United States v. Galloway

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-50978

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Dianna Michelle Galloway,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:12-CR-267-2

Before Davis, Jones, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Dianna Michelle Galloway violated the conditions of her supervised
release by using marijuana and failing to complete inpatient substance abuse
treatment for methamphetamine use. As a result, the district court revoked
her supervised release and sentenced her to nine months’ imprisonment and
a subsequent term of two years’ supervised release. Among other conditions

*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 13, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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No. 19-50978
2
of release, the district court ordered that Galloway have “no contact” with
her boyfriend, Shon Tomas Rushmore. Galloway appeals this condition,
arguing that it is not reasonably related to the relevant sentencing factors and
is overbroad, violating her First Amendment rights. We disagree and affirm
the district court.
A district court has extensive discretion to impose supervised release
conditions, but not unlimited discretion. United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155,
164 (5th Cir. 2001). First, conditions must be reasonably related to: (1) “the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant”; (2) deterring criminal conduct; (3) protecting the public
from the defendant’s future crimes; or (4) providing the defendant with
correctional treatment. United States v. Miller, 665 F.3d 114, 126 (5th Cir.
2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), 3553(a)(1), 3353(a)(2)(B)- (D)). Second,
conditions may not be more restrictive than necessary to achieve any of these
latter-three goals. Paul, 274 F.3d at 165.
Here, both requirements are easily satisfied. Rushmore, like
Galloway, has been convicted of a felony, has a long history of substance
abuse, and has struggled to remain sober. Also, like Galloway, Rushmore has
violated the conditions of his supervised release by engaging in illicit drug
use—heroin—and failing to participate in drug treatment. In fact,
Rushmore’s own (second) revocation hearing occurred on the same day as
Galloway’s and in front of the same judge. Therefore, the judge, who knew
of Galloway and Rushmore’s romantic relationship, could reasonably
conclude that the entanglement could be detrimental to preventing
Galloway’s recidivism, protecting the public, and providing Galloway with
the correctional treatment she needs. See United States v. Woods, 547 F.3d
515, 517–18 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The condition is thus reasonably
related to the goals of supervised release.
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No. 19-50978
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The condition is also sufficiently limited in scope. It does not, as
Galloway suggests, ban unknowing contact. See Paul, 274 F.3d at 165–66
(reiterating that “associational conditions do not extend to casual or chance
meetings” (internal quotation omitted)). Nor was the district court required
to narrow the condition by allowing Galloway to have contact with Rushmore
via phone or written communication. See United States v. Caravayo, 809 F.3d
269, 276 (5th Cir. 2015) (“The possibility of a less restrictive alternative is
not necessarily fatal to a blanket condition . . . .”). The record provides
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that prohibiting all contact with
Rushmore is reasonably necessary to serve the goals of supervised release. So
though prohibiting Galloway from having contact with her boyfriend is an
infringement on her liberty, the infringement is reasonably necessary and,
thus, permissible. See Woods, 547 F.3d at 519.
* * *
The order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Case: 19-50978 Document: 00515526529 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/13/2020