in Re: Dwight Campbell v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 593-94 3d Cir. 1992 explaining that a

CLD-140 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 25-1330
___________
IN RE: DWIGHT CAMPBELL,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Related to W.D. Pa. Civ. Nos. 3:20-cv-00151, 3:20-cv-00228)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 21
May 1, 2025
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed June 20, 2025)
_________
OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Pro se petitioner Dwight Campbell seeks a writ of prohibition. Because Campbell
has not demonstrated that he is entitled to such relief, we will deny his petition.
Campbell has filed several federal lawsuits regarding state court proceedings in
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Blair County, Pennsylvania. The District Court dismissed those cases, and we later
affirmed three of those dismissals, while a fourth appeal was dismissed for failure to
prosecute. In one of those cases, the District Court concluded that Campbell had
accumulated three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Campbell’s petition requests that this Court: (1) order the District Court to take
action on amended complaints and other documents he filed in his dismissed cases and
grant him equitable relief, and (2) prohibit courts from using the three-strikes rule against
him in the future. Campbell’s petition was dismissed for failure to prosecute in February
2025, after which he filed a motion to reopen and an application to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) in this case.
We grant his motions to reopen and proceed IFP. However, we will deny his
petition. A writ of mandamus or prohibition is a “drastic remedy” that may be granted
“only in extraordinary circumstances in response to an act amounting to a judicial
usurpation of power.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir.
2005) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 593-94 (3d Cir.
1992) (explaining that a petition for a writ of prohibition is governed by the same
standard as a mandamus petition). To obtain a writ of prohibition, “a party must establish
that (1) no other adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right
to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the
circumstances.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam)

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(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Campbell has not
met that standard.
Campbell has not shown a clear and indisputable right to submit filings and
receive rulings indefinitely in his attempts to relitigate issues in his cases, particularly
where he has had numerous opportunities to pursue his underlying claims, including on
appeal in this Court. Cf. Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining
that mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal). Additionally, to the extent that he asks
this Court to prevent a hypothetical future court from concluding that he has three strikes
under the PLRA, he has not explained why he would be unable to raise that issue it if
came up in a future case.
Accordingly, we will deny Campbell’s petition.

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