United States of America v. Albert Rossini

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued May 24, 2023
Decided June 7, 2023
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II Circuit Judge
No. 21‐3115
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee
v.
ALBERT ROSSINI,
Defendant‐Appellant
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:15‐cr‐515‐1
John Z. Lee, Judge.
O R D E R
Albert Rossini defrauded investors out of millions of dollars in an elaborate
Ponzi scheme. A federal jury convicted him of fourteen counts of wire fraud and mail
fraud. On appeal Rossini challenges his sentence of 132 months’ imprisonment and
$5.27 million in restitution. We affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 21‐3115 Page 2
I
Starting in 2011 Albert Rossini persuaded members of the Assyrian community
in Chicago to invest in his real estate company, Devon Street Investments. Rossini and
his co‐conspirators told investors that the firm would foreclose on 57 distressed
properties in the Chicagoland area, transferring the titles to the investors once the
foreclosures concluded. To strengthen his pitch, Rossini took investors to view the
exteriors of the properties and hired a handyman to make minor improvements. He
even sent investors what he claimed were rental payments from existing tenants.
But Devon Street Investments operated as a Ponzi scheme. The firm did not have
an ownership interest in most of the properties, and investors acquired title to only
three of them. Rossini made the purported rental payments using the investors’ own
money. So, when the payments stopped in 2012, the scheme collapsed. Some twenty
investors lost over $5 million.
Federal charges followed for wire fraud and mail fraud, and Rossini chose to go
to trial. The government introduced evidence at trial about Rossini’s role in executing
the fraud, including testimony from nine of his victims, one co‐conspirator, and a
forensic investigator. A jury convicted Rossini on all counts.
The district court sentenced Rossini to 132 months’ imprisonment, well below the
advisory Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months. The district court ordered Rossini to
pay $5.27 million in restitution as well, based on trial evidence about the victims’ actual
losses.
The district court explained that several mitigating factors justified the
downward variance from the Guidelines range—first and foremost Rossini’s advanced
age (at the time, 73 years), poor health, and obligations to care for his ailing wife. But
the district court believed the “vicious and calculated” nature of his fraud warranted a
substantial sentence. The district court also emphasized Rossini’s long history of fraud‐
related convictions dating back to the 1980s.
For his part, Rossini claimed at sentencing that he was innocent and that the
government’s loss calculations were inflated. Those claims were not credible, in the
district court’s view, in no small part because they were inconsistent with the trial
evidence.

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No. 21‐3115 Page 3
Rossini now appeals, challenging only his sentence. He contends that the district
court incorrectly calculated the advisory Guidelines range, imposed a substantively
unreasonable sentence, and ordered too much in restitution.
II
A
We take our own fresh look at the district court’s legal determinations in
calculating the advisory Guidelines range, and we review its factual findings for clear
error. See United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2005). Rossini argues that
the district court erred in discounting his sentencing testimony and submissions. But he
never explains how the error impacted the Guidelines calculations, aside from
undeveloped suggestions that the district court blamed him for a co‐conspirator’s
conduct, improperly imposed a sentencing enhancement for his leadership role in the
scheme, and inaccurately determined that the loss amount was $5.27 million.
Rossini is mistaken. The district court’s credibility determination “can virtually
never be clear error.” United States v. Pulley, 601 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2010). Just so
here. As the district court observed, Rossini had a long history of engaging in deceptive
conduct. He had accumulated multiple fraud convictions over the course of decades.
While on pretrial release in the present case, he allegedly engaged in a check kiting
scheme, conducted other financial transactions prohibited under the terms of his
pretrial release, and lied to the district court about what he was doing while traveling
outside the jurisdiction—causing the district court to revoke his pretrial release and
leading to fresh federal fraud charges in a separate case.
The district court also found Rossini’s contentions at sentencing inconsistent with
the “heavy weight” of the trial evidence and with the jury verdict itself. And Rossini
only further undermined his credibility by making “wholly incredible” claims during
his sentencing testimony, like accusing the FBI of thwarting his efforts to make the
victims whole. The district court stood on firm ground in rejecting his sentencing
testimony and his related arguments.
Nor do we see any error in the district court’s finding that the total loss amount
was $5.27 million. “The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss.”
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 n.3(C). Rossini shoulders the burden on appeal of showing that the loss
amount was “not only inaccurate, but also outside the realm of permissible
computation.” United States v. Mantas, 274 F.3d 1127, 1131 (7th Cir. 2001). He has not

