IZARIAH JUMP and ESTATE OF JONAH MARCINIAK , by Special Administrator BRENDA MROCH v. Village of Shorewood

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-2255
IZARIAH J UMP and ESTATE OF J ONAH MARCINIAK ,
by Special Administrator BRENDA M ROCH ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
VILLAGE OF SHOREWOOD, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 2:19-cv-1151 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.
____________________
A RGUED FEBRUARY 16, 2022 — D ECIDED A UGUST 2, 2022
____________________
Before R IPPLE , SCUDDER , and KIRSCH , Circuit Judges.
KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Jonah Marciniak died after hanging
himself in his holding cell. That tragedy occurred after three
officers of the Shorewood Police Department, Thomas Lieben-
thal, Cody J. Smith, and Nicolas Taraboi, had arrested
Marciniak after finding Eric Harper, Marciniak’s roommate,
lying on the ground four stories beneath the open window to
their shared apartment bedroom. Inside the apartment, the

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2 No. 21-2255
officers had found broken glass, blood droplets, and a naked,
intoxicated Marciniak.
Marciniak’s son, Izariah Jump, and estate sued the Village
of Shorewood and the three officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
pursuing both federal and state claims over Marciniak’s arrest
and death. After the district court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment, Jump appealed his false ar-
rest claim against all three officers and his failure to protect
claim against Sgt. Smith. We agree with the district court that
the officers had probable cause to arrest Marciniak and that
Sgt. Smith’s actions were not objectively unreasonable, so we
affirm.
I
A
At 1:35 am on August 15, 2016, Sgt. Cody J. Smith and Of-
ficer Nicolas Taraboi, joined by another officer and members
of the North Shore Fire Department, responded to a dispatch
regarding a “male subject that fell out of a fourth story win-
dow.” Upon arrival, they indeed found Eric Harper lying on
the ground below an open fourth story window. Officer Tar-
aboi observed blood and bruising on Harper’s face, scrapes
on his legs, and his left arm contorted under his body. The
EMT report also stated blood was visible coming from the
back of Harper’s head. Although alive, Harper could not
speak words to Sgt. Smith and Officer Taraboi, and neither
heard him speak to fire department personnel.
Determining Harper fell from apartment number 10, Sgt.
Smith, Officer Taraboi, and the other officer entered the build-
ing. Lack of a response from the apartment prompted the of-
ficers to force entry. Inside, they found Jonah Marciniak lying

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No. 21-2255 3
naked and unconscious on a bed near the open window. He
had no apparent injuries. They also observed drops of blood
on the bed and on a piece of mail next to the window as well
as broken glass on the bed and on Marciniak’s back. The win-
dow screen had been removed, a lamp broken, and the mat-
tress was askew.
During this investigation, the officers related to each other
a couple recent incidents involving Marciniak and the apart-
ment. The third officer told Sgt. Smith and Officer Taraboi
that responders had come to the apartment just a few days
prior because Marciniak had overdosed on heroin. Sergeant
Smith himself had responded to a disorderly conduct call at
the location a few weeks earlier involving Marciniak and Har-
per. Marciniak and Harper had each claimed the other had
started the argument, no one was arrested, and Sgt. Smith left
the incident believing the two were in an intimate relation-
ship.
Meanwhile, Marciniak regained consciousness and told
Officer Taraboi he had had some drinks, fallen asleep, and
had no memory of arguing with Harper. The officers in-
formed him that Harper had fallen out of the window and
been taken to the hospital. Officer Taraboi thought Marciniak
was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The officers re-
moved Marciniak from the apartment building while Sgt.
Smith reported all these events to his supervisor, Lt. Thomas
Liebenthal. Following Lt. Liebenthal’s orders, Sgt. Smith told
Officer Taraboi to handcuff Marciniak and transport him to
the Shorewood police station for questioning.
After placing him in one of the department’s municipal
lockup cells, separate from the general jail population, Sgt.
Smith and Officer Taraboi completed the standard booking

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4 No. 21-2255
and health screening form. The form, per Lt. Liebenthal, is to
make officers aware of potential health risks or suicide related
issues. Sergeant Smith filled out the form and signed it, noting
Marciniak appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or
drugs. The form contains three questions about mental health
and suicide, all of which Sgt. Smith was required to fill out.
First, the form asks, “Have you ever had psychiatric treat-
ment? Explain.” This was marked “Yes,” but no explanation
given. The form also asks, “Have you ever attempted or are
you now considering suicide?” Sgt. Smith marked that
Marciniak answered this “No.” Per Sgt. Smith, Officer Tara-
boi asked Marciniak this question, and Marciniak answered
in the negative. Last is the section entitled “Prisoner placed
on suicide watch and supervisor notified,” with a space for
“Remarks.” This row was left blank—Sgt. Smith marked nei-
ther “Yes” nor “No.” Sergeant Smith also testified that
Marciniak later volunteered to Smith that Marciniak was not
suicidal.
While Sgt. Smith—assigned to check on Marciniak—was
doing paperwork, an agitated Marciniak made loud noises,
prompting Smith to make multiple cell checks throughout the
early morning hours. Sergeant Smith did visual welfare
checks at 2:54, 3:12, 3:16, 3:23, 3:33, and 4:19 am. In the 46-mi-
nute gap between 3:33 and 4:19, Marciniak used his t-shirt to
hang himself. After Sgt. Smith found Marciniak hanging from
the bars with the t-shirt around his neck and his face yellow,
Smith cut him down and radioed for help but did not perform
CPR. Paramedics stationed in the same building arrived and
performed CPR on Marciniak. Sergeant Smith promptly falsi-
fied the booking sheet to show that he had checked in on
Marciniak at 4:10 am. Marciniak was taken to a hospital where
he died six days later.

