United States of America v. William Anthony Malone

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4678
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM ANTHONY MALONE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. Roderick Charles Young, District Judge. (3:22-cr-00182-RCY-1)
Submitted: June 26, 2026 Decided: July 15, 2026
Before GREGORY, WYNN, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Laura J. Koenig, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Lindsey
Halligan, United States Attorney, Ellen H. Theisen, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
William Anthony Malone appeals the 60-month sentence imposed following his
guilty plea to possession of firearms and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).1 He contends that the district court did not adequately explain its
sentencing decision. He also claims that the court relied too heavily on his criminal history.
Finding no error, we affirm.
We review a defendant’s sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness,
applying a deferential “abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
51 (2007). To impose a procedurally reasonable sentence, the district court “must conduct
an individualized assessment” by applying the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors “to the
particular defendant” being sentenced. United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212-13 (4th
Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court must also adequately explain the
defendant’s sentence. Id. at 212. And “where a defendant (or prosecutor) presents
nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a sentence outside the [Sentencing] Guidelines, the
sentencing judge must address or consider those arguments and explain why he has rejected
1 After pleading guilty, Malone moved to withdraw his plea, raising facial and as-
applied Second Amendment challenges under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v.
Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022) (holding that a firearm regulation is valid under the Second
Amendment only if it “is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation”). The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Malone renews his Bruen
claims, though he correctly concedes that these claims are foreclosed by United States v.
Canada, 123 F.4th 159, 161 (4th Cir. 2024) (holding that “Section 922(g)(1) is facially
constitutional because it has a plainly legitimate sweep and may constitutionally be applied
in at least some set of circumstances” (citation modified)), and United States v. Hunt, 123
F.4th 697, 702 (4th Cir. 2024) (reaffirming this court’s pre-Bruen “precedent foreclosing
as-applied challenges to Section 922(g)(1)”), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2756 (2025).

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them.” United States v. Powers, 40 F.4th 129, 137 (4th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). But
as long as the “district court addresses [the] defendant’s ‘central thesis,’” an exhaustive
explanation is not required. Id.
At sentencing, Malone argued that his extremely difficult upbringing put him on a
path toward criminality, thus mitigating the impact of his lengthy criminal history. On
appeal, he claims that the district court gave short shrift to this argument: although the court
acknowledged Malone’s various childhood traumas, the court allegedly failed to explain
how this mitigation evidence fit into its sentencing decision. We cannot agree.
As the district court noted, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) requires a sentencing court to
consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. The court remarked that
Malone’s upbringing was “not so different from many of the defendants that come before
[it].” (J.A.2 221). Though Malone would have preferred the court to say more, the court
was not obligated to offer its take on each and every piece of mitigation evidence. See
Powers, 40 F.4th at 137 (“Appellate review is not a game of ‘Gotcha!’ where we tally up
the number of distinguishable arguments a defendant mentioned in the district court and
then comb the sentencing transcript for proof the district court mentioned each one by
name.”).
Malone also claims that the district court’s sentencing explanation was insufficient
because, in his view, it is difficult to discern the precise reasons for the court’s decision.
On the contrary, the court made it abundantly clear that Malone’s “extensive criminal
2 Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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history” was the most important factor in determining his sentence. (J.A. 218); see 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Further, the court found that the 33-to-41-month Guidelines range
did not adequately capture the severity of Malone’s criminal record. So, although Malone
asked for a within-Guidelines sentence of 41 months, the court instead varied upward to
60 months to account for Malone’s “underrepresented” criminal history. (J.A. 221). Based
on our review, we conclude that the court amply supported its sentencing decision.
Next, Malone faults the district court for not indicating whether it had considered a
shorter upward variance sentence—i.e., one below 60 months. He insists that the court’s
sentencing explanation could have applied to any upward variance sentence. But it bears
noting that the probation officer initially calculated a Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months.
The district court sustained Malone’s objection to the base offense level—which depended
on Malone having a prior conviction for a crime of violence— after finding that Malone’s
robbery and firearm convictions were not qualifying predicates. Nevertheless, Malone’s
success on his Guidelines objection did not make his robbery and firearm convictions any
less serious. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 130 F.4th 114, 121 n.3 (4th Cir. 2025)
(“District judges may and should use their sound discretion to sentence on the basis of
reliable information about the defendant’s criminal history even where strict categorical
classification of a prior conviction might produce a different guideline sentencing range.”
(citation modified)). And, notably, the district court explained that it believed that the
correctly calculated Guidelines range “underrepresented” Malone’s “extensive criminal
history,” pointing specifically to the prior convictions in question. (J.A. 221.) With this

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context, we conclude that the court’s explanation was adequate. Cf. United States v. Banks,
104 F.4th 496, 524 (4th Cir. 2024). We therefore discern no procedural error.
Finally, Malone contends that the district court imposed a substantively
unreasonable sentence by relying too heavily on his criminal record and failing to
adequately incorporate other pertinent sentencing factors into its analysis. To be
substantively reasonable, a sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,”
to satisfy the goals of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “We will generally find a variance
sentence reasonable when the reasons justifying the variance are tied to § 3553(a) and are
plausible.” United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
It is true, as Malone points out, that sentencing courts should not “give excessive
weight to any relevant factor.” United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 531 (4th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, a sentence is not unreasonable
simply because it “turn[ed] on a single § 3553(a) factor.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, the court undoubtedly accorded great weight to Malone’s criminal history.
But the court also considered Malone’s prison disciplinary record, the seriousness of the
offense, the need to provide Malone with educational and vocational training, the need to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and Malone’s mitigation evidence. Though
Malone would have balanced these factors differently, his mere disagreement with the
value or weight attributed to the § 3553(a) factors is insufficient to establish an abuse of
the district court’s discretion. United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 290 (4th Cir. 2012).

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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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