Cameron Paul Crockett v. Harold W. Clarke

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-6636
CAMERON PAUL CROCKETT,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
HAROLD W. CLARKE,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. M. Hannah Lauck, District Judge. (3:18-cv-00139-MHL-RCY)
Argued: March 8, 2022 Decided: May 24, 2022
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in which Judge
Wilkinson and Judge Niemeyer joined.
ARGUED: Lauren Elizabeth Bateman, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW
CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Victoria Lee Johnson, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Erica Hashimoto, Director, Nicolas Sansone, Supervising Attorney, Hassan
Ahmad, Student Counsel, Meredith Manuel, Student Counsel, Appellate Litigation
Program, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, K. Scott Miles, Deputy Attorney General,
Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

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QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:
A Virginia jury convicted Cameron Crockett of involuntary manslaughter after his
car crashed into a tree killing the front seat passenger. To reach this result, the jury
concluded that Crockett was driving under the influence at the time of the crash. Crockett
subsequently sought post-conviction relief in Virginia state court, claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel. Crockett, who insisted he was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of
the accident, asserted that his lawyer failed to investigate evidence of the operation and use
of the driver’s seatbelt. He claimed that a proper investigation would have revealed the
driver’s seatbelt was used at the time of the accident, meaning he could not have been the
driver. The Virginia courts disagreed. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Virginia, after
considering the full record, held that, although the counsel’s performance fell below the
standard of care, that failure did not prejudice Crockett.
In response, Crockett brought a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
making essentially the same arguments. In doing so, he confronts an extraordinary standard
of review. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
precludes a federal court from granting habeas relief on a claim decided on the merits in a
state court unless it determines the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record evidence. That standard of
review proves fatal to Crockett’s habeas claims. While one might reasonably come to a
different conclusion than the Supreme Court of Virginia, the court’s decision was far from

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unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Crockett’s § 2254
petition.
I.
A. The Accident
Late on the night of December 28, 2008, Crockett’s 1998 Honda Accord two-door
coupe crashed into a tree after accelerating down Wolfsnare Road in Virginia Beach,
Virginia. One person walking on Wolfsnare Road witnessed the crash. Several neighbors
heard sounds from the impending accident, notified the police and rushed to the accident
scene. Officers arrived within minutes. They found Crockett’s best friend, Jack Korte, dead
in the front passenger seat area. They found Crockett unconscious, with his upper body in
the backseat area, while his legs and feet were in the front of the car over a collapsed front
seat. No one remembered Crockett wearing a seatbelt. No one saw anyone else in the car
or observed anyone leaving the scene. Crockett was intoxicated.
B. The Trial
The Commonwealth of Virginia charged Crockett with involuntary manslaughter.1
At trial, Crockett claimed he was not the driver. Instead, he maintained that another friend,
Jacob Palmer, was driving when the car crashed. Crockett said he and Korte were together
earlier that night drinking. They met up with Palmer at a party at an apartment some two
or so miles from the accident site. At the party, all three made plans to smoke marijuana,
1 The Commonwealth initially charged Crockett with aggravated involuntary
manslaughter. A jury found him not guilty of aggravated involuntary manslaughter but
guilty of a lesser included offense. However, after the jury could not agree on a sentence,
the court declared a mistrial. We thus focus on Crockett’s second trial.

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but they did not have any cigarette rolling papers which are commonly associated with the
use of marijuana. So, they decided to go to a store to buy some. Crockett insisted he knew
that he was too drunk to drive, so he gave his keys to Palmer. Crockett said he sat in the
back seat and let Korte take the front seat because Korte was “[a] bit taller.” J.A. 736, 762.
He also said he let one of his friends—he could not remember which one—borrow one of
his jackets from the car.
Consistent with Crockett’s version of the events, one of the party hosts testified that
Palmer asked him if he needed anything from the store. After that, the host said he did not
see Crockett, Palmer or Korte for about an hour. Another party guest said she recalled that
Palmer disappeared for a period of time but remembered him coming back later. The guest
said Palmer was breathing heavily and asking if anyone had heard from Crockett and Korte.
Crockett also relied on evidence from the first responders and witnesses. Police
officers found and photographed Crockett’s jacket on the ground behind the car at the
accident scene. The officers also noted in their police report that Crockett was the front
seat driver. And, although witnesses and officers testified that they did not see him wearing
a seatbelt or recall him to have been wearing a seatbelt, the report indicated he was belted.
But the officers and the emergency medical personnel testified that Crockett did not exhibit
signs of injuries from either a seatbelt or an airbag. Finally, the officers and witnesses found
the driver’s side window open—either rolled down or broken— providing, according to
Crockett, a way for Palmer to exit the car.
In summary, Crockett attempted to establish reasonable doubt by maintaining that
Palmer was driving and wearing a seatbelt, undermining witnesses’ testimony who placed