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No. 21-2255 5
B
Izariah Jump, Marciniak’s son, and Brenda Mroch, Special
Administrator for Marciniak’s estate, sued the Village of
Shorewood, Lt. Liebenthal, Sgt. Smith, and Officer Taraboi.
Their complaint alleged that the three officers falsely arrested
Marciniak without probable cause, violating his Fourth
Amendment rights, and failed to provide medical care and
attention and to protect from self harm. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. Granting it, the district court
concluded (1) the undisputed facts established the officers
had probable cause to arrest Marciniak for domestic violence;
and (2) a reasonable jury could not find the officers’ actions in
the period leading to Marciniak’s death were objectively un-
reasonable. Ending each claim there, the district court did not
need to deal with the defendants’ alternate grounds for sum-
mary judgment, qualified immunity.
C
Jump raises two distinct issues on appeal, one relating to
Marciniak’s arrest and one to his suicide. Both concern
whether the officers violated Marciniak’s Fourth Amendment
rights. Jump first contends the district court erred in finding
the officers had probable cause to arrest Marciniak for a crime.
Second, Jump argues the district court erred in finding Sgt.
Smith’s actions not objectively unreasonable in his treatment
of Marciniak as a pretrial detainee.
II
Jump challenges the district court’s conclusion that the
three officers had probable cause at arrest. “The existence of
probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any § 1983
claim against a police officer for false arrest … .” Abbott v.

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6 No. 21-2255
Sangamon County., 705 F.3d 706, 713–14 (7th Cir. 2013). We re-
view determinations at summary judgment de novo. Cibulka
v. City of Madison, 992 F.3d 633, 638, (7th Cir. 2021).
A
The district court found that the officers had probable
cause to arrest Marciniak for the crime of domestic abuse. The
briefing of both parties accepted this premise and debated
whether probable cause existed for domestic abuse under
Wis. Stat. § 968.075 (“‘Domestic abuse’ means any of the fol-
lowing engaged in by an adult person … against an adult with
whom the person resides or formerly resided … : 1. Inten-
tional infliction of physical pain, physical injury or illness. 2.
Intentional impairment of physical condition.”).
Right away we hit a snag: section 968.075 is not a criminal
liability statute. It is, as the officers point out, a mandatory ar-
rest statute, requiring officers to arrest possible aggressors.
But domestic abuse is not a freestanding crime under Wiscon-
sin law. See State v. Neis, No. 2009AP1287-CR, 2010 WL
2772679, at *4 (Wis. Ct. July 15, 2010) (Section 968.075(1)(a)
“plainly governs law enforcement procedures in domestic
abuse cases. It does not create criminal liability for the domes-
tic abuse perpetrator.”).
Rather, the statute works as a kind of sentencing rider.
Prosecutors attach domestic abuse as defined in § 968.075 to a
state crime to trigger Wisconsin’s domestic abuse assessment,
§ 973.055, or to add an additional year of probation under
§ 973.09(2)(a)1.b. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 830 N.W.2d 109,
112 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he complaint mentions ‘domes-
tic abuse’ and ‘invok[es] the provisions of sec. 968.075(1)(a),
Wis. Stats., because this charge is an act of domestic abuse,

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No. 21-2255 7
costs upon conviction would include the domestic abuse as-
sessment.’”). The domestic abuse rider is always paired with
an actual Wisconsin criminal offense. As far as we can tell,
Wisconsin prosecutors never charge domestic abuse as a free-
standing crime. That is, no doubt, why the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court calls § 968.075(1)(a) “the domestic abuse modi-
fier.” State v. Lagrone, 878 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Wis. 2016). The
statute is a modifier for sentencing purposes and victim-protec-
tion purposes. It’s not a criminal liability statute. That § 968.075
is not a criminal liability statute precludes it from being a
predicate offence in our probable cause analysis for § 1983
false arrest claims. See Abbott, 705 F.3d at 715 (“The existence
of probable cause … depends, in the first instance, on the ele-
ments of the predicate criminal offense(s) as defined by state
law.”).
But that is not a fatal issue here. The officers have alterna-
tively argued, both below and on appeal, that they had prob-
able cause to arrest Marciniak for battery. At summary judg-
ment, the defendants argued that the “evidence showed prob-
able cause for arrest … for simple battery.” And in their ap-
pellate brief, the officers kept that argument alive, alleging
“the evidence of an altercation in the apartment bedroom …
would give a reasonable officer good reason to believe that …
probable cause supported Marciniak’s arrest for … battery.”
And it does not matter what crime(s) for which the officers
subjectively thought they had probable cause at the time of
arrest. The Supreme Court has made clear that “an arresting
officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is
irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.” Devenpeck v. Al-
ford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004). Since that decision, we have held
that “an arrest can be supported by probable cause that the
arrestee committed any crime.” Abbott, 705 F.3d at 715.