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No. 21‐3115 Page 4
done so. The district court’s estimate of the loss drew on substantial evidence presented
at trial, including the testimony of a forensic investigator who tallied up the investors’
actual losses.
On appeal Rossini posits that the district court averaged the losses per victim and
then multiplied by the number of victims to arrive at its final estimate, a methodology
he maintains is unreliable. Rossini forfeited this objection by failing to raise it below, so
our review is only for plain error. See United States v. De La Torre, 940 F.3d 938, 946 (7th
Cir. 2019). We see no error with the district court’s methodology, let alone a plain error.
Indeed, the district court never used any sort of averaging methodology to calculate the
total loss amount. To the contrary, the court calculated the losses on an individual basis
for each victim and then aggregated them, an analysis rooted in the trial evidence.
Rossini reaches even further in insisting that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000), and its progeny required the district court to submit the issue of loss amount—
and possibly other factual findings too—to a jury. Not so. Apprendi bars judicial
factfinding for only those facts that “expose the defendant to a greater punishment than
that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.” Id. at 494. But “broad sentencing discretion,
informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment” so long as the
sentence is “within the range authorized by law.” Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99,
116–17 (2013). The judicial factfinding challenged here increased the advisory
Guidelines range but did nothing to affect the range of sentences authorized by the
federal mail and wire fraud statutes. Apprendi did not require the district court to
submit these facts to a jury.
B
Rossini’s challenges to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence fare no
better. We review this challenge for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Vasquez‐
Abarca, 946 F.3d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 2020). We uphold the sentence so long as the district
court provided a reasoned basis consistent with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). See id. A below‐Guidelines sentence, like this one, has a “nearly irrebuttable
presumption” of reasonableness. United States v. Oregon, 58 F.4th 298, 302 (7th Cir. 2023)
(quoting United States v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2016)).
The district court carefully grounded the sentence in the § 3553(a) factors. The
court emphasized Rossini’s lack of remorse, the severity of his offense conduct, and his
long criminal history. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (directing district courts to consider
“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the

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defendant”). Even at an advanced age, Rossini continued to commit crimes. So the
district court determined that a sentence of 132 months would serve the goals of just
punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public. See id. at § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B), (C).
Yet the district court also placed substantial weight on mitigating aspects of
Rossini’s history and characteristics, including his age, poor health, dedication to his
family, and the difficulties of his pretrial incarceration during the pandemic. The court
was “particularly cognizant of the fact that at [Rossini’s] advanced age, there is a risk
that a lengthy sentence might cause him to spend the rest of his life in prison.” All of
these considerations justified a below‐Guidelines sentence.
Rossini believes the district court should have placed still more weight on the
mitigating factors. But he shoulders a heavy burden in pressing that contention. The
district court exercises broad discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors, and we see
nothing close to an error here. See United States v. Melendez, 819 F.3d 1006, 1013 (7th Cir.
2016). Rossini cannot show that the district court’s weighing fell outside the wide
bounds of reason. See United States v. Smith, 721 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2013).
C
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution of
$5.27 million. See United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 906, 925 (7th Cir. 2011). As the
district court observed, the amount of restitution aligned with the trial evidence and
testimony. Rossini again suggests that the district court should have rejected the
government’s evidence and instead accepted his own evidence. His contention amounts
to another challenge to the district court’s credibility determination, which we see no
reason to set aside.
We have considered Rossini’s other arguments and likewise found them to fall
short on the merits. We therefore AFFIRM.

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