Menjivar-Guzman v. Barr

19-60477Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit19 août 2020

Texte intégral

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-60477
Summary Calendar

Roxana Elizabeth Menjivar-Guzman,

Petitioner,

versus

William P. Barr, U. S. Attorney General,

Respondent
.

Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A099 480 823

Before Wiener, Southwick, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Roxana Elizabeth Menjivar-Guzman, a native and citizen of
El Salvador, has filed a petition for review of the decision of the Board of

*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances
set forth in 5
TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 19, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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No. 19-60477
2
Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her motion to reopen or terminate her
in absentia removal order. In her motion to reopen, she relied on Pereira v.
Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), to assert that she lacked adequate notice of
the removal hearing and that she is now eligible for cancellation of removal
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) because she has resided in the United States for
more than 10 years as required by § 1229b(b)(1)(A).
Menjivar-Guzman was first detained by immigration officials in
November 2005, when she entered the United States without authorization.
A Notice to Appear (NTA) ordered her to appear at a removal hearing in San
Antonio at a date and time to be set. The NTA also advised her that she was
required to provide the Immigration and Naturalization Service—now the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—with an updated mailing address
and telephone number. She was further advised that the DHS would not be
required to notify her of the date and time of her hearing if she did not provide
a valid address, and that she could be ordered removed if she failed to appear
at the hearing. The NTA also indicates that Menjivar-Guzman was given
oral notice in Spanish of the consequences of failing to appear.
In 2013, the BIA dismissed an appeal from the denial of a motion to
reopen based on a lack of notice of the removal hearing. That motion was
denied because Menjivar-Guzman never provided a mailing address to which
notice of the time and date of the hearing could have been sent. The instant
motion to reopen was denied on the ground that, even in light of Pereira,
neither reopening nor termination were warranted because Menjivar-
Guzman failed to provide an address where a notice of hearing could be sent,
even if the NTA did not specify the time and date of the removal hearing.
This court has jurisdiction over orders denying motions to reopen.
Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 146-48 (2015). “In reviewing the denial of a
motion to reopen, this court applies a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion
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No. 19-60477
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standard, regardless of the basis of the alien’s request for relief.” Gomez-
Palacios v. Holder, 560 F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir. 2009). We will not reverse the
BIA’s decision “as long as it is not capricious, without foundation in the
evidence, or otherwise so irrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result
of any perceptible rational approach.” Id. Questions of law are reviewed
de novo and factual findings are reviewed under the substantial-evidence
test, “meaning that this court may not overturn the BIA’s factual findings
unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Id.
Underlying all of Menjivar-Guzman’s arguments is her assertion that
the DHS must provide the date, time, and place of the removal hearing on
the initial NTA because it is the most “practicable” thing to do, especially in
her case where she did not have an address to give at the time of her initial
encounter. She therefore contends that the defective NTA did not confer
jurisdiction on the immigration court for her removal proceedings, that her
failure to provide an address would not have mattered if she had received full
notice in the NTA, and that she is now eligible for cancellation of removal
because the defective NTA did not stop the running of the 10-year period of
continuous presence and good conduct that is one requirement for
cancellation.
Pereira held that an NTA that does not inform a noncitizen of the time
and place to appear for removal proceedings is inadequate to stop the running
of the 10-year period for cancellation of removal, the so-called “stop-time
rule.” Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110. This court has held that Pereira’s holding
is limited to the stop-time rule, and this court has rejected Pereira-based
jurisdictional arguments like Menjivar-Guzman’s. See Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d
at 691-92 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2020 WL 1978950 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2020)
(No. 19-779); see also Mejia v. Barr, 952 F.3d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 2020)
(following Pierre-Paul to reject a challenge to an in absentia removal order).
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No. 19-60477
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Contrary to Menjivar-Guzman’s general arguments about the need
for the NTA to inform an alien about the time and date of the hearing, this
court has “observed time and time again that an in absentia removal order
should not be revoked on the grounds that an alien failed to actually receive
the required statutory notice of his removal hearing when the alien’s failure
to receive actual notice was due to his neglect of his obligation to keep the
immigration court apprised of his current mailing address.” Ramos-Portillo
v. Barr, 919 F.3d 955, 959-60 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see Gomez-Palacios, 560 F.3d at 360-61. Pereira does not
affect this rule. See Fuentes-Pena v. Barr, 917 F.3d 827, 830 n.2 (5th Cir. 2019)
(reiterating that Pereira does not affect Gomez-Palacios); Mauricio-Benitez v.
Sessions, 908 F.3d 144, 148 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2018). Menjivar-Guzman’s
assertions that she was “unable” to provide an address when first
encountered and that she neither refused to provide an address nor provided
an incorrect address are immaterial, especially where she does not explain
how she was unable to provide an address for four months. Menjivar-
Guzman was not entitled to notice because she failed to provide a mailing
address, despite receiving notice of her obligation to do so and the
consequences of failing to do so. See Gomez-Palacios, 560 F.3d at 359.
Menjivar-Guzman fails to show that the BIA abused its discretion by
denying her motion to reopen. See id. at 361. Accordingly, we need not
consider her contention that she is entitled to cancellation of removal. See
Mauricio-Benitez, 908 F.3d at 148 n.1 (noting that the case pertained only to
reopening, so that “Pereira’s rule regarding cancellation is inapplicable”); see
also Mejia v. Barr, 952 F.3d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that “the BIA
had no obligation to reach the merits” of a cancellation claim where the
motion to reopen was barred). The petition for review is DENIED.
Case: 19-60477 Document: 00515533328 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/19/2020

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