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8 No. 21-2255
In lieu of § 968.075, we focus on Wisconsin’s criminal bat-
tery statute, Wis. Stat. § 940.19. Section 940.19 establishes
criminal liability for both simple battery (“[w]hoever causes
bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause
bodily harm to that person or another without the consent of
the person so harmed is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor,” id.
§ 940.19(1)) and substantial battery (“[w]hoever causes sub-
stantial bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to
cause bodily harm to that person or another is guilty of a Class
I felony,” id. § 940.19(2)). Both simple and substantial battery
share three elements: (1) causation, (2) harm, and (3) intent.
See State v. Martin, 456 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
Simple battery adds a fourth element, that the act is done
without the consent of the person harmed. Wis. Stat.
§ 940.19(1); see State v. Giwosky, 326 N.W.2d 232, 234–35 (Wis.
1982) (citing “the four elements of [simple] battery” as bodily
harm, causation, intent, and lack of consent). Criminal intent
in Wisconsin can be inferred from a party’s overt acts and con-
duct and inferences fairly deducible from the circumstances.
State v. Lunz, 273 N.W.2d 767, 772 (Wis. 1979). The levels of
harm are statutorily defined. “‘Bodily harm’ means physical
pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condi-
tion,” Wis. Stat. § 939.22(4), while “‘[s]ubstantial bodily harm’
means bodily injury that causes a laceration that requires
stitches, staples, or a tissue adhesive; any fracture of a bone; a
broken nose; a burn; a petechia; a temporary loss of conscious-
ness, sight or hearing; a concussion; or a loss or fracture of a
tooth,” id. § 939.22(38).
B
Equipped with a suitable predicate criminal offense, we
turn to the absolute defense of probable cause. It exists at

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No. 21-2255 9
arrest when a reasonable officer with all the knowledge of the
on-scene officers would have believed that the suspect com-
mitted an offense defined by state law. Jones v. Clark, 630 F.3d
677, 684 (7th Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court has admonished
us not to dissect every fact in isolation but to look at the total-
ity of the circumstances—the whole picture. District of Colum-
bia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018). We do not ignore cir-
cumstances susceptible to innocent explanation but look to
the degree of suspicion attached to particular types of possi-
bly noncriminal acts. Id.
Here, the suspect was Marciniak, the state crime battery,
and the moment of arrest Marciniak’s handcuffing. We accept
the officers’ argument (and Jump’s implicit agreement) that
Marciniak was arrested when Officer Taraboi handcuffed him
and placed him inside his squad car. A reasonable person in
Marciniak’s position would have understood the situation to
constitute a restraint on his freedom of movement to the de-
gree which the law associates with formal arrest. See Tebbens
v. Mushol, 692 F.3d 807, 816 (7th Cir. 2012).
At that moment of handcuffing, under the totality of the
circumstances, probable cause to arrest for battery existed.
The officers came upon a man who fell from a fourth story
bedroom window at 1:30 in the morning with the fall victim’s
roommate—with whom he had a history of conflict known to
the police—passed out on the bed in a disheveled room con-
taining broken glass and drops of blood. Enough facts sup-
ported a reasonable officer’s inference that (1) Marciniak had
intent to cause bodily harm; (2) Harper had suffered at least
bodily harm, probably substantial bodily harm; and (3)
Marciniak had caused that harm. Intent and causation could
be inferred by these circumstances known to the officers: the

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10 No. 21-2255
broken glass, broken lamp, and spots of blood around the bed
close to the window; Marciniak’s condition; and the earlier
disturbance call in which Harper claimed Marciniak was an
aggressor. As to harm, the officers saw Harper in fairly bad
shape: his arm was contorted and he had blood coming from
his head.
Jump attacks each circumstance, attempting to negate the
degree of suspicion attached to each. Jump first contends
summary judgment was precluded because Harper told the
defendant officers that Marciniak did not push him out of the
window. Harper said afterward that he told a “policeman”
and paramedics on scene that Marciniak had not pushed him
out the window, that he answered “no” twice to whether he
was pushed or jumped, and that he told the officers “be care-
ful with [Jonah]. His brain space isn’t in a good place.” But in
the district court, Jump did not dispute the testimony of Sgt.
Smith and Officer Taraboi—that neither heard what Harper
tried to say to the fire department personnel. Jump did not
dispute Harper was “unable to speak words” to Sgt. Smith
and Officer Taraboi and was “uncommunicative.” There is no
evidence—disputed or otherwise—that Sgt. Smith, Officer
Taraboi, or Lt. Liebenthal heard directly or heard about Har-
per’s alleged statements. In any case, even if the officers did
hear Harper’s words, they did not have to credit them in their
assessment of the situation. After all, “[a]cts of domestic vio-
lence often are intended to dissuade a victim from resorting
to outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent tes-
timony to police officers or cooperation in criminal prosecu-
tions.” Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 377 (2008). And the to-
tality of the other circumstances was enough to establish
probable cause regardless of whatever Harper said. See Out-
law v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2001) (no genuine

