United States of America v. Steve Briggins

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 18‐1921
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
S TEVE BRIGGINS ,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:17‐cr‐00243‐1 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 24, 2019 — D ECIDED MARCH 6, 2019
____________________
Before MANION, BRENNAN, and S CUDDER , Circuit Judges.
SCUDDER , Circuit Judge. In 2017 Steve Briggins was con‐
victed of robbing multiple banks over several months. This
was not Briggins’s first foray into bank robbery. Eighteen
years earlier, in 1999, Briggins was convicted of and sentenced
for ten bank robberies he committed over a span of a few
months. When the district court sentenced Briggins for the
2017 robberies, it accounted for the 1999 robberies in calculat‐
ing his criminal history points under the Sentencing

-- 1 of 9 --

2 No. 18‐1921
Guidelines. Briggins now appeals, contending that the district
court, when determining his advisory sentencing range, im‐
properly determined his criminal history category by impos‐
ing too many criminal history points for the 1999 robberies.
Seeing no error, we affirm.
I
Briggins pleaded guilty in 2017 to committing multiple
bank robberies. At sentencing a primary focus became
Briggins’s criminal history and, more specifically, how many
criminal history points should be assessed for the ten bank
robberies he was convicted of in 1999 and for which he was
sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The number of points
to be added for the 1999 robberies depended on whether the
prior 84‐month term reflected one sentence (for all ten
robberies) or multiple concurrent sentences (for the ten
separate robberies). Briggins urged the former—if the 84‐
month term reflected one sentence, it would yield fewer
criminal history points and thus a lower advisory guidelines
range.
The district court’s determination of Briggins’s criminal
history points tracked the Sentencing Guidelines analysis of‐
fered by the probation office. In its presentence investigation
report, the probation office concluded that Briggins received
ten concurrent sentences—one for each of the ten bank rob‐
beries. So, too, did the probation office recognize that the cal‐
culation of Briggins’s criminal history points needed to ac‐
count for the threefold reality that he was charged with all ten
robberies in the same indictment, pleaded guilty to each of
those robberies in the same proceeding, and faced sentencing
for all ten on the same day. All of this had ramifications for
the proper criminal history calculation.

-- 2 of 9 --

No. 18‐1921 3
In the end, the probation office recommended that
Briggins receive six criminal history points for the 1999 bank
robberies. These six points captured all ten robberies and
came from an application of two provisions within § 4A1.1 of
the guidelines. The first three of those points came from
§ 4A1.1(a), which requires sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3
points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one
year and one month.” And the other three points came from
a provision, § 4A1.1(e), that applies where, as here, a
defendant is convicted of multiple offenses charged in the
same indictment or receives multiple sentences on the same
day. In this way, § 4A1.1(e) accounts for the circumstance of
multiple convictions and sentences.
We can put the point in even plainer terms. A defendant
sentenced to more than 13 months’ imprisonment following a
felony conviction ordinarily receives three criminal history
points for that offense at a later sentencing. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.1(a). By this logic, it may seem that a defendant like
Briggins convicted of and sentenced for ten separate robberies
should receive 30 criminal history points—three for each
conviction. The guidelines do not work that way, though, in
situations like the ones present here. Where the prior
sentences “resulted from offenses contained in the same
charging instrument” or were “imposed on the same day,”
the Sentencing Commission limited the number of criminal
history points assigned to those sentences. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2).
The first sentence still receives three points (consistent with
the ordinary rule), but the remaining sentences are subject to
a capping rule: § 4A1.1(e) assigns one criminal history point
for each additional sentence resulting from a conviction of a
crime of violence but limits the maximum number of
additional points to three.

