Samuel Cardenas v. Attorney General United States of America on Petition for Review of An Order of the…

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 25-1522
______________
SAMUEL CARDENAS,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
______________
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
(Agency No. A 201-953-491)
Immigration Judge: Adam Panopoulos
______________
Argued March 3, 2026
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Before: SHWARTZ, BIBAS, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 31, 2026)
______________
Zoey Jones
Edward M. McCarthey

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Brooklyn Defender Services
177 Livingston Street, 7th Floor
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Andrew D. Silverman
Harmann P. Singh [ARGUED]
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe
51 W 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019
Counsel for Petitioner
Alanna Thanh Duong [ARGUED]
Brooke M. Maurer
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
Counsel for Respondent
Joseph Craig Lawlor, Esq.
Haynes & Boone
30 Rockefeller Center
26th Floor
New York, NY 10112
Counsel for Amicus

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____________
OPINION
______________
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Samuel Cardenas petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal
of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his
applications for cancellation of removal and adjustment of
status under (1) the special rule for battered children, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(II), (“special rule cancellation”), and (2)
the provision for non-lawful permanent residents, id. §
1229b(b)(1), (“cancellation of removal”). Because special rule
cancellation is available to applicants who were abused by an
individual who was a legal permanent resident (“LPR”) or
citizen, and Cardenas’ abuser was an LPR or citizen at the time
he sought relief, we will grant the petition and remand for
further proceedings for consideration of Cardenas’s request for
special rule cancellation. However, we will deny the petition
to review his request for cancellation of removal because
substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Cardenas
failed to show his mother would suffer exceptional or
extremely unusual hardship due to his removal.
I
A
Cardenas is a native and citizen of the Dominican
Republic who first entered the United States without

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authorization in 1999 when he was fourteen. He lived in the
United States with his mother, Maria Perdomo, his brother, and
his stepfather, Francisco Escolastico, who were all in the
United States without authorization. Escolastico abused
Cardenas and Perdomo. Among other things, Escolastico
violently beat Perdomo daily, sealed the windows in their
home so she could not look outside, and forcibly searched her
body for evidence of infidelity. Escolastico also beat Cardenas
when he attempted to defend his mother. During this time,
Cardenas was Perdomo’s primary emotional support, and she
credits Cardenas with saving her life. Cardenas left home
when he was seventeen or eighteen years old to escape
Escolastico’s abuse, but he continued to support Perdomo
emotionally and financially.
Escolastico repeatedly threatened to report Perdomo to
immigration authorities to have her deported, so she left the
relationship only after she obtained LPR status. Escolastico
continued to terrorize Perdomo and forced her to sponsor his
LPR application. Eventually, Escolastico obtained LPR status
and, thereafter, threatened Cardenas on one occasion.1
After Perdomo ended her relationship with Escolastico,
she was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder and Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and attempted suicide at
least three times. Throughout, Cardenas emotionally
supported her and once called 911 to save her life. Perdomo
experiences guilt for exposing Cardenas to abuse and for his
lack of immigration status, and she suffers cognitive distortions
1 There is also some evidence in the record that
Escolastico became a citizen before Cardenas filed for special
rule cancellation.

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as a symptom of her depression and PTSD. Cardenas remains
her main source of emotional support.
B
In 2019, the Government charged Cardenas as
inadmissible for not possessing a valid entry document.2
Cardenas conceded the charge of removability but applied for
cancellation of removal and adjustment of status under (1)
special rule cancellation, and (2) cancellation of removal. Both
types of cancellation require showing that removal would
result in hardship on qualifying relatives. 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(1)(D) & (b)(2)(A)(v). To show hardship, Cardenas
presented a psychoanalyst who stated that the abuse Perdomo
experienced was the worst she had ever heard and that
Perdomo would be at a greater risk of suicide if Cardenas were
deported because she would experience more cognitive
distortions and increased depression. The IJ also heard
evidence that Perdomo was separated from Escolastico,
remarried, drew support from her children and other family
members, was fully employed, and no longer feared
Escolastico.
The IJ denied Cardenas’s applications. First, the IJ
relied on Matter of L-L-P-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 241 (BIA 2021), to
conclude that Escolastico abused Cardenas but Cardenas was
not eligible for special rule cancellation because Escolastico
was not an LPR at the time of the abuse. Second, the IJ
concluded that Cardenas was not entitled to cancellation of
2 Cardenas was arrested while traveling in Mexico and
involuntarily paroled into the United States to face criminal
prosecution. All criminal charges against him were dropped.