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No. 21-2255 11
issue of material fact when “defendants would be entitled to
summary judgment even assuming the truth of [plaintiff’s]
version of the incident”).
Next, Jump points to three circumstances that do not, in
his view, indicate a crime had occurred—officer interaction
with Marciniak, the condition of the bedroom, and the prior
arguments between Marciniak and Harper. Citing Williams v.
City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2013), Jump says
Marciniak’s physical presence in the apartment cannot sup-
port probable cause without further indicia of involvement.
True enough. But when, as here, there are further indicia, po-
lice are allowed to take a suspect’s physical presence into ac-
count. So Jump assails some of those further indicia, like the
disheveled room, the shards of glass, and the drops of blood.
These, per Jump, could have come about for any number of
reasons and have a low degree of suspicion associated with
them. But we do not accept innocent explanations for one cir-
cumstance while divorcing it from the rest. The police were
entitled to view the state of the room—featuring broken glass
and blood—as having a significant degree of suspicion along-
side the rest of the circumstances. Jump also tries to negate
the prior disorderly conduct call by claiming Marciniak was
the victim of Harper, but Smith testified that both Marciniak
and Harper claimed at the time the other had started the ar-
gument. Smith and the others were certainly entitled to credit
Harper’s version of the previous incident when faced with the
rest of the facts in the apartment—including that Harper him-
self had taken a four-story fall. Taking reasonable inferences
in Jump’s favor on appeal does not require us to second guess
officers’ reasonable inferences made on the scene.

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12 No. 21-2255
Jump thinks the officers unreasonably disregarded excul-
patory evidence—a cell phone video and the potential state-
ment of the eyewitness who took the video. According to
Jump, the video shows Harper falling out of the window and
gives no indication he was pushed. He cites BeVier v. Hucal,
806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1986), for the notion that police of-
ficers must pursue reasonable avenues of investigation to es-
tablish probable cause, especially when it is unclear whether
a crime had taken place. We went on to specify in BeVier, how-
ever, that an arresting officer must seek out only information
that “could have been easily obtained and was necessary” to
conclude a crime had been committed. Id. That is not a free-
standing affirmative duty for officers to pursue all avenues of
investigation before arrest. Rather, it follows the “well-set-
tled” rule that “once detectives have performed a good-faith
investigation and assembled sufficient information from the
totality of the circumstances to establish probable cause, they
are not required under the Constitution to continue searching
for additional evidence.” Driebel v. City of Milwaukee, 298 F.3d
622, 643–44 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted). Only readily
obtainable information necessary and sufficient to establish
probable cause needs to be sought out by investigating offic-
ers.
Here, there’s no question the officers collected information
necessary and sufficient to arrest Marciniak for battery inde-
pendent of the video or the eyewitness’s potential statements.
After finding Harper, entering and observing the apartment,
and speaking to Marciniak, the officers had all they needed to
arrest him for battery. They had no obligation to seek out this
allegedly exculpatory evidence.

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No. 21-2255 13
Finally, Jump contends that the officers expressed on
scene that they did not have probable cause for arrest. But
subjective thoughts, expressed or not, are utterly immaterial
in challenging the sufficiency of probable cause for arrest. See
Abbott, 705 F.3d at 714; Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153.
We see plenty of facts here that, viewed together, estab-
lished probable cause for battery. Therefore, the officers have
an absolute defense to this § 1983 false arrest claim.
C
Even if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest
for battery, they are still entitled to qualified immunity. Jump
has the burden to defeat qualified immunity “either by iden-
tifying a closely analogous case or by persuading the court
that the conduct is so egregious and unreasonable that, not-
withstanding the lack of an analogous decision, no reasonable
officer could have thought he was acting lawfully.” Abbott,
705 F.3d at 723–24; see also Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589–90.
Jump takes the first route—identifying a closely analogous
case—and offers us two options: (a) it was clearly established
that an arrest made without probable cause violates the
Fourth Amendment; and (b) it was clearly established that po-
lice forcibly removing a person from their home, detaining
him, and transporting him to the police station in handcuffs
for investigative purposes violates the Fourth Amendment
under Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979) (holding
that seizing and transporting a suspect to a police station for
interrogation without probable cause violated the Fourth
Amendment) and Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) (re-
affirming Dunaway and holding that such seizures without

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14 No. 21-2255
judicial supervision are sufficiently like arrests and violate the
Fourth Amendment absent probable cause).
We’ve repeatedly told litigants the first option is at an im-
permissibly high level of generality for qualified immunity
purposes. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Doran, 807 F.3d 178, 183 (7th
Cir. 2015) (“It is not enough to simply assert that it was clearly
established law that officers need probable cause to arrest a
person”); see also Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590. And Jump’s second
option ignores that he was arrested at handcuffing. An arrest
is an arrest. We ask only whether the officers had probable
cause at that point. What happened afterward is irrelevant, as
are analogies to Dunaway and Hayes. Yes, the Supreme Court
was clear that officers cannot just drag people down to the
station for the purpose of questioning. But “bringing someone
in for questioning” is not the Fourth Amendment activity
challenged in this false arrest claim; the arrest is. And to the
extent Dunaway and Hayes reaffirm the established rule that
arrests lacking probable cause violate the Fourth Amend-
ment, that brings us full circle to the same generality problem
as before.
At no point has Jump presented us with a closely analo-
gous case putting these officers on notice that their conduct
violated the Fourth Amendment. He certainly has not shown
any case law establishing what constitutes probable cause un-
der the Wisconsin statutes for battery or even domestic abuse.
We’ve seen no case in which officers confronted with these
disturbing facts—a defenestrated man below an open win-
dow of an apartment containing broken glass and drops of
blood in the early morning hours—were found to have vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment by arresting someone for bat-
tery.

