Quickie Chickie Inc v. Sexton

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
August 24, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-30529
Summary Calendar
QUICKIE CHICKIE, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GARY S. SEXTON, In His Capacity as Sheriff of the
Parish of Webster,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(5:05-CV-44)
Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Quickie Chickie, Inc., appeals the dismissal of its civil
rights complaint against Gary S. Sexton, the Sheriff of Webster
Parish, Louisiana. Quickie Chickie contends: it has been deprived
of its immovable property by the Sheriff, in violation of its
procedural and substantive due process rights; and the Sheriff’s
actions constitute an unconstitutional “taking”.

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2
The district court dismissed the procedural due process claim
under the Parratt/Hudson doctrine. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 533–33 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1981),
overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986). Under that doctrine, a state actor’s random and
unauthorized deprivation of a plaintiff’s property does not result
in a violation of procedural due process if the State provides an
adequate postdeprivation remedy. See Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d
91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996). Quickie Chickie bears the burden of
showing the State’s postdeprivation remedy is inadequate. See id.
Quickie Chickie contends a state district court issued a
sequestration order pertaining to movable property stored on its
immovable property pursuant to a lease for which the lessee is in
default. Quickie Chickie asserts it is not challenging the writ of
sequestration, but wishes only to challenge the illegal seizure of
its immovable property resulting from the Sheriff’s execution of
the writ of sequestration. Quickie Chickie contends it does not
have standing to raise this question in the state-court action. In
that regard, it maintains no state court has ordered the seizure of
its immovable property and, therefore, there is no state-court
order for it to challenge.
Quickie Chickie cites no authority for these propositions; it
has not shown relief is not available in either the state district
court or the city court where an eviction proceeding filed by

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3
Quickie Chickie is pending. Quickie Chickie has not carried its
burden of showing it does not have an adequate state
postdeprivation remedy. See id.
As for its Fifth Amendment “takings” claim, Quickie Chickie
has not shown it has exhausted its state-court remedies.
See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194–95 (1985).
Finally, Quickie Chickie claims the Sheriff’s actions violated
its right to substantive due process. Those actions do not “shock
the conscience” and do not impinge upon fundamental rights. See
Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1256 (5th Cir. 1988). Moreover,
they were rationally related to the government’s interest in
maintaining the movable property pending disposition in the state-
court proceeding. See Simi Inv. Co., Inc. v. Harris County, Tex.,
236 F.3d 240, 249 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1022
(2001).
AFFIRMED

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