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Crockett’s body closer to the driver’s seat in terms of orientation, questioning police efforts
to analyze the driver’s side of the vehicle for blood and DNA and showing that Crockett
was sitting unbelted in the backseat.
In contrast, the Commonwealth focused on the fact that only Crockett and Korte
were found at the scene. It also emphasized that, although witnesses and police arrived at
the scene within minutes, no one saw anyone around the vehicle or fleeing the area. Finally,
the Commonwealth pointed out that after the crash, the car was wrapped around a tree and
severely damaged. The airbags deployed and the front seat collapsed. And Crockett was
lying unconscious with his feet under the steering wheel and his body across the collapsed
front seat. The Commonwealth argued there was not enough time before witnesses and
first responders arrived for a mystery driver to collect himself after such a violent crash,
disentangle himself from the damaged vehicle and the occupants in it, exit the vehicle and
then flee from the scene.
The jury found Crockett guilty of involuntary manslaughter and recommended a
five-year sentence. But Crockett, rather than appearing for his sentencing hearing,
absconded to Guatemala. As a result, he faced an additional felony charge.
Crockett later obtained new counsel, who moved to test the Honda’s seatbelt in
preparation for other potential charges related to the incident. The trial court granted that
motion. Then, at sentencing for the involuntary manslaughter conviction and abscondment
offense, Crockett moved for a new trial based on alleged newly discovered evidence that
showed he was not the driver. In support of the motion, Crockett submitted a report of
retained expert David Pape, Ph.D., P.E. (“Pape Report”) which concluded that one section

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of the driver’s seatbelt webbing had “cupping” consistent with occupant forces during a
collision. Cupping generally means a wavy appearance that, in a very general sense, can
result from the stresses on a belt from sudden movements of a belted-occupant’s body
during an accident. According to the Pape Report, the cupping “suggested that the seatbelt
was being worn by the driver at the time of the collision.” J.A. 1608. In other words: “If
the seat belt was not in use during the collision one would not expect this cupping.” J.A.
1609. Based on the testimony of witnesses who saw him after the crash, his position in the
car and his lack of injuries consistent with wearing a seat belt, Crockett claimed he was not
belted. According to Crockett, this proved he was not the driver. In addition, Crockett
called a classmate of Palmer’s who testified she overheard Palmer say “I just got free. . . .
I thought I killed them both.” J.A. 1167.
The Commonwealth responded that the police report’s references to the driver and
the seat belt had long been available and known. Therefore, it argued the evidence on which
Crockett’s motion was based was not new and was previously available to pursue.
The trial court denied Crockett’s motion for a new trial. It explained that the
evidence introduced could have been pursued at trial. In fact, the court recognized that,
although he was available, neither party elected to call Palmer during the guilt phase. As a
result, neither his testimony nor that of any witnesses who could have been called in
response for impeachment purposes was presented to the jury. The court also held that, in
light of all the evidence presented, the evidence offered by Crockett in support of his
motion would not produce a different result.

