25-2036 Susan Kerr v. County of Allegheny

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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Nos. 25-1775, 25-2036
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SUSAN KERR,
Appellant
v.
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY; JACOB PORTER;
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER,
a Pennsylvania Non-Profit Corporation;
WESTERN PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTE AND CLINIC, a division of UPMC
JOHN/JANE DOE
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 2:24-cv-00805)
District Judge: Honorable Robert J. Colville
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 16, 2026
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Before: MATEY, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 20, 2026)

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OPINION*
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CHUNG, Circuit Judge.
Following her seizure pursuant to an application for emergency mental health
treatment, Susan Kerr brought Fourteenth Amendment and Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act claims against Allegheny County and Jacob Porter (“Allegheny
Defendants”), and University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and Western Psychiatric
Institute and Clinic (“Hospital Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The District
Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss and Kerr appealed. For the reasons set
forth below, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
I. BACKGROUND1
Kerr resides in Allegheny County and shared a house with her wife until August
27, 2023. On that date, Kerr’s wife initiated an Application for Involuntary Emergency
Examination (the “Application”) under the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act
(“MHPA”), completing Part I of the Application. Kerr has bipolar disorder II,
generalized anxiety, and complex post-traumatic stress disorder. Porter, an Allegheny
County caseworker, completed Part III of the Application, which consisted of authorizing
and issuing a warrant for Kerr to be assessed for possible involuntary commitment and
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
1 Because we write for the parties, we recite only the facts pertinent to our decision.

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emergency mental health treatment. In turn, law enforcement executed the warrant,
removing Kerr from her home and transporting her to Western Psychiatric Institute and
Clinic (“Western Psych”) for evaluation.
The Defendants failed to complete Parts IV and V of the Application, which
required that Kerr’s rights be explained to her and that her personal property and the
premises where she resided be secured. While Kerr was at Western Psych, her wife
changed their home’s locks and told a Western Psych staff member that she did not want
Kerr returning to their property. Hospital Defendants did not relay this information to
Kerr.
A physician at Western Psych assessed Kerr and determined she was not in need
of emergency involuntary treatment. Kerr was discharged from Western Psych at
approximately 5:00 p.m., five hours after her arrival. Upon her return, Kerr was unable
to enter her home, retrieve her personal property, and gain possession of her pets. Kerr
retrieved some of her personal property approximately two weeks later, and was allowed
to see her pets in December 2023. Kerr was only able to return to her home and fully
regain her personal property and her pets on March 10, 2024.
On June 4, 2024, Kerr filed a complaint, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against all Defendants for deprivation of property without due process per the Fourteenth
Amendment, and under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
Hospital Defendants and Allegheny Defendants moved for dismissal of Kerr’s complaint
in August and September of 2023, respectively. The District Court granted their motions

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with leave to amend on March 28, 2025. Kerr stood on her Complaint and timely
appealed.
II. DISCUSSION2
A motion to dismiss will be granted where the complaint does not contain
sufficient factual allegations that, with the presumption of truth, state a plausible claim
for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Moreover, “[w]hile a complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations[,]” a plaintiff must offer “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The court “draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party.” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d
Cir. 2002).
On appeal, Kerr argues the District Court granted the Defendants’ motions to
dismiss in error because her complaint plausibly stated due process and ADA claims
upon which relief could be granted.
A. The District Court Properly Dismissed Kerr’s Due Process Claims
To state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must
show: “(i) a deprivation of life, liberty, or property; (ii) by a state actor; (iii) without due
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a grant of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state claim de novo. Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).