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removal because he did not show Perdomo would experience
greater hardship than would be expected when a close family
member is deported. The IJ acknowledged Perdomo’s suicide
attempts but emphasized that Perdomo would receive adequate
mental health support from her husband and other family
members, is working full time, and no longer fears Escolastico.
In a split decision, the BIA ruled that the IJ did not
clearly err. The BIA unanimously held that, to be eligible for
special rule cancellation, the abuser must be a citizen or LPR
at the time of abuse, and Escolastico lacked that status when
the abuse occurred. As to cancellation of removal, the BIA
majority agreed with the IJ that Perdomo’s mental
decompensation would not be exceptional or unusually
extreme if Cardenas were deported, while the dissenter opined
that Cardenas’s deportation would cause “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to his mother, given the extreme
nature of the abuse she experienced in the past.” CAR 11.
Cardenas petitions for review of each ruling.
II3
A
As relevant here, under special rule cancellation, the
Attorney General may cancel removal of an inadmissible or
3 The IJ had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a) and
8 C.F.R. § 1208.2, the BIA had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §
1103 and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), and we have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (2)(D). When the BIA issues its

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deportable alien who “demonstrates that . . . the alien has been
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a . . . parent4 who
is or was” an LPR.5 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). We
must decide whether “is or was” refers to the abuser’s
own opinion and does not “simply adopt the opinion of the IJ,
we review . . . the BIA’s decision as the final agency decision.”
Nelson v. Att’y Gen., 685 F.3d 318, 320-21 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citations omitted). “[T]o the extent the BIA deferred to or
adopted the IJ’s reasoning, we also look to and consider the
decision of the IJ on those points.” Id. at 321 (citing Chavarria
v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006)). We review
legal determinations of the BIA de novo. Sesay v. Att’y Gen.,
787 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2015).
4 An applicant who was abused by a stepparent can also
satisfy this condition. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(B) (defining
“child” to include “a stepchild. . . provided the child had not
reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage
creating the status of stepchild occurred”); Medina-Morales v.
Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 520, 531 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that
the statute “does not distinguish among stepchildren and
natural children”). Escolastico was Cardenas’s stepfather at
the time of the abuse, through his then-valid marriage to
Perdomo.
5 Special rule cancellation also requires a showing that
“the removal would result in extreme hardship to the alien, the
alien’s child, or the alien’s parent.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(v).

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immigration status when the abuse occurred or at some other
time.6
“As with any question of statutory interpretation, our
analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.”
Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (citation
omitted). “The people are entitled to rely on the law as written,
without fearing that courts might disregard its plain terms
based on some extratextual consideration,” so “when the
meaning of the statute’s terms is plain, our job is at an end.”
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 674 (2020). A
6 Although the parties agree that we need not consider
whether the clause of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) that
provides that cancellation of removal is available if the alien
“has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty” means that
the alien must show that the abuse was occurring when he
sought relief or whether it only applies to an alien subjected to
past abuse, we address that question here. The text
demonstrates that the statute applies to applicants who were
being abused when relief was sought as well as to those whose
abuse ended before the applicant sought special rule
cancellation because the phrase “has been” denotes “an act,
state, or condition that is now completed or continues up to the
present.” See Mejia-Castanon v. Att’y Gen., 931 F.3d 224,
233 n.10 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Chicago Manual of Style §
5.132, at 268 (17th ed. 2017)); see also Hewitt v. United States,
606 U.S. 419, 427-28 (2025) (discussing present-perfect
tense). By using “has been” in this context, Congress was
referring to the immutable fact that the alien was abused at
some point in time. The use of “is or was” elsewhere in the
provision refers to the immigration status of the abuser, which
can change.