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No. 21-2255 15
III
The second part of Jump’s appeal concerns the events at
the jail leading up to Marciniak’s death. The district court
found Smith not to have acted objectively unreasonably in
those moments, and Jump now challenges that conclusion.
We review de novo a district court’s entry of summary judg-
ment based on objective reasonableness. Pulera v. Sarzant, 966
F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 2020).
Jump’s complaint listed three § 1983 claims against the de-
fendants: failure to provide medical care and attention and
failure to protect from self harm. Jump appeals all claims—
though only as to Sgt. Smith.
The Fourth Amendment protects arrestees before a Ger-
stein probable cause finding, Pulera, 966 F.3d at 549 (citing Ger-
stein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)), the Fourteenth Amendment
after a finding of probable cause, id., while the Eighth Amend-
ment protects convicted prisoners, Miranda v. County of Lake,
900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018). Pretrial confinement claims
like Jump’s—whether characterized as arising under the
Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment1—are analyzed via the ob-
jective reasonableness standard. Pulera, 966 F.3d at 550.
Under this standard, the nonmoving plaintiff has the bur-
den to provide evidence that the defendants’ actions were
1 Marciniak never had a Gerstein hearing, so our current precedents sug-
gest this is a Fourth Amendment objective unreasonableness claim. Still,
we’ve twice suggested our distinction between pre and post hearing de-
tention needs reexamined after Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 917–
19 (2017). See Pulera, 966 F.3d at 549 n.1; Otis v. Demarasse, 886 F.3d 639,
645 n.27 (7th Cir. 2018). Both parties here, however, agree that the same
objective reasonableness standard governs either way, so we once again
put off this discussion.

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16 No. 21-2255
objectively unreasonable and caused his injuries. Id. We view
this objective standard not mechanically but in light of the to-
tality of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
Id.; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). Summary
judgment is due defendants when no rational jury could find
the official’s actions objectively unreasonable under the cir-
cumstances. Pulera, 966 F.3d at 551, 555. And when an officer
has no reason to think a detainee is suicidal, it is not objec-
tively unreasonable to take no special precautions. Id. at 555.
Pulera is on point. There, Pulera, who was intoxicated, was
arrested and booked into a pretrial facility. Id. at 545. Another
detainee (Pulera’s cousin) told multiple officers that he wor-
ried Pulera might hurt himself. Id. An officer screened Pulera
using a standard mental health form, noting Pulera was on
prescription medications and his brother had committed sui-
cide one year prior. Id. The officer marked down that he saw
no behavior suggesting a risk of suicide, and Pulera told the
officer he was not presently contemplating suicide. Id. Pulera
made three medical requests about his prescription medica-
tions, stating he could die if he did not receive them. Id. at
546–47. While speaking with multiple medical professionals,
Pulera told none of them he had suicidal thoughts. Id. at 547.
He nonetheless later tried to hang himself with bed sheets in
his cell. Id. We affirmed summary judgment, holding no rea-
sonable jury could find any of the state officials objectively
unreasonable in their actions. Id. at 556. We did not imply, as
the dissent suggests, that the facts known by the various de-
fendants would add up to notice of potential suicide had any
one individual defendant known all of them. This case is fac-
tually indistinguishable from Pulera.

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No. 21-2255 17
Jump disagrees and thinks a jury should see this case. He
presents several facts he believes satisfy his burden to provide
evidence Sgt. Smith was objectively unreasonable:
Marciniak’s being under the influence and having overdosed
a few days earlier; Smith’s observation of Marciniak crying
and asking for Harper; Marciniak’s telling Smith he had past
psychiatric treatment; general signs of distress such as
Marciniak’s slamming his body against the cell bars; the
health screening form’s failure to flag whether Marciniak was
suicidal; and the 45 minutes between wellness checks. From
these, Jump argues, a reasonable jury could conclude Sgt.
Smith was on notice of Marciniak’s suicidal ideation and in
fact put him on suicide watch, making Smith objectively un-
reasonable.
But—with Pulera in mind—each of these facts would not
have made a reasonable officer in Sgt. Smith’s position think
Marciniak was a suicide risk. First, and most dispositively, we
have no facts that Marciniak told Sgt. Smith or Officer Taraboi
he was suicidal. In fact, Sgt. Smith testified Marciniak had af-
firmatively told both the opposite. See Pulera, 966 F.3d. at 554
(state official “was not even negligently responsible for a sui-
cide risk that Pulera never told her about.”). The dissent con-
cludes that a jury could find Sgt. Smith lied on that count, but
it’s undisputed the intake form indicated Marciniak affirma-
tively said the opposite. And Marciniak’s general distress and
history of psychiatric treatment would give a reasonable of-
ficer notice of general distress and a history of psychiatric
treatment, not risk of suicide. See id. at 553 (medical request
for medications did not give a nurse “notice of any serious
problems, let alone a risk of suicide”). Nor was the 45 minutes
between checks unreasonable. Adding in extra checks would
be a special precaution—that’s why Shorewood policy was to

