United States of America v. Taiwo K. Onamuti

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 28, 2023 *
Decided April 3, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2984
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TAIWO K. ONAMUTI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:16-cr-00093-JRS-MJD-01
James R. Sweeney II,
Judge.
O R D E R
Taiwo Onamuti, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his compassionate-
release motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In the motion, he argued that his
underlying sentence for identity theft exceeded what he believed to be the statutory
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-2984 Page 2
maximum and thus constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. The
district judge denied the motion, concluding that alleged sentencing errors are not an
extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. We affirm.
Onamuti’s case arises from his role in a complex fraud scheme in which he and
coconspirators stole the personal identifying information of more than 1,000
individuals. The group used this information to file false tax returns seeking maximum
refunds and then laundered the proceeds.
Onamuti pleaded guilty to one count of filing false claims and one count of
identity theft with the intent to commit an unlawful activity. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 287,
1028(a)(7). (He also pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated identity theft, see id.
§ 1028A, but that conviction was vacated on collateral attack.) The district judge
sentenced Onamuti to five years in prison on the false-claims count and fifteen years—
the statutory maximum—on the identity-theft count, to be served concurrently.
Five years into his prison term, Onamuti moved (in two identically worded
filings) for compassionate release. He argued that extraordinary and compelling
reasons warranted release because his fifteen-year sentence for his identity-theft
conviction exceeded the five-year statutory maximum listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(b)(2)(B).
Some context: Section 1028 imposes different statutory maximums depending on the
extent of the identity theft. Section 1028(b)(2)(B), which addresses run-of-the-mill
§ 1028(a)(7) violations, imposes only a five-year maximum. Section 1028(b)(1)(D), on the
other hand, provides for a fifteen-year maximum sentence if the person convicted under
§ 1028(a)(7) uses, possesses, or transfers a means of identification to commit an offense,
and then obtains anything of value over $1,000 from that offense in a one-year period.
According to Onamuti, the fifteen-year maximum set forth in § 1028(b)(1)(D) was
incorrectly applied to him because, in his view, that provision concerned the
transferring of a means of identification, and he pleaded guilty only to possessing and
using the means of identification.
The district judge denied Onamuti’s motions, concluding that Onamuti’s
argument was foreclosed by circuit precedent. Citing a string of recent cases, the judge
highlighted our repeated pronouncements that a charge of error in the original
sentencing is not itself an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate
release.
On appeal, Onamuti asserts that the district judge wrongly denied his motion
without requiring a response from the government. But no such requirement appears in

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No. 22-2984 Page 3
the compassionate-release statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). To the contrary, if the
defendant does not meet his burden of establishing “extraordinary and compelling
circumstances” for release, the judge may deny the motion regardless of any
government response. See Ward v. United States, 11 F.4th 354, 361 (5th Cir. 2021).
Onamuti next challenges the district judge’s characterization of his argument as
resting on a sentencing error. He argues that his sentence is unlawful because it violates
congressional intent that defendants like him not be sentenced beyond the statutory
maximum. But the difference is semantic. His essential argument is that the district
judge misinterpreted the statutory maximum, and we have repeatedly stated that
defendants may not use the compassionate-release statute to challenge supposed errors
in sentencing. United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 595 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v.
Brock, 39 F.4th 462, 466 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Martin, 21 F.4th 944, 946 (7th Cir.
2021); United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2021).
AFFIRMED

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