United States of America v. Ransom Tae-Rick Robinson

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 24a0491n.06
No. 23-1994
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RANSOM TAE-RICK ROBINSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
MICHIGAN
OPINION
Before: GRIFFIN, STRANCH, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Ransom Tae-Rick Robinson challenges the substantive reasonableness of
his below-Guidelines sentence for a drug offense. As set forth below, we affirm Robinson’s
sentence.
After Robinson sold methamphetamine to a confidential informant on four occasions, a
federal grand jury indicted him on four counts of distributing methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Robinson pleaded guilty to one of those counts in exchange
for the dismissal of the other counts.
Robinson’s presentence report set forth a Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months of
imprisonment based on a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of II. Both
parties moved for a downward variance from the Guidelines range, citing Robinson’s limited
criminal history, his longtime employment, his family responsibilities, and the nature and
circumstances of his offense. At sentencing, the district court addressed the sentencing factors
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and granted the government’s motion for a two-level downward

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variance, which resulted in a Guidelines range of 97 to 121 months of imprisonment. The district
court concluded that a sentence at the low end of that range was appropriate and reflected the
seriousness of the offense, promoted respect for the law, and provided just punishment. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). So the district court sentenced Robinson to 97 months of imprisonment
followed by two years of supervised release.
In this timely appeal, Robinson challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.
We review the substantive reasonableness of Robinson’s sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). “The essence of a
substantive-reasonableness claim is whether the length of the sentence is ‘greater than necessary’
to achieve the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Tristan-
Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2010). “Simply put, a defendant’s sentence is
substantively unreasonable if it is too long.” United States v. Lee, 974 F.3d 670, 676 (6th Cir.
2020). “One way to gauge the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is to ask whether ‘the
court placed too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others’ in reaching
its sentencing decision.” United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 753–54 (6th Cir. 2020)
(quoting United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1047 (6th Cir. 2019)). We afford a within-
Guidelines sentence a rebuttable presumption of substantive reasonableness. See United States v.
Curry, 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2008). As a result, Robinson’s burden of demonstrating that
his below-Guidelines sentence “is unreasonably long is even more demanding.” Id.; see also
United States v. Greco, 734 F.3d 441, 450 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Although it is not impossible to
succeed on a substantive-reasonableness challenge to a below-guidelines sentence, defendants who
seek to do so bear a heavy burden.”).

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No. 23-1994, United States v. Robinson
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Robinson contends that when the district court considered the seriousness of his offense, it
placed an unreasonable amount of weight on the 20-year statutory maximum penalty, rather than
the overall statutory scheme. Robinson relies on the district court’s observation that the 20-year
statutory maximum penalty “is a clear indication” that the executive and legislative branches
“believe[] that distribution of this drug is a very serious offense.” According to Robinson, the
statutory minimum penalty is more significant than the statutory maximum penalty. Robinson
argues that probation was an available sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a). And he emphasizes
that, because other drug offenses are subject to mandatory minimum penalties and are offenses for
which probation is expressly precluded, those offenses are significantly more serious than his
offense. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B) (requiring mandatory minimum sentences and
prohibiting probation), with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (omitting any mandatory minimum
requirement and permitting probation).
In considering the seriousness of Robinson’s offense, however, the district court did not
limit its discussion to the statutory maximum penalty. The district court found that Robinson’s
offense was serious because it involved “significant quantities of distribution of
methamphetamine.” Robinson sold a total of 2.06 kilograms of methamphetamine to the
confidential informant.1 The district court went on to state that “[m]ethamphetamine regretfully
is the number one drug of abuse in the Western District of Michigan.” The record does not show
that the district court placed an inordinate amount of weight on the statutory maximum penalty in
discussing the seriousness of Robinson’s offense. Nor does the record support Robinson’s claim
that the district court misunderstood the statutory sentencing range.
1 The government points out that each count in the indictment could have carried a 10-year
mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) based on the quantity and
purity of the methamphetamine involved in each controlled buy.

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No. 23-1994, United States v. Robinson
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Robinson has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that his below-Guidelines
sentence is substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm Robinson’s sentence.

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