Jerico Matias Cruz v. STATE OF ILLINOIS and BRIAN KELLIHER

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 28, 2023 *
Decided May 1, 2023
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3182
JERICO MATIAS CRUZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ILLINOIS and
BRIAN KELLIHER,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States
District Court for Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 20 C 7767
Jorge L. Alonso,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jerico Matias Cruz appeals the judgment dismissing his civil-rights action for,
among other things, failure to prosecute his case. See FED. R. C IV. P. 41(b). We affirm.
* The Appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded that
the case is appropriate for summary disposition. See FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-3182 Page 2
After he was arrested at the James R. Thompson Center in downtown Chicago,
Cruz sued the State of Illinois and a responding police officer for unlawful arrest and
discrimination. District Judge Dow granted Cruz leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In
doing so, however, the judge expressed concern that the court may be precluded from
adjudicating Cruz’s federal claims because of apparent ongoing state-court proceedings.
(Before filing this action in federal court, Cruz had filed a complaint in an Illinois trial
court, challenging the accuracy of the Illinois State Police’s documentation of events
related to the arrest.) Judge Dow later granted Cruz’s request for leave to amend his
complaint.
Cruz eventually filed an amended complaint but neither mentioned his state case
nor described wrongful actions taken by any defendant.
Judge Alonso, who had been reassigned the case, screened the amended
complaint and determined that Cruz’s conclusory allegations failed to state a claim.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The judge dismissed the complaint without prejudice and
allowed Cruz 28 days in which to file a second amended complaint or the case would
be dismissed.
After the deadline for filing an amended complaint passed, Cruz moved for an
extension of time on account of competing obligations—he asserted that he had been
occupied with campaign operations for his bid for a seat with the United States House
of Representatives. The court denied the motion on grounds that the delay was within
Cruz’s control, see Sherman v. Quinn, 668 F.3d 421, 427 (7th Cir. 2012) (running for office
is “entirely voluntary”), and Cruz had not shown excusable neglect to justify an
extension. See FED. R. C IV. P. 6(b)(1)(B). The court dismissed the case with prejudice for
three reasons: Cruz’s noncompliance with the court’s order, failure to prosecute, and
failure to state a claim. See FED. R. C IV. P. 41(b); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,
629–30 (1962).
Cruz appeals the court’s judgment, but he says nothing to suggest why the court
was wrong to dismiss his suit based on noncompliance with its order or failure to
prosecute. Although we construe pro se briefs generously, an appellate brief must
contain a discernible argument and support for it. See FED. R. A PP. P. 28(a)(8)(A);
Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). In the end, Cruz has supplied us
with no reason to suggest that the district court committed any reversible error in
dismissing the case with prejudice for the three reasons listed above.
AFFIRMED

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