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18 No. 21-2255
check every 15 minutes for suicide risks. But Marciniak never
gave Sgt. Smith reason to think Marciniak might attempt sui-
cide, so no extra steps were required. See id. at 555 (“not un-
reasonable” for official to take “no special precautions”
against suicide when official had no reason to believe detainee
was a suicide risk).
Nor do the facts bear out that the officers consciously
treated Marciniak as a suicide risk. Both Officer Taraboi and
Sgt. Smith testified Marciniak told them he was not suicidal,
and Smith marked down that Marciniak was not contemplat-
ing suicide at that time. It is true that Sgt. Smith’s failure to fill
in the required suicide watch section introduces some ambi-
guity into this case. But drawing positive inferences in Jump’s
favor does not require us to conclude that the officers put
Marciniak on suicide watch. All we know is that they failed
to follow protocol and that—according to the same form—
Marciniak had told them he was not contemplating suicide.
This is simply not enough to create a reasonable inference that
they did in fact treat Marciniak as a suicide risk. And Sgt.
Smith’s repeated welfare checks weren’t suicide watch
checks. It’s undisputed Sgt. Smith was trying to calm
Marciniak down so he could get his paperwork done. What
matters is whether Smith’s actions were objectively unreason-
able. Pulera demands they weren’t, and a rational jury
couldn’t conclude otherwise.
* * *
Jonah Marciniak’s life ended far too early. Yet this is one
of those cases in which federal law leaves no one to blame le-
gally. Following the controlling precedent of this court, we
must A FFIRM the decision of the district court granting sum-
mary judgment for the defendants.

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No. 21-2255 19
R IPPLE , Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part. I join Parts I and II of the majority opinion. However,
because I disagree with the majority opinion’s affirmance of
summary judgment on Mr. Jump’s failure-to-protect claim, I
respectfully dissent as to Part III of the majority opinion. In
my view, Mr. Jump has the right have a jury evaluate his fail-
ure-to-protect claim.
I
A.
In conformity with the Supreme Court’s decision in Kings-
ley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015), we have long
held that “the Fourth Amendment governs the period of con-
finement between arrest without a warrant and the [probable
cause determination].” Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626, 629
(7th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Villanova v.
Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 1992)). And we have “since
applied the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objectively unreasonable’
standard to both ‘conditions of confinement’ and ‘medical
care’ claims brought by arrestees who have not yet had their
Gerstein hearing.”1 Id. (citing Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d
523 (7th Cir. 2011) (medical care); Williams v. Rodriguez,
509 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2007) (medical care); Sides v. City of
Champaign, 496 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2007) (medical care); Lopez
1 The Gerstein hearing refers to the probable cause determination,
promptly following a warrantless arrest, that serves as prerequisite to pre-
trial confinement. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975); County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 47, 56 (1991).

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20 No. 21-2255
v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2006) (conditions
of confinement)).2
In Currie, we explained that the rationale behind asking
whether the state officials’ response to an arrestee’s medical
needs was objectively reasonable is grounded in “greater so-
licitude to presumptively innocent arrestees.” 728 F.3d at 630–
31. To impose the deliberate indifference standard of the
Eighth Amendment on pretrial detainees and pre-Gerstein in-
mates would nullify the protections of the criminal process.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979).3 Mr. Jump
2 See also Pulera v. Sarzant, 966 F.3d 540, 549–50 (7th Cir. 2020); Lovett v.
Herbert, 907 F.3d 986, 992 (7th Cir. 2018); Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941,
953 (7th Cir. 2018); Est. of Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439, 453 (7th Cir. 2017);
Florek v. Village of Mundelein, 649 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2011); Sallenger v.
City of Springfield, 630 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 2010). We also evaluate med-
ical care claims brought by pretrial detainees (those who have had their
probable cause determination) under the objective unreasonableness in-
quiry grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment. See Miranda v. County of
Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Pulera, 966 F.3d at 550 (de-
clining to decide whether the objective unreasonable standards under the
Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment were identical).
3 Specifically, the Court stated:
Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be pun-
ished. A sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be pun-
ished, although that punishment may not be “cruel and un-
usual” under the Eighth Amendment. The Court recognized
this distinction in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–72,
n.40 (1977):
“Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only af-
ter the State has complied with the constitutional
guarantees traditionally associated with criminal
prosecutions. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,
317–18 (1946). … The State does not acquire the

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No. 21-2255 21
therefore bears the burden in this litigation of showing that
Sergeant Smith’s actions were “objectively unreasonable.”
Pulera v. Sarzant, 966 F.3d 540, 550 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 1509 (2021). On these important threshold princi-
ples, I have no disagreement with the majority opinion. It is
in the application of this standard that my views differ from
those expressed in the majority opinion.
B.
In my view, the record contains sufficient evidence to raise
a jury question as to whether Sergeant Smith acted in a rea-
sonable manner. “Reasonableness … must be determined in
light of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. To assist in this
assessment, we have identified four nonexclusive factors “rel-
evant for ascertaining whether a defendant’s conduct was ob-
jectively unreasonable”: (1) “notice of the arrestee’s medical
need, whether by word … , or through observation of the ar-
restee’s physical symptoms[;]” (2) “the seriousness of the
medical need[;]” (3) “the scope of the requested treatment[;]”
and (4) “police interests.” Williams, 509 F.3d at 403; Florek v.
Village of Mundelein, 649 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011) (explain-
ing that the factors are nonexclusive).
At the same time, we have cautioned that “[o]ne should
not fixate on factors … : the intuitive, organizing principle is
that police must do more to satisfy the reasonableness inquiry
when the medical condition they confront is apparent and
power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment
is concerned until after it has secured a formal adju-
dication of guilt in accordance with due process of
law.”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (cleaned up).