-- 3 of 9 --

4 No. 18‐1921
The probation office applied this capping rule when calcu‐
lating Briggins’s criminal history points here. It began with
the ten sentences Briggins received for the ten 1999 robberies
and assigned three points to the first of those sentences under
§ 4A1.1(a) because the sentence exceeded 13 months. From
there the probation office recognized that, because the ten
sentences came from the same indictment and were imposed
on the same day, the limitations of § 4A1.1(e) applied. Apply‐
ing § 4A1.1(e) meant that only three additional points were
allowed for Briggins’s remaining nine robberies. The math
from there was simple: Briggins received a total of six criminal
history points for the ten 1999 robberies.
At the sentencing hearing for the 2017 robberies, the
district court agreed with and adopted the probation office’s
analysis of Briggins’s criminal history. The resulting advisory
guidelines range for Briggins’s 2017 bank robberies was 77 to
96 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a
sentence of 96 months.
II
On appeal Briggins renews his challenge to the district
court’s calculation of the criminal history points assigned to
his 1999 bank robberies. He does so by attacking a key factual
premise upon which the district court based its determination
that the prior robberies warranted a total of six criminal his‐
tory points. As Briggins sees the 1999 proceeding, he received
not ten concurrent sentences, but rather one sentence of 84
months for all ten robberies. On this view, he contends he
should have received only three criminal history points for
the single term of 84 months he received for the 1999 rob‐
beries, and thus there was no need for the district court to ever
get into how the guidelines treat multiple sentences.

-- 4 of 9 --

No. 18‐1921 5
Resolving whether Briggins received multiple concurrent
sentences or one sentence for his ten bank robberies requires
us to review the 1999 sentencing hearing in some detail. The
beginning point is recognizing that Briggins pleaded guilty to
committing ten separate bank robberies, each of which had
been charged as a separate count in the underlying indict‐
ment. At the 1999 sentencing hearing, the district court stated
that it was sentencing Briggins “to a term of 84 months.” In
doing so, the court emphasized that Briggins deserved to be
punished for each robbery—he should not, as the sentencing
judge put it, receive any “group discounts” for having com‐
mitted ten separate robberies. The district court’s written
judgment reflected that Briggins pleaded guilty to ten counts
that resulted in “a total term of 84 months.” Nowhere in the
written judgment did the court indicate whether the 84‐
month term reflected concurrent sentences.
Briggins latches onto the district court’s use of the phrase
“a term” of imprisonment to argue that he received a single,
lump‐sum term of 84 months for the ten robberies. He does
not dispute that he pleaded guilty to ten separate robberies,
but rather underscores that he was sentenced to “a term” of
84 months—a single term, not multiple terms or concurrent
terms. And this single sentence, Briggins continues, is wholly
accounted for by the three criminal history points added un‐
der § 4A1.1(a); there was no basis for assigning additional
criminal history points under § 4A1.1(e) or any other provi‐
sion of the guidelines. The upshot of Briggins’s argument is
that it was not even necessary for the district court to reach
§ 4A1.1(e) because multiple sentences were not in play in the
first place.

-- 5 of 9 --

6 No. 18‐1921
We disagree. Briggins’s insistence that he received only
one sentence because the district court announced “a term” of
imprisonment ignores the substance and full context of what
transpired at his 1999 sentencing hearing. The transcript
shows that the district court intended to punish each robbery
separately, for there is no other way to understand the sen‐
tencing judge’s comments that Briggins was not entitled to
“any type of group discounts” or “a two‐for‐one sale or a ten‐
for‐one sale.”
The district judge made other statements at sentencing to
drive home that Briggins deserved to be punished for each of
the ten robberies. At one point, for example, the judge
explained that, if Briggins had committed just one bank
robbery, he would “probably be looking at three to five years
easily,” and that “any judge could sentence [him] to 30 years
and say, well, it’s three years for each of the bank robberies.”
The district judge further observed that, even if he sentenced
Briggins to just “one year for every one of the bank robberies,”
he would face a total of ten years. But the court was quick to
recognize that a sentence along those lines would be well
outside the then‐mandatory guidelines range of 63 to 78
months. So the district court instead applied an upward
departure, reasoning that the ten robberies conducted over a
short period of time presented an “unusual circumstance”
that was not adequately taken into consideration by the
guidelines. The 1999 sentencing ended with the district court
imposing a sentence of 84 months.
A broader point deserves underscoring. Accepting
Briggins’s position would require us to conclude that the
district court sentenced him to 84 months for one of the ten
1999 bank robberies but to no time for the other nine. But any

