Felton, et al v. Dillard University

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
December 21, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 03-30926
_____________________
MACK FELTON, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
TRACIE L. WASHINGTON,
Appellant,
versus
DILLARD UNIVERSITY,
Defendant-Appellee
_________________________________________________________________
HASAN KRAD, DR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
DILLARD UNIVERSITY,
Defendant - Appellee
_________________________________________________________________
ELYRIA ZUNIGA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
DILLARD UNIVERSITY,
Defendant - Appellee
_________________________________________________________________
HADI ALKAHBY, DR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,

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* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
2
versus
DILLARD UNIVERSITY,
Defendant - Appellee
_________________________________________________________________
LAWRENCE R. WILLIAMS, SR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
DILLARD UNIVERSITY,
Defendant - Appellee
_________________________________________________________________
GLENDA JOHNSON, DR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
DILLARD UNIVERSITY,
Defendant - Appellee
_________________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 01-CV-3808-B; 02-CV-2971-B; 02-CV-2972-B;
02-CV-2973-B; 02-CV-2974-B; 02-CV-2975-B
_________________________________________________________________
Before KING, Chief Judge, JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Tracie L. Washington served as counsel for the plaintiffs in
a group of related employment discrimination actions against

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Dillard University. Upon a motion by Dillard, the district court
entered a protective order barring Washington from engaging in any
ex parte communications with Dillard’s managerial level employees
or faculty members. Washington, however, contacted the dean of
Dillard’s nursing division to inquire as to whether she was still
employed by the university. Dillard contended that the telephone
call violated the protective order and filed a motion for sanctions
under FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b). In a September 5, 2003 order, the
district court only took the motion under advisement, but
simultaneously directed Washington to perform one hundred hours of
community service within sixty days. Washington sought a stay of
the order pending appeal, but it was denied. Washington completed
the community service and, some five months later, the judge
dismissed the motion for sanctions. Washington appeals the
district court’s September 5 community service order, arguing that
it constitutes an abuse of discretion. This appeal has been
briefed and argued before this panel and it is evident that this
aberrant sanctions case has value only to the parties, who well
understand the facts and issues. We therefore only briefly address
the issues and hold as follows.
The case is not moot. Although the community service was
completed, the September 5, 2003 order by which it was imposed
remains in the public record and may affect Washington’s ability to
attract clients and represent them effectively. This represents a

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significant collateral consequence of the sanction. See Dailey v.
Vought Aircraft Co., 141 F.3d 224, 228 (5th Cir. 1998).
Although the district court stated that it was taking the
motion for sanctions under advisement, it in fact imposed an
express sanction on Washington by ordering her to perform one
hundred hours of community service within sixty days. The district
court gave no explanation for its decision to impose this community
service sanction, notwithstanding that it was both relatively
severe and imposed in an unorthodox manner. This court has made it
quite clear that a trial court should provide reasons for its
decisions regarding attorney sanctions, such that we can exercise
meaningful review. See, e.g., Copeland v. Wasserstein, Perella &
Co., Inc., 278 F.3d 472, 485-86 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Schwartz
v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 133 (5th Cir. 1985)).
In cases where a district judge gives no reasons for a
decision regarding attorney sanctions, our usual course of action
is to remand in order to give the judge an opportunity to provide
explanation. See, e.g., Copeland, 278 F.3d at 485-86. Here,
however, we find the district court’s method of meting out
sanctions to be an inherent abuse of judicial discretion.
The district court was incorrect in disclaiming that the
community service was a sanction. One hundred hours of an
attorney’s time represents a substantial cost, particularly where
the window for compliance is so brief. Thus, by ordering
Washington to devote one hundred hours of her time to community

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service, while inexplicably denying that any sanction had been
imposed, and later dismissing the motion for sanctions precisely
because the community service had been completed, the district
court did not reasonably exercise its sanction power. The judge
erred in two significant ways. First, he effectively barred
meaningful appellate review by withholding the formal disposition
of the motion for sanctions until the community service (which is
functionally irreversible) had been completed. Second, he made the
question of whether sanctions should be imposed contingent upon
whether those very sanctions had been completed.
We hold that the district judge’s disposition of the motion
for sanctions in this case constituted an abuse of discretion. The
district court’s order of September 5, 2003 is, therefore,
VACATED.

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