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The trial court then imposed the jury’s verdict of five years for the involuntary
manslaughter conviction. And after Crockett pleaded guilty to the felony failure to appear,
the court imposed a five-year sentence for that charge, suspending two of those years
conditioned on good behavior under supervised probation. Thus, the trial court imposed an
active sentence of eight years.
C. Direct Appeal
Crockett appealed his conviction, including the denial of his motion for a new trial,
to the Court of Appeals of Virginia. In affirming the denial of the motion for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence, the court agreed that the expert opinion about the
seatbelt mechanism could have been secured for use at trial in the exercise of reasonable
diligence. Further, the Court of Appeals noted that the Pape Report only “suggests” that
the driver’s seatbelt was in use at the time of the accident. J.A. 1245. As for the claim that
witnesses heard Palmer say he was the driver, the court found that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in ruling that the evidence was unlikely to produce an opposite result
at another trial. The full court denied Crockett’s petition for rehearing en banc and the
Supreme Court of Virginia denied Crockett’s petition for appeal and petition for rehearing
as well.
D. State Habeas Proceedings
After his unsuccessful appeal, Crockett filed, pro se, an extensive writ of habeas
corpus in Virginia state court. Among his arguments, Crockett contended that his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present exculpatory

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evidence pertaining to the driver’s side seatbelt mechanism.2 In support of this claim,
Crockett presented the Pape Report. In addition, Crockett introduced an email exchange
between Pape and Crockett’s uncle. In that exchange, Pape told Crockett’s uncle that he
would be comfortable adding that the conclusions were accurate to a reasonable degree of
engineering certainty at the time of the inspection. Crockett introduced an affidavit from
an investigator who worked with Crockett’s counsel. The investigator testified that he
urged counsel to test the seat belt, that trial counsel agreed that testing the belt was
important, but that the testing just fell through the cracks. Crockett also introduced the
affidavit of a consulting engineer who testified that trial counsel had retained him in
Crockett’s case. The engineer said he recommended that counsel have the seat belt tested
and he told counsel that, to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, Crockett could
not have ended up in the position he was found in the car on the night of the accident had
he been the belted driver. Finally, Crockett introduced affidavits from two of the trial jurors
who generally testified that they would not have found Crockett guilty had they seen the
seatbelt information.
In response, the Commonwealth introduced an affidavit from Crockett’s trial
counsel who explained that whether the driver was belted was discussed at various times
2 Crockett also argued that (1) police violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and present his motion to suppress
statements on that ground; (2) Crockett’s statements were involuntary and trial counsel
failed to adequately investigate and present his motion to suppress statements on that
ground; (3) counsel failed to interview and call Jacob Palmer and others as witnesses; (4)
sentencing counsel failed to preserve Crockett’s post-verdict challenge under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the Commonwealth violated Brady by suppressing
favorable evidence; and (5) Crockett was actually innocent.

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and that he “neither ignored it nor rejected it as out of hand.” J.A. 1808. Ultimately, he
decided not to test the seat belt for several strategic reasons, including concerns about the
admissibility of accident reconstruction evidence in Virginia, the potential unfavorable
results of any such testing and the risk that pursuing the testimony might open the door to
even more damaging evidence against Crockett.
In considering the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the state court applied
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The court explained Crockett had the
burden of showing both that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that he was
prejudiced as a result. The court found it significant that Crockett “failed to proffer any
expert opinion explaining the manner of injuries one would expect to find as a consequence
of the use of a seatbelt in a collision.” J.A. 1842. It added, “[i]n the absence of such opinion,
his argument that [the] analysis of the seatbelt indicated its use at the time of the collision,
standing alone, is meaningless.” J.A. 1842. The court indicated that this failure was fatal
to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also discussed how trial
counsel’s determinations and trial decisions were not unreasonable. It denied the petition,
concluding that Crockett failed to demonstrate both deficient performance of counsel and
prejudice required under Strickland.
Crockett appealed ultimately to the Supreme Court of Virginia. After reviewing the
record, that court concluded:
[T]here is no reasonable probability, based on this record, that a reasonable
jury would have believed [Palmer] was the belted driver of the car, that
during the crash Crockett, who claimed he was sitting in the backseat, was
thrown on top of [Palmer] and the driver’s seat, landing on his back with his
feet near the steering wheel and his head in the rear of the car, or that after

