United States of America v. Anthony Rashad Dawson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4110
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY RASHAD DAWSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:20-cr-00180-D-1)
Submitted: September 8, 2022 Decided: September 13, 2022
Before HARRIS and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Brian Michael Aus, BRIAN AUS, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Durham, North
Carolina, for Appellant. David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Lucy Partain
Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Anthony Rashad Dawson pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to carjacking
resulting in serious bodily injury and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 2119(2), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), and possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). The
district court sentenced Dawson to 540 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Dawson’s trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance. In his pro se supplemental brief, Dawson also contends that counsel
rendered ineffective assistance and raises additional challenges to his convictions and
sentence. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal pursuant to the appellate
waiver in Dawson’s plea agreement. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
We review the validity of an appellate waiver de novo and “will enforce the waiver
if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” United States v.
Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 2016). A waiver is valid if it is “knowing and
voluntary.” Id. To determine whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary, “we consider
the totality of the circumstances, including the experience and conduct of the defendant,
his educational background, and his knowledge of the plea agreement and its terms.”
United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Generally, “if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of
appellate rights during the [Fed R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the

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defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record confirms that Dawson knowingly and voluntarily waived
his right to appeal his convictions and sentence, with limited exceptions. We therefore
conclude that the waiver is valid and enforceable. Although the ineffective-assistance
claims fall outside the scope of the waiver, we “will reverse only if it conclusively appears
in the trial record itself that the defendant was not provided effective representation.”
United States v. Freeman, 24 F.4th 320, 326 (4th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (cleaned up).
Because the record does not conclusively show that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance, we decline to consider these claims on appeal.∗ The remainder of the claims
raised in Dawson’s pro se supplemental brief fall within the scope of the waiver.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal outside of Dawson’s valid appellate waiver. We
therefore grant the Government’s motion in part and dismiss the appeal as to the issues
within the scope of the waiver. We otherwise affirm the judgment. This court requires
that counsel inform Dawson, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Dawson requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
∗ These claims should be raised, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. United
States v. Jordan, 952 F.3d 160, 163 n.1 (4th Cir. 2020).

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leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Dawson.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
DISMISSED IN PART

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