-- 6 of 9 --

No. 18‐1921 7
view like that neither accounts for what the district judge said
at sentencing—that Briggins would not receive a break
because he committed multiple bank robberies—nor the
reality that the court was obligated to sentence him on each of
the ten separate bank robberies to which he pleaded guilty.
We also cannot overlook that the district court imposed a
special assessment of $100 for each of the ten robberies for a
total of $1,000—yet another indicator that the district judge
understood the ten robberies as resulting in separate
convictions warranting separate sentences. The only other
interpretation, which makes even less sense, is that the 84‐
month sentence reflected the sum total of ten consecutive
sentences of 8.4 months each. Not only would a sentence like
that—less than one year for a bank robbery—bear little
relationship to the applicable guidelines range, but it would
also require us to assume the district judge (who uttered not
a word about consecutive sentences) intended to impose ten
small but consecutive sentences.
Our conclusion that the district court imposed ten
concurrent sentences for the 1999 robberies aligns squarely
with the presumption that sentences imposed in a multiple‐
count case run concurrently with one another. See U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.2(c) (explaining that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the
count carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to
achieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts
shall run concurrently”). Indeed, the Sentencing
Commission’s accompanying commentary (in effect at the
time of the 1999 sentencing and now) clarifies that, in a
multiple‐count case, the total punishment is to be imposed on
each count and the sentences on all counts are to run
concurrently. See id. § 5G1.2 & cmt; see also id. § 5G1.2 & cmt.
(effective Nov. 1, 1998). Congress incorporated this same

-- 7 of 9 --

8 No. 18‐1921
presumption of concurrence into the statutory provision
governing the imposition of multiple sentences for a
defendant convicted of a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3584(a).
We decline to interpret Briggins’s 1999 sentence in a way
that contravenes not only this presumption of concurrence,
but also the sentencing judge’s clear statements that he in‐
tended to hold Briggins accountable for each robbery. The
most accurate reading of Briggins’s 1999 sentence—the read‐
ing fairest to the record—is that “a term of 84 months” re‐
flected multiple concurrent sentences.
Briggins urges a contrary conclusion by pointing to prior
decisions where courts have concluded that “a term” refers to
one sentence or, at the very least, creates enough ambiguity
about what sentence a defendant received to warrant resen‐
tencing. In United States v. Eskridge, for example, the question
was whether the district court had imposed one term or two
concurrent terms of supervised release for the defendant’s
two convictions. 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). After exam‐
ining the sentencing transcript, we held that the defendant
was entitled to resentencing for supervised release violations
because the district judge, in sentencing the defendant to “a
term of 26 months,” in no way clarified (in the judgment or
otherwise) whether he had sentenced the defendant to one or
two terms of supervised release. See id. at 935. And we added
that “if the order accurately reflects the judge’s decision, how‐
ever mistaken, to impose just a single term, it cannot be cor‐
rected.” Id. at 934.
The circumstances here are different. The statements the
district judge made immediately before sentencing Briggins
for the 1999 robberies do not leave room for an interpretation

-- 8 of 9 --

No. 18‐1921 9
that the court may have decided—however mistakenly—to
impose a single term of imprisonment. To the contrary, the
district judge’s statements made clear that he intended to hold
Briggins accountable for each of the ten robbery convictions.
At the time, moreover, the guidelines required the court to
sentence Briggins on each count of conviction, with the pre‐
sumption that such sentences would run concurrently.
On this record, we conclude that the district court in 1999
imposed multiple sentences for Briggins’s ten robbery convic‐
tions. At Briggins’s sentencing for the 2017 convictions, the
district court thus properly assessed six criminal history
points for Briggins’s 1999 sentences—three criminal history
points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) for one sentence, and three
additional points for the remaining nine sentences under
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

-- 9 of 9 --