Winters v. Pasadena Indep Sch

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
January 26, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-20575
Summary Calendar
STORMYJEAN WINTERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PASADENA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 03-CV-1487
Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Stormyjean Winters filed suit against the Pasadena
Independent School District alleging a discrimination claim under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district
court ultimately granted. We affirm.
The Pasadena Independent School District first employed
Winters as a second-grade teacher at Burnett Elementary for the
1994-95 school year under a one-year probationary teacher contract.
Winters accepted a second and a third one-year probationary

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contract for the 1995-96 and the 1996-97 school years. Winters
took medical leave from November 30, 1996, until March 10, 1997.
In March 1997, the principal did not recommend Winters for a three-
year term contract. On April 8, the board voted to accept the
principal’s recommendation.
Winters asserts that the Pasadena Independent School
District violated the ADA because it did not offer her a teacher
contract for the 1997-98 school year because she had a “record of”
and was “regarded as” having the disability of depression. The
defendant asserts that Winters did not offer any evidence that she
had a record of disability or that she was “regarded as” disabled.
Further, the defendant argues that Winters’ performance problems
were a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not renewing her
teaching contract, and that Winters did not offer any evidence to
show that this explanation was pretextual. The district court
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. BP Oil Intern., Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petoleos de
Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is
only proper where “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Additionally, all inferences from the
record must be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-movant.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Co., 475 U.S. 574, 587-
88 (1986).

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To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under
the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she suffers from a
disability; (2) she is qualified for the job; (3) she was subjected
to an adverse employment action on account of her disability; and
(4) she was replaced by or treated less favorably than non-disabled
employees. Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Systems, 321 F.3d 503,
511 (5th Cir. 2003). An individual is disabled under the ADA if
she demonstrates: (1) she has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of her major life activities;
(2) she has a record of such impairment; or (3) she is regarded as
having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Aldrup v.
Caldera, 274 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2001).
Winters asserts that the district court incorrectly
evaluated her evidence of a disability under the ADA. Specifi-
cally, Winters asserts that the fact that she went on medical leave
for depression and was hospitalized in a mental institution during
this time is evidence that she has a record of disability. Simply
being hospitalized does not establish a record of a mental
disability. Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 317 (5th Cir.
1997); Heisler v. Metropolitan Council, 339 F.3d 622, 630 (8th Cir.
2003).
The ADA requires an individualized inquiry beyond the
mere existence of a hospital stay. . . . To accept [the
proposition that a hospital stay establishes that an
impairment substantially limits major life activities]
would work a presumption that any condition requiring
temporary hospitalization is disabling--a presumption
that runs counter to the very goal of the ADA.

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Burch, 119 F.3d at 317. The district court performed an indivi-
dualized inquiry into Winters’ evidence and correctly determined
that she had presented no evidence showing a record of a specific
condition that substantially limited a major life activity.
Winters testified that her depression is controllable by medica-
tion. Further, her doctor stated that her depression is treatable
with medication and will not prevent her from working. In this
context, Winters’ medical leave and hospitalization is insufficient
to create a question for the jury. See Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146-47 (1999)
(stating that a person whose physical or mental impairment is
corrected by medication or other measures does not have an impair-
ment that presently substantially limits a major life activity).
Winters also asserts that the Pasadena Independent School
District incorrectly regarded her as having a disability. Winters
has failed to present evidence that school officials regarded her
depression as being a condition that prevented her from performing
the major life function of work. Winters fails to identify how
Bill Kielman’s April 1, 1997, conversation with her or his corres-
pondences to her physician show that the Pasadena Independent
School District regarded her as disabled. The simple fact that
Cynthia Amador kept a personal file on Winters that included
documentation that dealt with incidents involving her reactions to
medications and her hospitalization is not evidence that the

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employer regarded Winters as substantially limited in the major
life activity of working.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of the defendant is AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED.

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