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statute’s use of the present-tense verb “is” generally includes
the future as well as the present. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie,
239 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc); see also 1 U.S.C.
§ 1 (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,
unless the context indicates otherwise . . . words used in the
present tense include the future as well as the present.”). The
word “was” refers to the past. United States v. Atiyeh, 402
F.3d 354, 364 (3d Cir. 2005). Read in context, the statute
addresses the act of battery by a particular actor, here, the
parent. It then addresses the actor’s status, and given the use
of the phrase “is or was,” it covers actors who at some point
before the application for relief was adjudicated had LPR
status, and thus applies even if the abuser lacked that status at
the time of the abuse.7 If Congress meant to limit the statute’s
coverage to only abusers who were LPRs at the time of abuse,
it would have used language such as “who was then” an LPR.
Instead, Congress chose language that captures actors who
committed abuse either (1) while they were an LPR and
subsequently retained or lost their immigration status, or (2)
gained LPR status after the abuse. Accordingly, the statutory
language that “the alien has been battered or subjected to
extreme cruelty by a . . . parent who is or was a lawful
permanent resident” demonstrates that relief is not limited to
cases where abusers were LPRs when the abuse occurred, but
also applies to cases where abusers were LPRs at some point
before relief for special rule cancellation is adjudicated. 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(II); see Saleheen v. Holder, 618
F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2010) (observing that, “[a]ccording to
7 An alien may also move to amend any application for
relief that is pending if, after the initial application has been
filed, the abuser obtains LPR status. See 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).

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the BIA, the [requirement] that the abusive [parent] ‘is or was
a lawful permanent resident’ [applies] . . . ‘where an alien is
abused by an individual who is not [an LPR at the time of the
abuse], but who is . . . at the time the abused alien seeks
relief’”); In re Tabassum Saleheen, A097 967 736, at 4-5 (BIA
July 20, 2009).8
Arriving at the opposite conclusion, the BIA here relied
on Matter of L-L-P-, which held that the special cancellation
statute “is susceptible to more than one interpretation” and thus
“ambiguous” because “[t]he word ‘is’ in these provisions could
be interpreted to mean that the [abuser] held United States
citizenship or [LPR] status at the time of the . . . abuse, or . . .
at the time the application for cancellation of removal was
filed.” 28 I. & N. Dec. at 243. This conclusion violates basic
rules of grammar because “is” is a present-tense, not past-
tense, verb. Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 408 (2019)
(quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The
8 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did not
assess the BIA’s conclusion “that the statute’s plain language
did not require that the abusive spouse be [an LPR] when the
abuse occurred,” Saleheen, 618 F.3d at 960, but the BIA in
Saleheen concluded that the purpose and legislative history of
§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(II)—which emphasized “that Congress
intended to afford broad protection to aliens in abusive
relationships”—supported “the most straightforward reading
of the statutory language . . . i.e., that it applies to all aliens
whose qualifying spouse [or parent] is [an LPR] or United
States citizen at the time of the application, without regard to
whether the spouse [or parent] acquired the status after the
abuse.” A097 967 736, at 4-5.

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Interpretation of Legal Texts 140 (2012)) (noting that “‘rules
of grammar govern’ statutory interpretation ‘unless they
contradict legislative intent or purpose’”). L-L-P’s
interpretation also renders “or was” superfluous. There would
be no need for the disjunctive “is or was” if the statute were
concerned only with the abuser’s status at the time of the abuse.
See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (citation
omitted) (“It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every
clause and word of a statute.’”). Because “is” unambiguously
refers to the present, which under the statute captures the
period up until the application for relief is adjudicated, the
BIA’s interpretation does not comport with the plain text,
which includes abusers who became LPRs between the time
the abuse occurred and when the application for relief is
decided. Bostock, 590 U.S. at 674.9
9 The BIA’s reliance on materials beyond the statute’s
text introduced additional errors. First, the BIA interpreted a
parenthetical in a neighboring provision, which provides that
an applicant may be “(. . . the parent of a child of a United
States citizen and the child has been battered or subjected to
extreme cruelty by such citizen parent),” to conclude that
“Congress used the phrase ‘by such citizen parent’ to explicitly
tie the abusive parent’s citizenship status to the past abuse,
indicating that the abusive parent must have possessed United
States citizenship status at the time the abuse took place.” L-
L-P-, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 244. The BIA’s interpretation of the
phrase “has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty”
relied on the mistaken premise that the “present perfect tense”
denotes that the abuse had been completed. Id. The present
perfect tense can refer either to acts that “continue[] up to the
present” or past events. Mejia-Castanon, 931 F.3d at 233 n.10

