Achilles Cedric Curbison v. United States of America

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 25-2893
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ACHILLES CEDRIC CURBISON,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; PHILLIP L. BUVIA, Special Agent; EDWARD R.
DAVIS, Agent; MICHAEL T. POULTON, Agent; ANDREW SCHIFF, AUSA;
ROBERT J. CLEARY, Former U.S. Attorney
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-15408)
District Judge: Honorable Edward S. Kiel
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 17, 2026
Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed March 20, 2026)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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2
Achilles Curbison, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP), appeals from
the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
This case is Curbison’s second attempt to sue federal agents who he claims
illegally seized and destroyed his property. In 2005, Curbison filed a lawsuit in the
District Court against the United States and federal agents, alleging constitutional
violations and violations under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) stemming from the
seizure of his real property. See Curbison v. United States, D.N.J. Civ. No. 05-cv-05280
(“Case 1”). After the District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for
summary judgement, Curbison appealed and this Court affirmed the District Court’s
judgment. See Curbison v. U.S. Gov’t of N.J., 242 F. App’x 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) (per
curiam).1
In September 2025, Curbison brought the instant case against the same defendants
he sued in Case 1, alleging violations under the constitution and the FTCA, stemming
from the same seizure he complained of in Case 1. The District Court granted Curbison
1 The District Court’s order disposed of all of Curbison’s claims as to the named and
served defendants, rendering it a final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Curbison,
242 F. App’x at 808 n.3 (so holding). At the same time, the District Court granted
Curbison leave to file an amended complaint that named new defendants, providing it did
not contain claims that had already been dismissed. That amended complaint created “a
new action.” Curbison, 242 F. App’x at 808 n.3. In that new action, Curbison failed to
serve any new defendants with process, and the case was dismissed for failure to
prosecute.

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3
leave to proceed IFP, and dismissed his complaint with prejudice because it determined
that his claims were barred by res judicata. Curbison filed a timely notice of appeal and
has filed a pro se brief in support of his appeal in this Court.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo an order
dismissing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
III.
We agree with the judgment of the District Court, because Curbison’s claims are
barred by res judicata.2 In order for the doctrine to apply, there must be “(1) a final
judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and
(3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.” Duhaney v. Att'y Gen., 621 F.3d
340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010).
Each of those requirements was satisfied here. Each of the parties Curbison named
in his complaint was previously named in Case 1. Curbison’s current suit arises from the
same cause of action—the purportedly illegal seizure of his property—as did the first
suit. Lastly, there was a final judgment on the merits in Curbison’s previous suit because
2 Though res judicata is an affirmative defense, it is appropriate for a court to raise the
issue sua sponte if the court is on notice that it has decided the issue previously. See
Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000). Given that Curbison filed Case 1 and
the instant case in the same court, the District Court was on notice that the issue had
previously been decided, and properly raised the issue of claim preclusion sua sponte. See
id.

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a dismissal for failure to state a claim constitutes a final judgment on the merits, see
Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981), as does a grant of
summary judgment, see generally Papera v. Pa. Quarried Bluestone Co., 948 F.3d 607,
610 (3d Cir. 2020). Thus, his complaint is barred by res judicata. See Duhaney, 621 F.3d
at 347.
The District Court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, and did not abuse its
discretion in determining that granting leave to amend would have been futile. See
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we will
affirm the decision of the District Court.

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