Paul Hunter v. Jeff Leggett

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 15, 2023 *
Decided June 15, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3146
PAUL HUNTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JEFF LEGGETT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 22-CV-424-JPS
J.P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
O R D E R
Paul Hunter seeks to overturn a Wisconsin state-court order related to his unpaid
child support. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, ruling that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred his claims. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-3146 Page 2
After Hunter failed to pay child support and appear at a hearing, a Wisconsin
state judge held him in contempt and issued a warrant for his arrest. The judge ruled
that Hunter could purge the contempt order by paying $3,000 or by requesting a
hearing to demonstrate his inability to pay. Hunter instead asked the court to dismiss
the arrest warrant. The court’s commissioner denied the request, and another judge
scheduled a hearing for Hunter to appeal the commissioner’s decision. But Hunter
asked that the hearing be canceled, and the court removed the hearing from its
calendar.
Hunter then brought this suit in federal court against Wisconsin state-court
judges, the state-court commissioner, and others for failing to dismiss the warrant.
Citing various constitutional amendments (the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Fourteenth), as well as several federal statutes (most notably, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3720D, which lays out the garnishment procedures for an agency collecting money
owed to the United States), he claimed to be injured by the warrant and the
garnishment of his unemployment benefits and tax refunds. The defendants, in turn,
moved to dismiss the complaint based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005)
(citing Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983)).
The district judge dismissed Hunter’s constitutional claims without prejudice
and his statutory claims with prejudice. Regarding the constitutional claims, the judge
determined that these were barred under Rooker-Feldman because Hunter sought to
“revisit and undo actions taken by the state court.” The claims were alternatively
barred, the judge ruled, under the domestic-relations exception to federal jurisdiction,
which blocks federal adjudication of cases involving child-custody decrees.
See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693–95 (1992). As for Hunter’s statutory claims,
the judge explained that Hunter could not state a claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3720D
because the statute is limited to federal debtors, and Hunter alleged that the IRS applied
his benefits and refunds to his debt owed to Racine County. Nor could Hunter, the
judge added, bring a civil suit under the many criminal statutes he listed in his
complaint.
On appeal, Hunter argues generally that the district judge misapplied the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. But the judge correctly ruled that the doctrine blocks Hunter’s suit.
Hunter expressly seeks to challenge the state-court order authorizing his arrest, and

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No. 22-3146 Page 3
seeks an injunction against the contempt order, an endeavor squarely prohibited by
Rooker-Feldman. See Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017). Hunter also
seeks to undo and prevent further garnishment of his unemployment benefits and tax
refunds, which the IRS applied to his debt with the Racine County Child Support
Agency. But the alleged garnishment injury is rooted in the state court’s determination
that he owed $3,000, see Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 885–86 (7th Cir. 2014), and only a
Wisconsin appellate court or the Supreme Court of the United States can overturn that
judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.
Hunter also contests the application of Rooker-Feldman on grounds that he was
never provided a hearing to challenge the state-court judgment. But while Rooker-
Feldman does not apply when “state-court rules or procedures” deprive a plaintiff of a
reasonable opportunity to raise his claims in state court, Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson,
62 F.4th 394, 408 (7th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted), Hunter has not identified any such
obstacles. Indeed, to the extent indigency was a hindrance, Hunter was informed in the
order authorizing his arrest that he could purge the contempt order by seeking a
hearing to show his inability to pay. But rather than pursue that option, Hunter asked
the court to remove a hearing from its calendar.
A final note regarding the disposition. Although we affirm the judgment
dismissing this case, we modify it to be without prejudice to Hunter’s statutory claims
insofar as he complains of injuries that are inseparable from the state court’s judgments.
Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman must be without prejudice,
see Mains, 852 F.3d at 678, and at least one of Hunter’s statutory claims, purportedly
brought under 31 U.S.C. § 3720D, appears to allege the same injury as his constitutional
claims about garnishment that the district court lacked jurisdiction to address. To the
extent Hunter alleges injuries independent of the state court’s orders—apparently
including his claims that assert, improperly in a civil suit, that defendants violated
criminal statutes—we affirm the judgment dismissing those claims with prejudice.
We AFFIRM the judgment as modified.

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