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Because Cardenas’s abuser was an LPR or citizen when
Cardenas applied for relief, he satisfies the requirement that he
“has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a . . .
parent who is or was a lawful permanent resident.” 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). We will therefore remand to the BIA
for it to remand to the IJ to determine whether Cardenas has
satisfied § 1229b(b)(2)’s other conditions10 and whether to
(quoting Chicago Manual of Style § 5.132, at 268 (17th ed.
2017)). In the clause of the statute, the focus is on the
petitioner and whether he has been “battered or subject to
extreme cruelty” and not the timing of the “parent[’s]”
immigration status. The only statutory language relevant to the
timing of the parent’s immigration status are the verbs “is or
was.” Second, because the statue is unambiguous, the BIA
should not have relied on legislative history. Bostock, 590
U.S. at 674 (“[I]t is ultimately the provisions of those
legislative commands rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed.” (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)).
10 One condition for receiving special rule cancellation
is that “removal would result in extreme hardship to the alien,
the alien’s child, or the alien’s parent.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(v). While the BIA assessed whether
“removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen
of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence” for cancellation of removal under
§ 1292b(b)(1)(D), it did not assess the separate, differently-
worded hardship condition under § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(v).
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (“removal would result in
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s

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grant or deny this discretionary relief. See Saleheen, 618 F.3d
at 960 (“Section 1229b(b) provides that the attorney general
‘may’ grant cancellation of removal to an eligible individual
and thus the attorney general’s decision whether to grant or
deny relief is discretionary.”).
B11
We next review the BIA’s decision that Cardenas failed
to show that a qualifying family member would suffer
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” which is
required to obtain cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(1)(D). To meet this standard, the alien must show
that the hardship on the family member is “substantially
beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a
close family member leaves this country.” Wilkinson v. Att’y
Gen., 131 F.4th 134, 142 (3d Cir. 2025) (quotations and
citations omitted). “In evaluating the degree of hardship,
courts and the agency consider the ‘ages, health, and
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence”), with id.
§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(v) (“removal would result in extreme
hardship to the alien, the alien’s child, or the alien’s parent”).
11 “[T]he substantial-evidence standard governs review
of a hardship determination in a cancellation-of-removal
proceeding.” Wilkinson v. Att’y Gen., 131 F.4th 134, 142 (3d
Cir. 2025). Under the deferential substantial-evidence
standard, we uphold the agency’s findings “unless the evidence
not only supports a contrary conclusion but compels it.”
Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).

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circumstances’ of qualifying relatives.” Id. at 143 (quoting In
re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 63 (BIA 2001)).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that
Perdomo would not suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” if Cardenas were deported. 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(1)(D). As an initial matter, the IJ’s and BIA’s
opinions contradict Cardenas’s argument that they failed to
consider evidence that Perdomo would be at an increased risk
of suicide if Cardenas were deported as both the IJ and BIA
discussed her history of suicidality and the expert report’s
prediction that Perdomo was at risk of mental decompensation.
The IJ recognized Perdomo’s trauma but concluded that she (1)
would receive adequate mental health support from her
husband, children, and other family members, (2) works full
time, and (3) no longer fears Escolastico. The BIA reasonably
concluded that these changed circumstances mitigated the
mental health consequences Cardenas’s deportation would
cause. We do not minimize the severity of Perdomo’s terrible
experience, but the evidence in the record does not compel a
conclusion other than that reached by the BIA—that
Cardenas’s removal would not cause Perdomo “extremely
unusual hardship.” Wilkinson, 131 F.4th at 144-45.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the petition in
part, deny it in part, and remand.

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