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that facial challenges are disfavored—particularly
where, as here, they rest on undeveloped factual records or
require speculation on hypothetical applications. See, e.g.,
Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450–51 (noting that facial
challenges are disfavored because, in part, they “threaten to
short circuit the democratic process”); Sabri v. United States,
542 U.S. 600, 608–10 (2004) (noting that “facial challenges are
best when infrequent,” particularly when they “invite
judgments on fact-poor records”). Ultimately, such challenges
“run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint
that courts should neither anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is to be applied.” Wash. State Grange,
552 U.S. at 450–51 (inner quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
An as-applied challenge, by contrast, “does not contend
that a law is unconstitutional as written but that its application
10 Whether 48 U.S.C. § 70504(b)(2) might operate un-
constitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances
is not enough to render it wholly invalid, as we do not recog-
nize the “overbreadth” doctrine outside the First Amendment
context. See United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 172 n.3
(3d Cir. 2011) (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18
(1984)).

-- 16 of 23 --

17
to a particular person under particular circumstances deprived
that person of a constitutional right.” Marcavage, 609 F.3d at
273 (citing Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
546 U.S. 410, 411–12 (2006)). When that occurs, the particular
provision more narrowly offends the Constitution and should
“thus be declared invalid to the extent that it reaches too far,
but otherwise be left intact.” Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d
235, 258 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood
of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006)). The
distinction, then, between a facial and as-applied challenge
goes to the scope of the statute’s claimed constitutional
infirmity and the breadth of the remedy sought. Marcavage,
609 F.3d at 273 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010)).
We begin with Cuevas-Almonte’s as-applied
constitutional challenge to the MDLEA’s “any district” venue
provision. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 406 (3d
Cir. 2011) (analyzing appellant’s as-applied challenge before
his facial challenge). To prevail on his as-applied challenge,
Cuevas-Almonte must show that “under [these] particular
circumstances [he was] deprived . . . of a constitutional right.”
Id. (quoting Marcavage, 609 F.3d at 273) (alterations in
original). Of course, if Cuevas-Almonte’s as-applied challenge
fails because the statute was constitutionally applied to him,
his facial challenge must likewise fail, for the statute is not
unconstitutional in all its applications.
Proper venue in criminal trials is more than just a
procedural requirement—it is a safeguard guaranteed twice in
the United States Constitution. United States v. Baxter, 884
F.2d 734, 736 (3d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Article III,
section two, clause three of the Constitution requires that “[t]he
Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State where the said

-- 17 of 23 --

18
Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed
within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as
the Congress may by Law have directed.” U.S. Const. Art. III,
§ 2, cl. 3. In addition, the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law.” U.S.
Const. amend. VI. Congress further embedded this venue
guarantee into Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, requiring that “[u]nless a statute or these rules
permit otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in
a district where the offense was committed.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
18.
On appeal, Cuevas-Almonte renews his as-applied
challenge by asserting that his prosecution in the Virgin Islands
deprived him of constitutional rights under Article III, section
2, clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment. In doing so, he frames
Section 3238 as embodying the constitutional limitations
imposed by the Venue and Vicinage clauses—which, he
contends, constrained venue to Puerto Rico as his passage
through its territorial waters made it the district where he was
first brought. Thus, he argues that the “any district” provision
of Section 70504(b)(2) operated unconstitutionally as applied
to him by impermissibly expanding the venue limitations the
Constitution imposes on the government, permitting trial in the
Virgin Islands when, in his view, venue was confined to Puerto
Rico.
We begin with the observation that the plain text of the
Venue Clause evinces no restriction on the number of places
Congress may designate for trial when an offense is not
committed within any State. Offenses on the high seas are, by

-- 18 of 23 --

19
definition, “not committed within any State,” and the clause
accordingly provides that trial “shall be at such Place or Places
as the Congress may by Law have directed.” U.S. Const. Art.
III, § 2, cl. 3. More than a century ago, the Supreme Court
endorsed this reading in Cook v. United States, where Justice
Harlan explained:
[T]he contention of the defendants
is, in effect, that in respect to
crimes committed outside of the
states in some place within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, congress is
forbidden by the second section of
article 3 of the constitution from
providing a place of trial different
from the one in which the accused
might have been tried at the time
the offense was committed. We do
not so interpret that section. The
words, ‘the trial shall be at such
place or places as the congress may
by law have directed,’ impose no
restriction as to the place of trial,
except that the trial cannot occur
until congress designates the place,
and may occur at any place which
shall have been designated by
congress previous to the trial.
138 U.S. 157, 182 (1891) (emphasis added); see also Zicarelli
v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 324–26 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Cook for
the proposition that “when an offense was not committed
within a state,” Congress may prescribe venue under Article

-- 19 of 23 --

20
III, section 2, clause 3 without limitation from the Sixth
Amendment). We are duty-bound to give full effect to this
precedent. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)
(“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case,
yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.”) (citation omitted). 11 In doing
so, we adhere to a fundamental principle of judicial restraint
not to “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” Wash.
State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450–51 (quoting Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
A plain reading of the Vicinage Clause likewise reveals
no restriction on Congress’s power to designate venue for
crimes committed on the high seas. That clause guarantees
“the right to . . . an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law.” U.S. Const.
amend. VI. As Justice Harlan explained in Cook, that
“amendment has reference only to offences against the United
States committed within a State.” Cook, 138 U.S. at 181 (citing
United States v. Dawson, 56 U.S. 467, 487-88 (1853))
11 This Circuit has steadfastly applied the Agostini doc-
trine. See, e.g., United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 205
(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Agostini and noting that “[w]e have al-
ways sought to adhere to that counsel”); United States v. Ex-
treme Assocs., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 155–56 (3d Cir. 2005)
(stressing, at length, that the Third Circuit cannot ignore a Su-
preme Court case directly on point unless that case has been
completely abrogated).

