Texte intégral
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
June 11, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-40171
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-
Appellee,
versus
ROSALINDA GUERRA,
Defendant-
Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:05-CR-1536
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Before DeMOSS, STEWART and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Rosalinda Guerra was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute
more than five kilograms of cocaine, possession with the intent to distribute more than five kilograms
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of cocaine, and importation into this country of more than five kilograms of cocaine. The district
court sentenced Guerra to three concurrent 151-month terms of imprisonment, three concurrent five-
year terms of supervised release, and a $300 special assessment.
Guerra argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of her
prior uncharged conduct. The extrinsic evidence was relevant to Guerra’s intent and to her
knowledge that there was cocaine hidden in her car. See United States v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 755,
760 (5th Cir. 2003). Guerra’s prior uncharged conduct was strikingly similar to her offense conduct
and occurred only four months before her arrest. See United States v. Booker, 334 F.3d 406, 411-12
(5th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the district court’s decision to admit the evidence was not an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (1978) (en banc).
Guerra also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that she knew that
she was transporting cocaine. The jury heard circumstantial evidence that was suspicious in nature,
including that Guerra gave border patrol officers a false name; stated that her car had been purchased
at an auction, when it had not; gave conflicting stories about how she acquired her car; paid more
attention to a canine inspection of her vehicle than to questions posed by an officer; and could not
provide an address for or directions to a house she had allegedly just visited. Considering the
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational
trier of fact could have found that the evidence established the elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. See United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.
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