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the impact during the approximately thirty seconds to one minute before
witnesses arrived at the wrecked car, [Palmer] managed to unbuckle his
seatbelt and extricate himself from under Crockett and from the wrecked car
and slip away into the woods, unnoticed by the crowd, and then return, on
foot and unscathed, to a party some distance away that Crockett, Korte, and
[Palmer] had attended earlier in the evening. There is therefore no reasonable
probability that, absent Crockett’s statements, the fact finder could have had
a reasonable doubt as to whether Crockett was the driver of the car that
crashed.
J.A 1856.
Specifically concerning Crockett’s claim about the driver’s seatbelt, the court
concluded that counsel was deficient. The court noted:
The record, including Crockett’s habeas exhibits, demonstrates that although
counsel pursued the possibility of obtaining an expert to inspect and test the
seatbelt in hopes of presenting the expert’s testimony at trial to support the
theory that the driver was belted while Crockett, according to witnesses, was
not, counsel ultimately elected not to pursue this evidence. Counsel claimed
he made this decision because the expert was unavailable and because he was
concerned any such evidence might be inadmissible accident reconstruction
evidence. However, the affidavits of disinterested witnesses, Alan Donker,
counsel’s investigator, and Paul Lewis, Jr., a biomedical engineer, show that
for unknown reasons, counsel simply failed to follow-up with Lewis to have
the seatbelt examined before Crockett’s second trial.
J.A.1858. However, “[n]otwithstanding counsel’s deficient representation,” the court
concluded that Crockett “failed to establish prejudice under Strickland.” J.A. 1858. The
court determined that the Pape Report “only ‘suggest[ed]’ the driver’s seatbelt was in use
at the time of the crash based on ‘cupping’ on the belt.” J.A. 1858 (alteration in original).
Thus, based on the report, “it cannot be said there is a reasonable probability that the result
of the proceeding would have been different had this evidence been obtained and admitted
before the jury.” J.A. 1858–59. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with

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the habeas court on the sufficiency of counsel’s representation. But it nevertheless affirmed
the denial of the habeas petition, concluding Crockett was unable to establish prejudice.
E. Federal Habeas Proceedings
Next, Crockett filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in the Eastern District of
Virginia. Crockett again argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and
present evidence involving the driver’s seatbelt mechanism.3 Crockett argued that the state
court’s prejudice ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts and
overlooked the substance of the Pape Report and findings, and that any concerns about the
certainty of the report should have been resolved only after an evidentiary hearing.
The district court denied the § 2254 petition. In addressing Crockett’s claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the seatbelt issue, the district court denied relief
based on the absence of prejudice under Strickland. The court concluded it was not
reasonably likely that the Pape Report would outweigh the other evidence of Crockett’s
guilt presented at trial. The court determined that the evidence of Crockett’s guilt was
overwhelming, explaining that none of the witnesses—most of whom arrived at the vehicle
3 Crockett pressed eight grounds before the district court: (1) Crockett is actually
innocent; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence
involving the driver’s seatbelt mechanism; (3) Crockett’s Miranda rights were violated
when police interrogated him in a custodial setting without advising him of his rights
against self-incrimination; (4) Crockett’s statements to the police were involuntary; (5) the
Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland by suppressing exculpatory evidence; (6) the
cumulative effect of the Brady violations and of the ineffective assistance of counsel
deprived Crockett of a fair trial; (7) the Commonwealth violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986), by striking two African-American women from the venire; and (8) the
prosecuting attorney had a conflict of interest that violated Crockett’s constitutional right
to a fair trial. However, this Court granted a certificate of appealability only for the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the seatbelt evidence.

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within just a few minutes of the crash—saw a third person exit the vehicle or flee the scene.
And although the evidence presented at trial suggested no one observed Crockett wearing
a seatbelt, no evidence conclusively showed he was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of
the incident either. In sum, the court held that it is not reasonably likely that the result
would have been different as required by Strickland. Even so, the court admitted that it
“does not doubt that evidence regarding the use of the driver’s seatbelt would have been
relevant at trial.” J.A. 2165.
Crockett timely appealed. We have appellate jurisdiction over final decisions
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. But Crockett may not appeal the dismissal of his § 2254
petition “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.” See 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). We granted a certificate of appealability on a single issue: Whether
Crockett established that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and present
evidence about the driver’s seatbelt mechanism and, if not, whether he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on the issue. ECF No. 20.4
4 Crockett was released from active incarceration in May 2019 to serve a two-year
period of supervised probation (ECF No.5). This raises two issues that we address before
turning to the merits of Crockett’s appeal. The first is mootness. The case is not moot
because the existence of certain “collateral consequences” to the petitioner’s conviction
prevent a habeas petition from becoming moot. Plymail v. Mirandy, 8 F.4th 308, 315 (4th
Cir. 2021). The second is whether Crockett is “in custody” as required by § 2254. The
statute only requires that Crockett be in custody at the time the § 2254 was filed, which he
was, so his release from custody does not bar our review under § 2254. See Plymail, 8 F.4th
at 314.