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22 No. 21-2255
serious and the interests of law enforcement in delaying treat-
ment are low.” Florek, 649 F.3d at 600. The medical condition
need not be an objectively serious medical condition;4 instead,
the “reasonableness analysis operates on a sliding scale, bal-
ancing the seriousness of the medical need with … the scope
of the requested treatment.” Williams, 509 F.3d at 403. “Our
ultimate inquiry, however, is ‘whether the conduct of each de-
fendant was objectively reasonable under the circum-
stances.’” Est. of Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439, 453–54 (7th Cir.
2017) (quoting Ortiz, 656 F.3d at 531).
This case should not be taken away from the jury.
Mr. Jump has put forth sufficient evidence from which a rea-
sonable jury could conclude that Sergeant Smith acted in an
objectively unreasonable manner when he failed to protect
Mr. Marciniak from suicide. Regarding the first factor noted
in Williams, there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that
Sergeant Smith was on notice that Mr. Marciniak needed
medical attention. Mr. Jump relies on the following alleged
facts to show notice:
4 We stated recently that a pretrial detainee must have “an objectively se-
rious medical need” to “state a claim for inadequate medical care.” Gon-
zalez v. McHenry County, No. 21-2756, 2022 WL 2921022, at *2 (7th Cir. July
26, 2022). This is in tension with our prior position that “[w]hether a med-
ical need is serious … is just a threshold requirement before the state has
a duty under the Eighth Amendment to provide medical care to a pris-
oner … [, and] there is no such threshold under the Fourth Amendment.”
Pulera, 966 F.3d at 552. We have viewed the standards of the Fourth
Amendment (that applies here) and the Fourteenth Amendment (applied
in Gonzalez) as functionally identical. Id. at 550; see also Manuel v. City of
Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 917–19 (2017); Majority Op. 15 n.1. Either way, “the
risk of suicide is an objectively serious medical condition.” Lisle v. Welborn,
933 F.3d 705, 716 (7th Cir. 2019).

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No. 21-2255 23
• Paramedics on the scene of his arrest observed that
Mr. Marciniak was emotionally distressed and recom-
mended that Mr. Marciniak go to the hospital.
• Sergeant Smith knew Mr. Marciniak was intoxicated,
confused and upset, and then handcuffed, brought to
a police station, and put in a cell.
• Mr. Marciniak repeatedly asked where Harper was.
• Mr. Marciniak was distressed in his cell, slamming his
body against the cell wall or cell door.
• Sergeant Smith knew Mr. Marciniak had a history of
psychiatric treatment.
• Sergeant Smith initially checked on Mr. Marciniak
every fifteen minutes after placing him in a cell, indi-
cating that Sergeant Smith had put Mr. Marciniak on
de facto suicide watch.5
• The “suicide watch” section of the health screening
form was left blank. It is the only section where neither
“yes” nor “no” was marked.6
• Sergeant Smith was aware that Mr. Marciniak over-
dosed on heroin within the past week.
5 See R.58 at 12–13 (explaining that “if someone is identified as a suicide
risk, checks were to be made every 15 minutes” and that Sergeant Smith
understood this policy).
6 R.51-1 at 2.

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24 No. 21-2255
• “[Sergeant] Smith was aware that a drug overdose
could be a suicide attempt.”7
• Sergeant Smith and Officer Taraboi each insist the
other asked Mr. Marciniak if he was suicidal.8
• The intake booking sheet section for the prisoner sig-
nature is marked “refused,”9 which Mr. Jump main-
tains a jury could find as “evidence of
[Mr. Marciniak’s] impairments, needs and risk, and
that [Sergeant] Smith did not conduct a proper, ade-
quate or reasonable intake procedure.”10
These facts, taken together, demonstrate that
Mr. Marciniak was not well, distraught, and in need of help.
Sergeant Smith knew that Mr. Marciniak was severely dis-
traught, “being loud and kicking the door.”11 The banging
was so loud (and Sergeant Smith so close to Mr. Marciniak’s
cell) that it was interfering with the officer’s ability to do
work. Sergeant Smith knew Mr. Marciniak was troubled, was
asking for Harper and unsure of Harper’s condition, and was
upset about the state of his relationship with his son; with that
7 R.58 at 11.
8 See R.46-1 at 95:19–23 (Sergeant Smith testifying that he did not recall
which intake questions he asked Mr. Marciniak, and “[a]ll I know is that
[Officer Taraboi is] the one that asked if he was suicidal and then at some
point after there is when I picked it up”).
9 R.58 at 19.
10 Appellant’s Br. 36.
11 R.46-1 at 102:3–12.

