Deborah Lee Roseboro v. the Executive Office of the United States Department of Justice

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 26-2032
__________
DEBORAH LEE ROSEBORO,
Appellant
v.
THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE; THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE’S OFFICE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-05418)
District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 13, 2026
Before: MATEY, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 15, 2026)
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OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Deborah Lee Roseboro, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the
District Court’s order dismissing her complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). For
the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
Roseboro, who is a Black woman, filed a complaint against two of her former
supervisors at the United States Trustee’s Office in Philadelphia, Andrew R. Vara and
Frederic J. Baker, alleging race-based discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e – 2000e-17. Her complaint form indicated
that the discriminatory conduct included termination, a failure to promote her, and
retaliation. The District Court permitted Roseboro to proceed IFP and subsequently
dismissed the complaint without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), noting
that federal employees can only bring Title VII allegations against the “head of the
department, agency, or unit, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)[,]” and Roseboro failed to do
so. See ECF 6 at 4.
The court granted Roseboro leave to amend within 30 days, and she subsequently
filed an amended complaint against the Executive Office of the United States Department
of Justice and the United States Trustee’s Office. The District Court again dismissed the
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), explaining that Roseboro had failed to
name a proper defendant and that her allegations were insufficient to state plausible
claims of racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. She was also advised that
she must “articulate [her factual allegations] in narrative form” and that she could not rely
on exhibits to state her claims. ECF 11 at 7.

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Roseboro was again provided leave to amend, and she filed a second amended
complaint against the Executive Office of the Department of Justice and the United States
Trustee’s Office. The District Court determined that the second amended complaint failed
to cure the deficiencies of the first two and dismissed the case with prejudice. Roseboro
timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise de novo review over
the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
The District Court dismissed Roseboro’s complaint because she had again failed
to name a proper defendant. See Williams v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 830 F.2d 27,
29 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (providing that federal employees
must bring Title VII claims against “the head of the department, agency, or unit”)). The
court also concluded that Roseboro had failed to state a claim for employment
discrimination or retaliation under Title VII. See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809
F.3d 780, 791 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that, to state a discrimination claim under Title
VII, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to “raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence that [her] protected status . . . played either a motivating or
determinative factor” in the employer’s adverse employment action”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).
Roseboro agrees with the District Court’s disposition of her claims. Indeed, her
informal appellate brief states that the District Court neither incorrectly decided the facts

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nor applied the wrong law. She states that the District Court gave her “three attempts to
comply with procedural rules,” and asks this Court to remand her case for yet another
chance “due to [her] pro se status.” C.A. Doc. 6 at 1.
Though we liberally construe pro se filings, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972) (per curiam), “federal courts treat pro se litigants the same as any other
litigant.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). Further, the
“District Court has discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend where the plaintiff was
put on notice as to the deficiencies in [her] complaint, but chose not to resolve them.”
Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (per
curiam). Here, the District Court’s first two memorandum dismissal orders explained
how Roseboro could properly plead her claims under the relevant standards. See ECF 6 &
11. Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to determine that further amendment
would be futile. See Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d
478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied leave to amend after providing two opportunities for amendment).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

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