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II.
On appeal, Crockett argues the Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably applied
Strickland in its prejudice analysis by not considering the totality of the evidence and
minimizing the Pape Report. He insists the evidence demonstrated that the driver of the car
was wearing a seatbelt, while Crockett was found, unbelted, and primarily in the backseat.
Crockett argues that, had such evidence been admitted, it was “reasonably likely that at
least one juror would have found reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Crockett was the
driver.” Appellant’s Br. 27. Alternatively, Crockett asks us to remand to the district court
for an evidentiary hearing to assess the prejudicial effect of trial counsel’s failure to
investigate the seatbelt mechanism.
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s decision on a federal habeas petition de novo. Nicolas
v. Attorney Gen. of Md., 820 F.3d 124, 129–30 (4th Cir. 2016). That requires us to review
Crockett’s appeal through the lens of AEDPA and Strickland. See Wood v. Stirling, 27
F.4th 269, 276 (4th Cir. 2022).
Under AEDPA, federal courts may consider a state prisoner’s habeas petition that
asserts he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a). Because such claims implicate concerns about federalism and comity,
the standard for such claims is exceedingly high. See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013).
Where a state court has previously ruled on the alleged wrongful conviction, as has
happened in this case, concerns of comity and federalism “reach their apex.” Valentino v.
Clarke, 972 F. 3d. 560, 575 (4th Cir. 2020).

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When a state prisoner’s claim has already been adjudicated on its merits, § 2254
restricts federal habeas relief to limited circumstances. One avenue is § 2254(d)(1). Under
it, the prisoner must show that the state court’s determination “resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
As the Supreme Court has explained:
[A] state-court decision can involve an “unreasonable application” of [the
Supreme] Court’s clearly established precedent in two ways. First, a state-
court decision involves an unreasonable application . . . if the state court
identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . but unreasonably applies it to
the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case. Second . . . if the state court
either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s]
precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses
to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000) (O’Connor, J., delivering the majority
opinion with respect to Part II). For the purposes of § 2254(d)(1), to be “unreasonable,” the
state court’s application of that law must be “objectively unreasonable,” not simply
incorrect. Owens v. Stirling, 967 F.3d 396, 411 (4th Cir. 2020). Federal courts owe state
tribunals “significant deference” with respect to “their determination that a state prisoner
isn’t entitled to habeas relief.” Id.
The other avenue of relief is § 2254(d)(2). Under it, the prisoner must show the state
court proceedings “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2). That means the “federal court must conclude not only that the state court’s
determination was wrong, but that it was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented,

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that is, it is not ‘debatable among jurists of reason.’” Merzbacher v. Shearin, 706 F.3d 356,
368 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). The Supreme Court
has noted that this “unreasonable” reference under AEDPA is a “substantially higher
threshold” and a more demanding standard than prior standards for granting federal habeas
relief. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473–74 (2007). Additionally, AEDPA
requires federal habeas courts to presume the correctness of the state courts’ factual
findings unless applicants rebut this presumption with “clear and convincing
evidence.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Schriro, 550 U.S. at 473–74.
The Supreme Court has provided clear guidance on the difficulty satisfying either
prong of § 2254(d). “Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard
against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for
ordinary error correction through appeal.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102–03
(2011) (internal citation omitted). To obtain habeas relief from a federal court, “a state
prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal
court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at
103. The Supreme Court has stated, “[i]t bears repeating that even a strong case for relief
does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. at 102. It is hard
to overstate the difficulty of the burden that must be met. As the Supreme Court explained:
“If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” Id.
But because Crockett’s § 2254 claim alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, his
burden is even steeper. When a state prisoner seeks § 2254 relief for ineffective assistance

