Jermaine Franklin Jr., Inc v. Mark F. Haak

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 25a0447n.06
No. 21-1027
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JERMAINE FRANKLIN JR., INC, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Counterclaim Defendants- Appellees,
v.
MARK F. HAAK,
Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff-Appellant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
OPINION
Before: GILMAN, McKEAGUE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellee Jermaine Franklin is a professional
boxer, and Defendant-Appellant Mark Haak is his manager. After Franklin won a national boxing
championship in 2014, he sought a manager. Later that year, Franklin met Haak, and they signed
a contract.
As time went on, Franklin became frustrated with Haak’s performance as a manager. So
he tried to terminate the contract in August 2018. This went nowhere, and Franklin and Haak
eventually sued each other.
In April 2019, Franklin filed the operative First Amended Complaint in the Eastern District
of Michigan for a violation of the Muhammad Ali Act, a violation of the Boxers Bill of Rights, a
violation of the Pennsylvania Boxing Code, breach of contract, fraud, tortious interference, breach
of fiduciary duty, and defamation. Haak answered and counterclaimed for declaratory judgment,
equitable estoppel, and breach of contract.

-- 1 of 2 --

No. 21-1027, Franklin v. Haak
2
After some motion practice cut down almost all of Franklin’s claims, the parties cross-
moved for summary judgment on Haak’s declaratory judgment claim, Franklin’s affirmative
defenses, and Franklin’s request for an accounting. The district court entered an order dated
November 6, 2020, which sided with Haak on Franklin’s outstanding claims and agreed with
Franklin that the tolling provision of the contract kicked in on March 1, 2019. The district court
did not rule on the counts for equitable estoppel and breach of contract, nor is there any indication
on the district court’s docket that those claims were disposed of.
Haak timely appealed from the district court’s November 6, 2020, order. After the appeal
was briefed but before it was submitted to the panel, Franklin petitioned for bankruptcy relief, so
we held this case in abeyance. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (automatically staying all litigation
involving a debtor during the bankruptcy case). That bankruptcy case concluded on September
15, 2025, so we dissolved the abeyance. See id. § 362(c)(2)(B) (automatically lifting the stay when
the bankruptcy case is dismissed). As a result, we now consider the appeal.
“With certain limited exceptions not applicable here, we have jurisdiction only over
appeals from final decisions of a district court.” Bonner v. Perry, 564 F.3d 424, 426–27 (6th Cir.
2009). “A grant of partial summary judgment that does not dispose of all parties and all claims is
generally not immediately appealable unless the district court issues a Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
certificate.” Id. at 427. The district court’s order was a grant of partial summary judgment and
did not dispose of Haak’s claims for equitable estoppel and breach of contract. The parties agree
that those claims remain pending, and the district court did not certify that there was no just reason
for delaying the appeal under Rule 54(b). So we do not have a final and appealable order before
us. We therefore DISMISS the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

-- 2 of 2 --