United States of America v. Jeffrey Scott Munro

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0049n.06
No. 25-1298
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JEFFREY SCOTT MUNRO,
Defendant-Appellant.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
OPINION
Before: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey Munro pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute, and
possession with intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. He now argues that
his sentence—92 months in prison and a $1,500 fine—was substantively unreasonable. We
disagree and affirm.
I.
In 2021, federal and Michigan investigators learned that Curtis St. Andre was supplying
residents of Marquette County, Michigan, with methamphetamine by the pound. Over the next
year, the investigators identified Jacquelyn Dunn and Jeffrey Munro as two of St. Andre’s buyers.
In February 2023, the investigators stopped Dunn’s car. A police dog smelled drugs, and a search
of the car revealed nearly two pounds of methamphetamine. The investigators then obtained a
search warrant for Dunn’s cellphone, where they found over 400 messages between her and
Munro.

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The messages concerned buying and selling drugs. At least twice, the messages revealed
(and Dunn later confirmed) that Dunn had accompanied St. Andre to Munro’s house, where St.
Andre sold Munro between eight and thirteen pounds of methamphetamine each time. In May
2023, investigators executed a search warrant at Munro’s house, where they found nearly two
pounds of methamphetamine, digital scales with methamphetamine residue, some heroin, and
some methamphetamine mixed with fentanyl. Munro was arrested on state charges, released, and
later rearrested on federal charges. Meanwhile, federal authorities also arrested St. Andre, who
admitted he had provided Munro with up to 15 pounds of methamphetamine in a single sale.
A grand jury indicted St. Andre, Dunn, and Munro for conspiracy to distribute—and Munro
for possession with intent to distribute—50 grams or more of methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(viii), 846. All three pled guilty. Munro’s base offense level under the
sentencing guidelines was 34. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(3) (2024). Munro received two
reductions for acceptance of responsibility, which made his total offense level 31 and yielded a
guideline range of 121 to 151 months. Id. § 3E1.1(a)-(b).
At sentencing, the district court awarded Munro a reduction for cooperating with the
government’s investigation of the conspiracy, which lowered his offense level to 28 and his
guideline range to 87 to 108 months. See id. § 5K1.1. The court then considered the statutory
sentencing factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); id. § 3572(a). Ultimately, the court imposed a
sentence of 92 months in prison. Munro could not afford to pay a fine in the guideline range of
$30,000 to $5,000,000, so the court imposed a fine of $1,500. See U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3)-(4)
(2024); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii). This appeal followed.

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II.
We review the reasonableness of Munro’s sentence for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018).
Munro argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. A sentence is
substantively unreasonable when the district court puts “too much weight” on some § 3553(a)
factors and “too little on others.” Id. We presume that Munro’s sentence was reasonable, given
that it was within (indeed, near the bottom of) his guideline range. See United States v. Vonner,
516 F.3d 382, 389–90 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Munro contends that the district court put too much weight on the quantity of
methamphetamine that he purchased from St. Andre. This number, Munro reasons, had already
largely determined his base offense level and guideline range; for the court to have cited it again
when selecting a sentence within the guideline range, he says, was “essentially double-counting.”
Appellant Br. 9. But the district court was required to consider “the nature and circumstances of
the offense,” as well as its “seriousness,” when the court chose Munro’s sentence. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1)-(2). And for a drug offense its seriousness depends in part on the quantity of drugs
sold or possessed. Cf. United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 636 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010).
The court here did not err by complying with its statutory mandate.
Munro next argues that the district court put too much weight on his “lengthy list of prior
convictions.” Appellant Br. 9. Specifically, Munro says, the court did not “explicitly
acknowledg[e] that the vast majority of his prior convictions could be attributed to his struggles
with addiction.” Id. at 10. But the court thoroughly reviewed Munro’s criminal history, which
comprised more than simple-possession convictions. And the court acknowledged Munro’s
“addiction issues.” Sentencing Hearing Transcript, R. 184, PageID 719. But the court also

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recognized that, as an addict, Munro was aware of the harm his distribution crimes caused to
others. And the court expressly rejected the probation officer’s recommendation to “depart upward
because of [Munro’s] criminal history.” Id. at 722. Hence the court did not abuse its discretion
on this point either.
Next, Munro contends that his sentence of 92 months in prison was substantively
unreasonable because the district court failed to provide “adequate reasoning” for its sentence.
Appellant Br. 11. Such an argument sounds in procedural reasonableness. United States v. Brooks,
628 F.3d 791, 795–96 (6th Cir. 2011). But Munro failed to object on this ground even when the
district court solicited his objections, so we review the court’s stated reasoning for plain error. See
Vonner, 516 F.3d at 385–86. Suffice it to say that we find no error, let alone plain error, in the
court’s careful explanation of the sentence.
Finally, Munro argues that the court abused its discretion by imposing a $1,500 fine, given
that he is “dirt-poor.” Appellant Br. 14. But that fine was a small fraction of the lower end of
Munro’s guideline range for the fine. See U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3)-(4) (2024); 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(viii). Munro counters that there was “no loss caused by [his] offense.” Appellant
Br. 18. The court did not abuse its discretion in thinking otherwise, given that—in every relevant
sense—drug distribution is hardly free.
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

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