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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-6387
SEAN K. HEYWARD,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
HAROLD W. CLARKE,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:20-cv-00577-JAG-EWH)
Submitted: July 21, 2022 Decided: July 26, 2022
Before MOTZ, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Sean K. Heyward, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Sean K. Heyward seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice
of appeal was not timely filed.
In civil cases, parties have 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final
judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court
extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a
jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
The district court entered its order on June 2, 2021. Heyward filed the notice of
appeal on March 31, 2022.1 Because Heyward failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to
obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal.2
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED
1 For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of
appeal is the earliest date Heyward could have delivered the notice to prison officials for
mailing to the district court. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266,
276 (1988).
2 Heyward’s notice of appeal arguably sought a reopening of the appeal period. But
the time for seeking reopening had already expired, see 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(6)(B), and the district court could not enlarge the reopening period, see Bowles, 551
U.S. at 213-14.
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