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of counsel, we apply the “highly deferential” Strickland standard. Owens, 967 F.3d at 412.
In Strickland, the Supreme Court offered its well-known explanation of the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee to an accused the assistance of counsel for his defense. The
guarantee supports ensuring criminal defendants get a fair trial and in doing so
acknowledges that an accused’s attorney can make unprofessional errors so serious that
they undermine the adversarial process as well as the constitutional guarantee. See 466 U.S.
at 686–89; see also Valentino, 972 F.3d at 579–80 (explaining Strickland). In Strickland,
the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. First, the petitioner must show counsel’s performance was deficient and fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Second, the
petitioner must show prejudice, meaning “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Id. at 694. Counsel gets the strong presumption that he or she rendered “adequate assistance
and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”
Burt, 571 U.S. at 22 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
“AEDPA and Strickland thus provide ‘dual and overlapping’ lenses of deference,
which we apply ‘simultaneously rather than sequentially.’” Owens, 967 F.3d at 411. “This
double-deference standard effectively cabins our review to a determination of ‘whether
there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.’”
Morva v. Zook, 821 F.3d 517, 528 (4th Cir. 2016).
With these principles in mind, we turn to Crockett’s claim.

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B. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
Crockett argues that the Supreme Court of Virginia failed to apply the totality of the
evidence standard of Strickland resulting in “a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Thus, we review the
Supreme Court of Virginia’s application of Strickland as it pertains to counsel’s failure to
investigate and present evidence related to the driver’s seatbelt.
After correctly outlining the two prongs of the Strickland test, the Supreme Court
of Virginia applied the law to Crockett’s claim. It found that Crockett met his burden of
showing deficient representation by his trial counsel. But it held that Crockett “failed to
establish prejudice under Strickland.” J.A. 1858. In explaining that decision, the court
focused on the primary evidence on which Crockett’s petition was based: the Pape Report.
It noted that the report merely “‘suggest[ed]’ the driver’s seatbelt was in use at the time of
the crash.” J.A. 1858 (alteration in original). Because of that, the court held that “it cannot
be said there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different had this evidence been obtained and admitted before the jury.” J.A. 1858–59.
Crockett disagrees with the court’s analysis. And arguably, reasonable jurists could
have agreed with Crockett. See Valentino, 972 F.3d at 583. But that, of course, is not our
standard. AEDPA requires much more. AEDPA requires an “extreme malfunction[] in the
state criminal justice system[],” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102, such as a decision “so lacking
in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103. That is not what we have

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here. To the contrary, the Supreme Court of Virginia based its decision, in part, on the less
than conclusive language Pape used in his report.5
But the court did not stop there. It also evaluated the persuasiveness of Crockett’s
theory that Palmer was driving the car. As described above, the court determined there was
no possibility that a reasonable jury would believe that Palmer—after a violent crash in
which Korte was killed, Crockett was knocked unconscious, the front seat collapsed and
Crockett landed on top of the collapsed front seat—would be able to disentangle himself
from the seat and Crockett, exit the car and not be noticed by any of the witnesses. While
Crockett disagrees with this analysis as well, the court based its decision on a full
assessment of evidence presented at Crockett’s trial. One could certainly come to a
different conclusion. But the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court was not
unreasonable.
5 While not presented to us, the Pape Report would likely have led to a bevy of
questions. For example, were there other potential causes of the cupping? Were those
causes ruled out? Is there other evidence, besides cupping, that would suggest whether or
not the seat belt was being worn at the time of the accident? What testing was actually
done? How much or how little of the belt was tested? What was the methodology of that
testing? Has the methodology been peer reviewed? What is the potential rate of error of
Pape’s conclusions? Did the failure of the police to maintain and preserve the evidence
compromise the testing? If Crockett introduced expert testimony about the seatbelt, surely
the Commonwealth could have done the same, and if so, whose expert would have been
more persuasive? And so on. Perhaps these questions would have been answered favorably
to Crockett. Or perhaps not. Neither these questions nor the answers to them are necessary
to our conclusions. They simply illustrate that expert testimony is not necessarily the silver
bullet Crockett suggests. And at the same time, they also highlight the sort of issues
Crockett’s trial counsel was dealing with at the ground level as he decided whether to
pursue the testimony in the first place.

