United States of America v. David L. Green

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 30, 2023
Decided July 5, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2981
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DAVID L. GREEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 3:22-CR-30071-SMY-1
Staci M. Yandle,
Judge.
O R D E R
David Green appeals the district court’s revocation of his supervised release, but
his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Green does not have an unqualified
constitutional right to counsel in revocation proceedings. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973). Still, we apply the Anders safeguards to ensure that all
potential issues receive consideration. See United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-2981 Page 2
(7th Cir. 2016). Because counsel’s brief appears to adequately address the possible issues
that an appeal of this kind might involve, and Green did not respond to counsel’s
motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the issues counsel raises.
See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
In 2014, Green was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), and sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), to
110 months’ imprisonment followed by 3 years of supervised release.
In June 2022, about four months after Green’s release from prison, a probation
officer petitioned to revoke his supervision based on three alleged violations of his
release: commission of another crime (aggravated domestic battery), unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and failure to participate in
required behavioral treatment. The probation officer recommended a revocation
sentence of 51 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the policy-statement range (based
on Green’s criminal history category of VI, his commission of a Grade A violation—the
domestic battery offense—with the underlying offense being a Class A felony, capped
by a 60-month statutory maximum, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)). See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a)–(b). She
also recommended a supervised release term of 60 months, minus any term of
imprisonment that the district court would impose. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1), (e)(3).
At the joint revocation-and-sentencing hearing, Green admitted to each violation.
When asked by the court if his admissions were voluntary and knowing, Green
affirmed that they were. Green did not object to the calculation of the statutory
maximum or policy-statement range. He did object to a proposed condition of his
future supervised release that would prevent him from contacting his ex-wife (the
victim of his aggravated domestic battery conviction), but the district court concluded
that the condition was necessary to protect his ex-wife and was neither vague nor
overly long.
The court then revoked Green’s supervised release and sentenced him to 54
months’ imprisonment and 6 months’ supervised release. The court acknowledged
Green’s acceptance of responsibility but found “severe punishment” warranted based
on the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including Green’s extensive
history of violent conduct, his serious drug use, his mental-health issues, and the need
to protect the public.

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No. 22-2981 Page 3
At the outset, counsel reports that Green does not wish to challenge the validity
of the revocation itself, and so counsel appropriately discusses only possible challenges
to Green’s new sentence. See United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016).
Counsel first considers whether Green could challenge his new terms of
imprisonment and supervised release, and rightly rejects any such argument as
frivolous. Because Green did not object to the district court’s calculation of the policy-
statement range, our review would be for plain error. Id. And here, the 54-month prison
term was substantively and procedurally reasonable. The court correctly determined
that Green’s most serious offense—aggravated domestic battery, see 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3—
was a Grade A violation, that his underlying conviction was a Class A felony, and that
he had a criminal history category of VI—yielding a policy-statement range of 51–63
months in prison. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1). In addition, the court accounted for the
relevant sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) by highlighting the combination of
Green’s violent conduct, his serious use of methamphetamine, his mental-health issues,
and the need to protect the public.
Finally, we agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to challenge the
condition prohibiting Green from contacting his ex-wife. A condition of supervised
release should not be broader than necessary to promote deterrence, United States v.
Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 845 (7th Cir. 2015), and the court here appropriately justified the
no-contact condition as relatively short in duration, necessary to protect the public, and
not so broad that it would interfere with Green’s familial relationships. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(d)(3). If Green—after he begins serving the term of supervised release—believes
the no-contact condition to be overly burdensome, he would be free to seek
modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). See Brown, 823 F.3d at 395.
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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