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No. 21-2255 25
knowledge, Sergeant Smith in turn asked Mr. Marciniak
“what would your kid say if he could see the way you are
behaving, would you want your kid to behave like this[?]”12
Moreover, Mr. Marciniak’s mental health history indi-
cated that he needed help. The purpose of the screening form
is to make officers aware of an arrestee’s “psychiatric issues,
suicidal issues, things of that nature.”13 Mr. Marciniak admit-
ted during the intake process that he had a prior history of
psychiatric treatment. The form prompts for an explanation if
the answer to a given question is yes. Although Mr. Marciniak
answered affirmatively, no explanation is listed. And at the
place reserved for Mr. Marciniak’s signature, the booking
sheet is marked “Refused.” Although the sheet indicates that
Mr. Marciniak said he was not suicidal, a rational jury could
find from this evidence that his conduct indicated he had sig-
nificant psychiatric needs that required attention. Cf. Sanville
v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 738 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that
prison officials could not ignore repeated signs that an inmate
with a history of mental illness was not functioning nor-
mally). One more fact weighs on Mr. Marciniak’s mental
12 Id. at 102:3–12. Sergeant Smith claims that at this time, Mr. Marciniak—
unprompted—said that he was not suicidal. Id. at 102:13–19. When the
only witness who could contradict an officer is deceased, the court must
undertake a “fairly critical assessment” of the evidence and “decide
whether the officer’s testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial.”
Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir. 1994). A reasonable jury could
disbelieve Sergeant Smith’s contention that Mr. Marciniak said he was not
suicidal, which was uttered without prompting and out of place in the
conversation.
13 R.59-10 at 110:4–12.

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26 No. 21-2255
condition at the time: he was distraught with concern for his
intimate partner, Harper.
Faced with this evidence of Mr. Marciniak’s mental state,
Sergeant Smith initially checked Mr. Marciniak approxi-
mately every fifteen minutes (which would be consistent with
department policy on monitoring suicidal inmates). After
3:33 a.m. however, forty-six minutes elapsed between that fi-
nal check and 4:19 a.m., when Sergeant Smith found
Mr. Marciniak hanging in his cell. Sergeant Smith testified
that he was “swamped” assisting officers searching for juve-
niles driving around, who might have been involved in an
armed robbery the previous night and might have still been
armed.14 No doubt, Sergeant Smith’s need to provide accurate
information to the officers on the scene is a legitimate police
interest that comes into the equation. A jury could find the
situation so pressing that he was unable to step away from the
office and check on Mr. Marciniak for the entire forty-six-mi-
nute duration. But a jury could also find that it was unreason-
able for him not to check on Mr. Marciniak or get help, partic-
ularly if getting that help would have been easy.
Sergeant Smith also testified that it would have been easy
to get Mr. Marciniak the help he needed. The office where he
was working was very close to Mr. Marciniak’s cell, and Ser-
geant Smith’s earlier checks on Mr. Marciniak’s welfare estab-
lished that he was capable of checking on Mr. Marciniak with-
out significantly interrupting his other work. Additionally,
Sergeant Smith had other options such as placing
Mr. Marciniak in a restraint chair or calling an ambulance,
14 R.46-1 at 103:19–104:15.

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No. 21-2255 27
medical personnel, or a supervisor. After all, “[t]he fire de-
partment was right upstairs.”15
Another factual consideration needs the jury’s attention.
When Sergeant Smith found Mr. Marciniak hanging by his
neck in his cell, he falsified the booking sheet to show that he
had checked on Mr. Marciniak at 4:10 a.m.16 A jury could de-
termine quite easily from this admitted deviation from estab-
lished police practice that Sergeant Smith himself knew that
his long gap in checking on Mr. Marciniak was a significant
breach of the custodial obligations that he had undertaken.
Nor does Pulera require, or even counsel, the majority’s
outcome. In that case, each of several defendant officers had
some information on the detainee’s psychiatric state, but none
of them had sufficient information to be on notice that the de-
fendant would engage in self harm. We held that an intake
officer’s conduct towards a detainee was not unreasonable
when the officer simply could hear the detainee “standing on
a bench and yelling” about needing a jacket. Pulera, 966 F.3d
at 545, 550–51. A different intake officer was not on notice of
the detainee’s suicidal ideations, we explained, after they ob-
served signs that the detainee suffered from depression, and
they knew that the detainee’s mother and brother had re-
cently committed suicide. A nurse declined to give the de-
tainee his depression treatment without a prison physician’s
approval and, as we held, a “simple request for medicine”
15 Id. at 25:19–24.
16 Sergeant Smith pleaded guilty to criminal official misconduct for falsi-
fying the booking sheet. R.58 at 19.

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28 No. 21-2255
would not give notice to any serious problems to which a re-
sponse would be necessary. Id. at 553.
Each of the Pulera defendants had a part of the picture, but
the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and Ser-
geant Smith had the whole picture. Here, one single officer
had knowledge that the arrestee had prior psychiatric treat-
ment; that the arrestee was upset, confused, and intoxicated;
that the arrestee believed his intimate partner could be se-
verely injured or dead; and that the arrestee began to self-
harm by slamming his body against the cell walls. Armed
with this knowledge, Sergeant Smith questioned
Mr. Marciniak, bringing up his difficult relationship with his
son, Mr. Jump. He then failed to check on Mr. Marciniak for
forty-six minutes, and when he finally did check on
Mr. Marciniak, he found him hanging in his cell. He then fal-
sified the booking sheet. A jury could find this conduct objec-
tively unreasonable.
In sum, construing the facts in the light most favorable to
Mr. Jump (as we must given the summary judgment posture
of the case), a reasonable jury could determine that Ser-
geant Smith acted unreasonably when he failed to check on
Mr. Marciniak. We should not deprive him of his right to pre-
sent this claim to a jury. For these reasons, I respectfully dis-
sent as to Part III.

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