-- 20 of 23 --

21
(emphasis added); see also Smith v. United States, 599 U.S.
236, 245 (2023) (“[T]he Vicinage Clause . . . concerns jury
composition, not the place where a trial may be held.”). If a
crime is not committed within any State, “the trial may be
wherever within the jurisdiction of the United States the
Congress shall by law direct.” Dawson, 56 U.S. at 484.
Cuevas-Almonte asks us to ignore the plain text of the
Venue and Vicinage clauses and graft onto them a limitation on
venue for high seas offenses. He grounds this argument in the
Crimes Act of 1790, enacted by the First Congress, which
provided that trial for such offenses “shall be in the district
where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first
be brought.” Ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 114 (1790). Congress has
since codified that provision’s modern progeny as Section
3238. Until 2017 the MDLEA’s venue provision likewise
provided venue to the district where the accused was first
brought. Pub. L. No. 109-304, § 10(2), 120 Stat. 1485, 1688
(2006). Thus, Cuevas-Almonte maintains that until 2017, there
were “227 years of unbroken history . . . indicat[ing] that the
Constitution’s venue provisions . . . limit[] the venue for crimes
committed on the high seas to one ascertainable district.”
Appellant’s Br. at 17.
This argument fails for several reasons. First, it is
factually inaccurate, as Section 3238 has also provided for
venue in “the district of the last known residence of the
offender or . . . in the District of Columbia” since 1948. Act of
June 25, 1948, Pub. L. 772, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 826 (codified
as 18 U.S.C. § 3238). Second, it inappropriately invites us to
“assume[] that founding-era legislatures maximally exercised
their power to regulate, thereby adopting a ‘use it or lose it’
view of legislative authority.” United States v. Rahimi, 602
U.S. 680, 739–40 (2024) (Barrett, J., concurring). And third,

-- 21 of 23 --

22
most importantly to our holding, adopting his position would
require us to disregard the Supreme Court’s decision in Cook,
which squarely interpreted the Constitution’s venue provisions
and has not been abrogated or even questioned.
Cuevas-Almonte’s invocation of the history
surrounding the Declaration of Independence is even less
helpful to his as-applied challenge. In the years leading up to
the American Revolution, Parliament revived an ancient statute
under which colonists accused of treason could be transported
across the Atlantic for trial in England or in another distant
colony. See William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial of
Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 Mich.
L. Rev. 59, 63–64 (1944). Resentment against such measures
ran so deep that the Founding Fathers explicitly denounced
King George III in the Declaration of Independence “[f]or
transporting [the colonists] beyond Seas to be tried for
pretended offenses.” The Declaration of Independence para.
21 (U.S. 1776).
Yet Cuevas-Almonte’s situation is nearly the opposite—
he was brought from the high seas to be tried in a nearby district
within the United States. He was not taken from the district
where he committed a crime and transported “beyond seas” to
be tried “in Utah or Idaho, which are landlocked and are
thousands of miles away.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. Nor was he
dragged to “Guam, which is literally halfway around the
world.” Id. Even more to the point, Cuevas-Almonte cannot
explain how exactly the “first brought” provision of Section
3238—or the Crimes Act of 1790 for that matter—protect
against this colonial-era concern. Would a trial in the District
of Alaska for a crime committed in the middle of the Atlantic
Ocean not comply with his supposed constitutional limitation
so long as the defendant was first brought there? Nor does he

-- 22 of 23 --

23
reconcile that, under his theory, Section 3238 would still permit
prosecution in Guam for an offender apprehended on the high
seas south of Puerto Rico, transported through the Panama
Canal, and first brought into Guam’s territorial waters. In other
words, it is difficult to see how the “first brought” venue
concept for high seas crimes remedies the colonial-era
complaints of trials in a distant, foreign land.
We agree with Cuevas-Almonte that the Constitution
“twice safeguards the defendant’s venue right,” and “the
constitutional limitations on venue are extraordinarily
important.” United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 540
(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1,
6 (1998)). But the Supreme Court has instructed that Article
III, section 2, clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment do not create
a limitation on venue for offenses committed not within any
state that would render the MDLEA’s venue provision
unconstitutional as applied here. See Cook, 138 U.S. at 181–
82. We are duty-bound to follow that precedent until guided
otherwise. We therefore hold that 46 U.S.C. § 70504(b)(2) is
constitutional as applied to Cuevas-Almonte. Because the
provision is constitutional as applied to him, we also hold that
his facial challenge fails. See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 415. The
District Court therefore did not err in rejecting Cuevas-
Almonte’s argument that Section 70504(b)(2) is
unconstitutional and denying his motion to dismiss for
improper venue on that ground.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court’s orders.

-- 23 of 23 --