Orguna Sanders v. City of Erie

CLD-125 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 26-1135
___________
ORGUNA SANDERS,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF ERIE; DANIEL SPIZARNY, Chief of Police for City of Erie; SUZANNE C.
MACK, District Magistrate Judge; NICHOLAS A. MASKERY, District Attorney;
JEREMY C. LIGHTNER, District Attorney; K.M. MULLANEY, Erie Police Dept
PTLM; JOSEPH SCHEMBER, Mayor of the City of Erie
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00355)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Richard A. Lanzillo
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 30, 2026
Before: BIBAS, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed May 21, 2026)
_________
OPINION*
_________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM
Orguna Sanders, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s judgment against him in a civil-rights action.
We will summarily affirm.
I.
Sanders filed a complaint in the District Court1 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the City of Erie, its mayor, its chief of police, an individual Erie police officer
(“Erie City Defendants”), two Erie County assistant district attorneys (“ADA
Defendants”), and a Magistrate Judge alleging that the police officer, K.M. Mullaney,
initiated certain criminal charges against him without probable cause. Sanders claimed
that the Magistrate Judge improperly increased his bail because of those allegedly
baseless criminal charges, and that the ADA Defendants maliciously prosecuted him on
those charges.
After Sanders filed his operative amended complaint, all defendants filed motions
to dismiss his complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court granted the motion as to
the Magistrate Judge and the ADA defendants, concluding that they were immune from
1 In this case, a United States Magistrate Judge presided over the District Court
proceedings pursuant to the parties’ consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Accordingly, we
will refer to the Magistrate Judge as “the District Court.”

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suit. The Court also dismissed the claims against the mayor, and the chief of police, and
so the case continued solely against Officer Mullaney.
After a period of discovery, Sanders and Mullaney each moved for summary
judgment, which the Court granted in favor of Mullaney, concluding that he had
sufficient probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings against Sanders. After the Court
denied Sanders’s motion for reconsideration, he filed a timely appeal. In this Court,
Sanders has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and has filed a brief that
has been construed as a document in support of his appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review district court decisions
regarding both summary judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim under the
same de novo standard of review.” Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822,
826 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation modified). We may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to
present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
III.
The District Court properly dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the Magistrate
Judge and the ADA defendants who were involved in adjudicating and prosecuting
criminal charges against him. Plaintiff’s claim against Judge Mack fails because his
allegations against her arise exclusively from her conduct while acting as a judge. He

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complains that she approved a criminal complaint against him and increased his bail, but
“[a] judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and
will not be liable for his judicial acts.” Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir.
2006) (per curiam). Therefore, the District Court’s dismissal of Sanders’s claims against
her was proper.
The claims against the ADA defendants were also properly dismissed, because the
ADA defendants enjoy prosecutorial immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
427 (1976). A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity when she “function[s] as the
state's advocate while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional
violation.” Yarris v. Cnty. of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation
modified). Here, Sanders alleges that the ADA defendants were maliciously prosecuting
him because the criminal charges they prosecuted were brought, allegedly, without
probable cause; however, a district attorney acting “within the scope of his duties in
initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution” is immune from suit, even when a litigant
alleges a lack of probable cause. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124 (1997) (citation
modified).
Plaintiff’s claims against Erie City’s mayor and chief of police were properly
dismissed, because defendants in a § 1983 action cannot be held liable under a theory of
vicarious liability or respondeat superior, unless he alleges that there was a custom or

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policy maintained by these defendants that led to a constitutional violation. See Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Sanders does not allege that
either of these individuals was personally involved in his prosecution, and his allegation
that they maintained a custom of violating “the rights of those individuals whom they
come in contact with” is conclusory, and unsupported by any factual allegation. It was
therefore proper for the District Court to dismiss these claims.
The District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Officer
Mullaney. In order to succeed on any of the false arrest, false imprisonment or malicious
prosecution claims Sanders sought to bring against Mullaney, he needed to establish that
Mullaney did not have probable cause to initiate criminal charges against him. See
Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2020). Specifically, Sanders
claimed that Mullaney lacked probable cause to initiate charges of “terroristic threats”
and “disorderly conduct” against him, stemming from an incident where Sanders
allegedly threatened to kill a teenage girl, S.C., outside of her school.
Here, after receiving an initial complaint regarding the incident, Mullaney spoke
directly with S.C., who confirmed the identification of Sanders as the individual who
threatened her. The victim’s eyewitness identification of Sanders to Officer Mullaney is
sufficient to establish probable cause. See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 791 (3d Cir.
2000) (“When a police officer has received a reliable identification by a victim of his or

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her attacker, the police have probable cause.” (citation modified)). To the extent that
Sanders complains about Mullaney’s insufficient investigation, we have held that “post-
hoc claims about investigative deficiencies do not undermine probable cause.” Wexler v.
Hawkins, —F.4th --, 2026 WL 1090195, at *4 (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2026).
In his motion for summary judgment, Sanders complains that Mullaney’s criminal
complaint against him was illegal because it lacked an affidavit of probable cause;
however, an affidavit is only required when an officer seeks an arrest warrant. See 234
Pa. Code Rule 513. Because Mullaney did not seek an arrest warrant, and merely issued a
summons for Sanders to appear at a preliminary hearing, no affidavit was necessary. See
234 Pa. Code Rule 504 (detailing the requirements of a criminal complaint).
Finally, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of
Sanders’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. See Fed. Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher,
807 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that “abuse of discretion” is the standard under
which Rule 59(e) motion denials are reviewed). The Court construed Sanders’s motion as
a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, but determined that he failed to demonstrate that
he was entitled to relief. See Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176
F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, because this appeal presents no substantial
question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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