United States of America v. Radrecus De Mario Young

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4711
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RADRECUS DE MARIO YOUNG,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior District Judge. (6:18-cr-00177-HMH-1)
Submitted: April 25, 2019 Decided: April 29, 2019
Before FLOYD and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Justin William
Holloway, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Radrecus De Mario Young appeals his convictions and the 102-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea to three counts of possession with intent to distribute
controlled substances, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense,
and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), addressing whether Young’s sentence is
reasonable, but conceding there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Young was advised
of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so. The Government has
moved to dismiss the appeal as barred by Young’s waiver of the right to appeal included
in the plea agreement. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
We review de novo the validity of an appeal waiver. United States v. Copeland,
707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013). We generally will enforce a waiver “if the record
establishes that the waiver is valid and that the issue being appealed is within the scope of
the waiver.” United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A defendant’s waiver is valid if he “knowingly and
intelligently agreed to it.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010).
Upon review of the plea agreement and the transcript of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
hearing, we conclude that Young knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal
his convictions and sentence, except as to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
prosecutorial misconduct, or future changes in the law that affect his sentence. We
conclude that the waiver is valid and enforceable.

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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver. We
therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal. This court requires that
counsel inform Young, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Young requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Young. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED

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