United States of America v. Jakeem Molik-Artrell Bennett

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4579
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAKEEM MOLIK-ARTRELL BENNETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:24-cr-00304-CCE-1)
Submitted: April 28, 2026 Decided: April 30, 2026
Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Eric D. Placke, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen A. Gleason, First
Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Emilie Daramola, WAKE FOREST
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Dan Bishop, United
States Attorney, Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Jakeem Molik-Artrell Bennett pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement,
to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).
The district court sentenced Bennett to 110 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, Bennett’s counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no potentially
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Bennett’s sentence is substantively
reasonable. Though notified of his opportunity to do so, Bennett has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal based on the appeal
waiver in Bennett’s plea agreement. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.
We first conclude that, with certain exceptions inapplicable here, Bennett has
waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. A defendant may, in a valid plea
agreement, waive the right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. See United States v. Wiggins,
905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). This court reviews the validity of an appeal waiver de
novo and will enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope
thereof. United States v. Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 2016).
An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to the
waiver. Id. at 169. “To determine whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed
to waive his appellate rights, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the
defendant’s experience, conduct, educational background and knowledge of his plea
agreement and its terms.” United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 224 (4th Cir. 2023).
“Generally, . . . if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate

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rights during the [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant
understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Based on the totality of circumstances in this case, we conclude that
Bennett knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and understood the waiver.
We therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss, in part, and dismiss the
appeal as to all issues falling within the scope of the broad appeal waiver in Bennett’s plea
agreement. In accordance with our obligations under Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any potentially meritorious issues that do not fall within the scope of the appeal
waiver and have found none. Accordingly, we deny the Government’s motion, in part, as
to any issues falling outside the scope of the appeal waiver, and affirm the criminal
judgment in part.
This court requires that counsel inform Bennett, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Bennett requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Bennett. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART,
AFFIRMED IN PART

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