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process of law.” Parker v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 158 F.4th 470, 481 (3d
Cir. 2025).
1. Kerr Did Not Suffer a Deprivation by a State Actor
Kerr maintains that Hospital Defendants are state actors and that they, together
with Allegheny Defendants, deprived her of property interests without due process.3
However, even if we were to credit Kerr’s argument that Hospital Defendants are state
actors, her Fourteenth Amendment claims against all of the Defendants fail because it
was her wife who changed the locks of their home and denied Kerr access to the
property. Kerr makes no argument that her wife is a state actor. In any case, her wife
would not qualify as one under any of the tests for state action used by this Court. Kach
v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). Thus, any deprivation Kerr suffered did not
occur “by a state actor[,]” Parker, 158 F.4th at 481, and dismissal of Kerr’s Fourteenth
Amendment claims was warranted.4
2. Kerr’s Monell Claim Necessarily Fails Without an Underlying
Violation of a Constitutional Right
3 Kerr’s complaint claimed only a deprivation of her property interest, so we do not
address the liberty interest she alludes to in her appellate brief.
4 Kerr asserts that the MHPA procedure inherently recognizes that she had a special
relationship with the Defendants and that they therefore had a duty to safeguard her
property. She does not develop this as an argument distinct from her procedural due
process claim, however. Even assuming that she asserts a separate argument and that
such a relationship exists, the defendants would not have the duty she asserts. This is
because the statement by Kerr’s wife would not give the Defendants reason to foresee
that Kerr would be refused access to her belongings and pets for months. See Nicini v.
Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 807-12 (3d Cir. 2000).

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Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell, there must have been a
violation of a constitutional right for municipal liability to attach. See Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Because Kerr has not
plausibly alleged a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, there is no underlying
injury upon which Kerr can bring a Monell claim against Allegheny. Consequently, we
will affirm the dismissal of Kerr’s Monell claim.
B. The District Court Properly Dismissed Kerr’s ADA Claims
The ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Therefore, to bring about a claim under Title II of
the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) they are qualified individuals; (2) with a
disability; and (3) they were excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or were subjected to discrimination by
any such entity; (4) by reason of their disability.” Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 225
(3d Cir. 2023).
Kerr argues that she pled facts from which it could be reasonably inferred that the
Defendants discriminated against her because of her disability. Kerr further contends that
the District Court applied a heightened pleading standard in granting the Defendants’
motions to dismiss Kerr’s complaint. Both arguments lack merit.
First, Kerr asserts that Hospital Defendants are ADA public entities because they
were contractually obligated to provide care for people committed pursuant to the

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MHPA. Although “[t]he text of the ADA is deliberately broad[,]” id. at 179, we have
previously stated that an entity’s status as private cannot be changed to public by a mere
contractual relationship with a local government, Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 145
(3d Cir. 2025). We reach the same conclusion here: the provision of care by Hospital
Defendants, as part of the MHPA’s commitment process, without more, falls short of
transforming Hospital Defendants into a covered entity. Accordingly, the District Court
properly dismissed Kerr’s ADA claims against Hospital Defendants.
Even if the Hospital Defendants were covered entities, Kerr’s ADA claims would
fail against all Defendants as she did not plausibly allege that she was denied any benefit
“by reason of” her disability. Causation is a necessary component of an ADA claim. CG
v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2013). Presently, the
Complaint only asserts perfunctorily that the Defendants discriminated against her on the
basis of her disability but fails to allege any facts from which such a conclusion can
reasonably be inferred. We have held that “the clearest indication that an allegation is
conclusory and unworthy of weight in analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint is that it
embodies a legal point.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir.
2016). Kerr’s repeated assertion that the Defendants discriminated against her due to her
disability “embodies a legal point,” id., namely causation, and is the type of conclusory
statement that we have said fails to plausibly state a claim’s element. Davis v. Wells
Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2016) (in assessing whether a complaint states a claim,
court sets aside conclusory allegations). Kerr nonetheless argues that the District Court
“did not analyze the facts pled in the light most favorable” to her. Plaintiff’s Opening Br.

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at 31. But there were no factual allegations for the District Court to construe in her favor,
only conclusory allegations which it need not accept. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Consequently, we will affirm the dismissal of Kerr’s
ADA claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons presented above, we affirm.

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