United States of America v. Christopher Lee Foster, a/k/a Capone

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4070
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LEE FOSTER, a/k/a Capone,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:10-cr-00644-CCB-2)
Submitted: January 30, 2015 Decided: February 6, 2015
Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F. X. Becker, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod
J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Michael T. Packard,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Christopher Lee Foster appeals his conviction pursuant
to a guilty plea to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951(a) (2012), and to possessing
and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). Foster
argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because the
district court failed to define the term “brandish” during the
plea colloquy. We affirm.
Because Foster did not move in the district court to
withdraw his plea, this court reviews this claim for plain
error. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525-26 (4th
Cir. 2002). To establish plain error, Foster must show: (1) an
error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error
affected his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 732 (1993). In the context of a guilty plea, an error
affects substantial rights if there is “a reasonable probability
that, but for the error, [the defendant] would not have entered
the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83
(2004).
We find that Foster has failed to show that the
alleged defect in the plea colloquy affected his substantial
rights. We “presume that in most cases defense counsel

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routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail
to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.”
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976). Foster testified
during the plea hearing that he was satisfied with counsel’s
representation and understood the elements of the offenses to
which he was pleading guilty. Foster’s ability to consult with
counsel on such matters was demonstrated at the plea hearing,
when Foster responded to the district court’s inquiries
regarding his understanding of the conspiracy charge by excusing
himself to speak with counsel. Foster does not now allege that
his testimony was false or that he was ever under a
misapprehension of what “brandish” meant. Nor does Foster
allege that he would not have pled guilty if the district court
had defined this term.
Because Foster has failed to show that the alleged
defect affected his substantial rights, we affirm the judgment
of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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