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Undeterred, Crockett advances another argument. He insists that the Supreme Court
of Virginia did not consider the totality of the evidence—specifically, additional evidence
that would have driven home “the significance of the belted driver.” Appellant’s Br. 42.
For example, he claims the court did not consider how jurors would have reacted to
testimony from an expert engineer that Crockett’s position in the car was inconsistent with
him being the belted driver.
First, it is important to accurately frame this argument. To the extent Crockett
attempts to make Strickland’s reference to the “totality of the evidence” into a third prong
of Strickland, we reject the invitation. “[T]otality of the evidence” is a part of the prejudice
analysis whereby a court considers the “broad evidentiary picture before the jury.” See
Valentino, 972 F.3d at 583; Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 858 (4th Cir. 2011).
Second, even considering this additional argument regarding prejudice, Crockett’s
claim fails. Contrary to Crockett’s assertions, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered all
the evidence. It specified that Crockett filed over 400 exhibits and stated that it considered
the “pleadings [related to the habeas petition] and the record in Crockett’s manslaughter
case.” See J.A. 1852–53.
What’s more, under AEDPA, a state court need not refer to each piece of a
petitioner’s evidence. See generally Moore v. Hardee, 723 F.3d 488, 499 (4th Cir. 2013).
The opposite is true. The deference required under AEDPA means that if the state court
offers a conclusion on the “prejudice question without articulating its reasoning supporting
that conclusion, we must determine what arguments or theories . . . could have supported
the state court’s determination that [petitioner] failed to show prejudice.” Shinn v. Kayer,

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141 S. Ct. 517, 524 (2020) (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed,
“we must assess whether fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state
court’s decision if based on one of those arguments or theories.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 187 (2011) (“Section 2254(d)
applies even where there has been a summary denial.”). For example, although it did not
expressly rely on this information, the court recounted Crockett’s own statements to
officers following the accident. He asked one officer “I mean did I hit someone or I mean?”
J.A. 1853. He also initially denied anyone else was in the car. And after finally admitting
Korte was in the car and being told he died, Crockett responded, “That figures.” J.A. 489.
This evidence, which is certainly damaging to Crockett, could be considered if the Supreme
Court of Virginia failed to adequately explain its reasoning. But because it provided an
explanation—and a reasonable one at that—we need not fill any gaps here.
For those reasons, we reject Crockett’s argument that state court failed to consider
the totality of the evidence.
C. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)
Crockett also maintains that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s Strickland prejudice
analysis, in particular the court’s discussion of the Pape Report, rested on an “unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Crockett
argues that the court improperly discounted the report by focusing on the term “suggested”
when referring to the use of the driver’s seatbelt at the time of the collision. See J.A. 1858
(quoting J.A. 1607).

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Even though Crockett frames his argument differently, this is essentially the same
argument he made under § 2254(d)(1). So, we need not repeat that analysis. The Supreme
Court of Virginia did not discount or mischaracterize the report. It simply did not find it
persuasive in light of all of the other evidence. For basically the same reasons discussed
above, Crockett failed to meet his burden under § 2254(d)(2).
III.
AEDPA’s demanding standard is rooted in the principles of comity and federalism
embedded in our constitutional system of government. In that system, state governments,
including their judicial branches, deserve federal courts’ respect and deference. In light of
the deferential standard upon which we review the state court’s adjudication, for the
reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Crockett’s § 2254
petition and denial of Crockett’s request for an evidentiary hearing.6
AFFIRMED
6 We also reject Crockett’s alternative plea for an evidentiary hearing in the district
court. We review a district court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing in a
postconviction proceeding for abuse of discretion. See Gordon v. Braxton, 780 F.3d 196,
204 (4th Cir. 2015). “Although state prisoners may sometimes submit new evidence in
federal court, AEDPA’s statutory scheme is designed to strongly discourage them from
doing so.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 186. The district court denied Crockett’s request for a
hearing, concluding that the substance of the newly identified evidence did not outweigh
the substantial and compelling evidence of Crockett’s guilt. In so concluding the district
court cited Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007), which confirms that the
deferential standards of § 2254 must be considered when deciding whether an evidentiary
hearing is appropriate. In Schriro, the Supreme Court held that “[i]t follows that if the
record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a
district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. In light of the evidence
and the records before the district court, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
decision to deny the motion for an evidentiary hearing.

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