Raj K. Patel v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 22, 2023*
Decided March 7, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2251
RAJ K. PATEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME DU
LAC,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:22-cv-01329-JPH-MG
James Patrick Hanlon,
Judge.
O R D E R
Raj Patel, a former law student at Notre Dame Law School, has repeatedly and
frivolously sued the school for refusing to readmit him. After the district court imposed
a filing bar, Patel turned to state court, but Notre Dame removed the case to federal
court, and the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. Patel contends that the
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the issues
presented are straightforward and would not significantly benefit from further
development through oral argument. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(A).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 22-2251 Page 2
district judge wrongly handled the suit and should not have dismissed it with
prejudice. We agree in part. The judge properly exercised removal jurisdiction and
dismissed Patel’s federal claims under the filing bar, but the court should have
relinquished jurisdiction over Patel’s state-law claims rather than dismissing them
under the filing bar. Thus, we affirm the dismissal of Patel’s federal claims but vacate
the dismissal of his state-law claims and instruct the district court to remand them to
state court.
Patel’s litigation against Notre Dame began after he took leave from the law
school in early 2015. Once he left, he was involuntarily admitted to a mental health
facility and criminally charged with pointing a gun at a relative. When Patel sought
readmission, the law school refused, in part because of the pending criminal charge.
In response, Patel launched dozens of meritless lawsuits against Notre Dame,
seeking (among other relief) readmission and millions of dollars under unfounded legal
theories. See In re Patel, No. 1:22-mc-00024-TWP, at *3 (S.D. Ind. March 28, 2022). Notre
Dame then refused Patel’s readmission even after his criminal charge was expunged,
citing concerns about his ability to meet the Indiana bar’s character and fitness
requirements, given that he had sent disturbing messages to faculty and staff and filed
frivolous lawsuits.
Federal judges noticed Patel’s pattern of meritless litigation against Notre Dame.
In March 2022, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
imposed a filing bar that required Patel to seek and obtain leave before filing any suit in
that court. Id. Similarly, after Patel filed a frivolous appeal with us, we warned him that
further frivolous appeals might lead to sanctions in the Seventh Circuit. See Patel v.
Patel, 834 F. App’x 244, 245 (7th Cir. 2021).
Just three months after the district court imposed the filing bar, Patel sued again,
this time in Indiana state court. As before, he alleged that Notre Dame had violated
federal law by discriminating against him on the basis of his religion and disability. He
also brought state claims, asserting that Notre Dame had violated state law by denying
him readmission to the law school. Because most of Patel’s claims were based on federal
law, Notre Dame removed the suit to the Southern District of Indiana. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441. It also asked the court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Patel’s related
state-law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and to dismiss the case because it was frivolous.

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 22-2251 Page 3
In order to comply with the filing bar, Patel moved for leave to litigate in the
Southern District of Indiana. The district’s chief judge denied the motion. She explained
that, by filing his latest suit against Notre Dame in state court, Patel was attempting to
“abuse the judicial process” with “an end-run around [the district court’s] filing
restriction.” Further, the chief judge continued, Patel could not “litigate an otherwise-
prohibited lawsuit” after Notre Dame removed it to federal court. Once the chief judge
denied Patel leave to litigate, the assigned district judge dismissed the suit with
prejudice.
On appeal, Patel challenges the district court’s jurisdiction and the propriety of
removal. We review both matters de novo. See Farnik v. F.D.I.C., 707 F.3d 717, 721 (7th
Cir. 2013). Patel does not dispute that his complaint attempts to assert principally
federal-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Instead, he argues that his federal claims are
not ripe and, therefore, that the district court lacked subject-matter and removal
jurisdiction. He also contends that the judge should have remanded his state-law claims
to state court.
The suit’s removal to federal court was proper. A defendant may remove to
federal court any suit containing claims arising under federal law and claims falling
within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (c). The removal
statute “gives defendants an absolute right to remove” even when a litigant, like Patel,
is barred from litigating in federal district court. See In re Skupniewitz, 73 F.3d 702, 705
(7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the ripeness doctrine does not block this suit. The doctrine
bars federal courts from deciding cases that turn on “so many future events that a
judicial opinion would be ‘advice about remote contingencies.’” Amling v. Harrow Indus.
LLC, 943 F.3d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Rock Energy Corp. v. Vill. of Rockton,
614 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2010)). But the injuries that Patel alleges all stem from Notre
Dame’s past refusal to readmit him; no future contingencies are at play.
The dismissal of Patel’s federal claims with prejudice also was proper. The filing
bar, which Patel does not challenge, gave the district court discretion to deny Patel’s
request to litigate his claims in federal court, and it reasonably denied his request here,
since his federal claims are simply another version of his many failed suits against
Notre Dame. Once the court denied him leave to litigate, the assigned district judge
rightly dismissed the federal claims with prejudice, because Patel could not prosecute
them in the district court.

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 22-2251 Page 4
Patel’s state-law claims, however, should have been remanded to the state court.
District courts generally should exercise their discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to
relinquish jurisdiction over state-law claims when, as here, all federal claims have been
dismissed, unless equity compels a decision on the merits of the state-law claims.
Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines, 789 F.3d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 2015). The district judge should
have stated the grounds for retaining supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
claims, which Patel did not even seek to bring in federal court. See Groce v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999). The lack of an explanation is a problem that is
“practically a fatal one for abuse-of-discretion review,” because the record does not
compel the conclusion that retaining jurisdiction to decide the merits of the state-law
claims furthers “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Montano v. City
of Chicago, 375 F.3d 593, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2004) (second quotation quoting City of Chicago
v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)). The district court’s reliance on the
filing bar to dismiss Patel’s state-law claims does not satisfy this requirement because
Patel originally filed those claims in state court.
We therefore VACATE the dismissal of Patel’s state-law claims and REMAND
them to the district court with instructions to return the state-law claims to the Indiana
court from which the case was removed. We otherwise AFFIRM.

-- 4 of 4 --