SARAH CHILCUTT, Individually v. LOYDA SANTIAGO and RICK TABISZ

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued June 6, 2023
Decided July 21, 2023
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2916
SARAH CHILCUTT, Individually and as
Independent Administrator of the Estate
of Aaron Chilcutt, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LOYDA SANTIAGO and RICK TABISZ,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 19 CV 6732
Manish S. Shah,
Judge.
O R D E R
Aaron Chilcutt’s wife Mandy Tumis called Waukegan police officers to her home
in October 2017 because she believed that her husband had attempted suicide. After
another call to police from Tumis two weeks later, this time to report abuse, two of the
same officers, Loyda Santiago and Rick Tabisz, arrested Chilcutt. While detained,
Chilcutt died by suicide.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Chilcutt’s daughter, individually and as independent administrator of her
father’s estate, sued Santiago and Tabisz, claiming they failed to protect Chilcutt or
provide adequate medical care. The district court denied a motion for summary
judgment by the officers because factual disputes precluded a conclusion on qualified
immunity. The officers then filed this interlocutory appeal. We agree with the district
court that whether the officers enjoy qualified immunity turns on disputed facts. We
therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
We recount the facts in the light most favorable to Chilcutt. See Stewardson v.
Biggs, 43 F.4th 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2022). Waukegan police officers Loyda Santiago and
Rick Tabisz responded to a call from Chilcutt’s wife, Mandy Tumis, on October 7, 2017.
Tumis told the officers that Chilcutt was suicidal, had been drinking alcohol, and had
taken a lot of pills. She also told Santiago that Chilcutt, who had attempted suicide in
the past, had assaulted her and said he was “tired of living and over his effing life.”
Chilcutt told Santiago that he was not suicidal. But Santiago decided that Chilcutt
should be taken to a hospital because he had “suicidal ideations” and had taken pills in
an attempt to commit suicide. At the hospital, Tumis completed an involuntary-
commitment petition. Santiago and Tabisz were present when Chilcutt was
involuntarily committed. Chilcutt was in the hospital for two days.
Two weeks after this incident, on October 21, Tumis called the police again from
a gas station after Chilcutt had passed out. She told the dispatcher that she needed
officers to arrest Chilcutt because she was not safe. Santiago and Tabisz met her at the
gas station. Tumis told them that she and Chilcutt had been drinking and arguing. She
did not mention his mental health. Santiago and Tabisz remembered Chilcutt’s
hospitalization. Tabisz expressly recalled that Chilcutt had been involuntarily
committed but did not ask if Chilcutt was suicidal or had taken any pills.
Santiago and Tabisz (along with a third officer) arrested Chilcutt pursuant to a
domestic battery warrant issued after the October 7 interaction. Chilcutt was calm and
compliant during the arrest and did not say anything about being suicidal. Santiago
drove Chilcutt to the municipal jail.
At the jail, Chilcutt proceeded through the booking process, all of which was
recorded on video and audio. Typically, the officer who transports a detainee completes

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the detainee screening forms, but this time, Santiago and Tabisz stood close by while
the third officer completed Chilcutt’s intake. That booking officer asked Chilcutt if he
had any medical issues or was taking medication; Chilcutt said no. That officer did not
ask Chilcutt if he had any mental health problems or was suicidal, even though the
screening form she used had checkboxes for “Suicidal/Self-Destructive” and “Mental
Condition.” The officer did not check those boxes and did check the box marked
“calm.” Santiago did not give the officer any information to complete this part of the
screening form; she later explained she did not know if Chilcutt had any mental
conditions, Chilcutt had said he wasn’t suicidal on October 7, and on October 21
Chilcutt did not make any comments suggesting he was suicidal.
After asking about Chilcutt’s medical issues, the booking officer asked Chilcutt
for an emergency contact. Chilcutt named Tumis, but the booking officer asked if there
was anyone else. The parties dispute Chilcutt’s response, and the audio on the booking-
room video is not entirely clear. Chilcutt apparently could not name anyone else (the
emergency contact section says, “NONE”), and he then said, according to the estate, “I
guess I can go and die.” (Elsewhere, the estate says Chilcutt said, “I guess I can go die”;
this does not alter the meaning, but we agree with the district court’s use of “go and
die.”) Santiago and Tabisz were standing a few feet away from Chilcutt. Both testified,
like the booking officer, that they did not see or hear anything on October 21 to suggest
that Chilcutt was suicidal.
A training coordinator from the department later said that “I guess I can go and
die” is a suicidal statement that officers could have identified as a factor in deciding
whether Chilcutt was suicidal. The Waukegan police chief opined that a statement like
“I guess I can go and die now” was a good indicator of a person’s current state of mind.
And Waukegan police officers were trained that threatening statements are a warning
sign that a detainee is at risk; they also could consider, among other things, past suicide
attempts and hospitalizations for mental illness to help them identify at-risk detainees.
Chilcutt cooperated throughout the rest of the booking process. He joked while
waiting to be moved to a cell, but at other times was muted and at one point said, “I’ve
got to find someone who cares to bond me out.” The officers did not enact the jail’s
protocols for detainees deemed suicidal—such as contacting a supervisor, calling an
ambulance, and continually supervising the detainee. Nor did they follow the
procedures for managing detainees at a high risk of self-harm—such as dressing them
in a paper gown, placing them in a holding cell, and conducting 15-minute checks.

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Instead, Santiago placed Chilcutt in a regular cell and, the officers emphasize, per “the
jail’s standard suicide-prevention protocol[],” removed his shoelaces and the drawstring
from his shorts.
At 4:26 p.m., Chilcutt asked for a blanket, and Santiago gave him one. Officers
(apparently including Santiago) learned informally, rather than through formal
training, that blankets can be used to harm oneself. Around 6 p.m. a new officer began
his shift. That officer let Chilcutt leave his cell to get water; he and Chilcutt had a
conversation, in which Chilcutt was polite. About thirty minutes later, that officer was
conducting a cell check and found Chilcutt hanging in his cell with the blanket tied to
the bars and wrapped around his neck. Officers attempted to revive him while awaiting
paramedics. Chilcutt was pronounced dead at the hospital.
Chilcutt’s daughter, as administrator of his estate, sued the City of Waukegan
and multiple police officers, including Santiago and Tabisz, alleging they failed to
protect Chilcutt and provide him with adequate medical care. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (She
also brought state-law claims, which were later dismissed, as were other officers.) The
remaining defendants moved for summary judgment. As relevant here, Santiago and
Tabisz argued the estate failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether
the officers had notice that Chilcutt was at substantial risk of suicide on October 21.
They further contended they were entitled to qualified immunity because their lack of
notice meant there was no constitutional violation, and it was not clearly established
that “failing to invoke suicide protections when the officers had no knowledge or
reason to suspect the detainee was at risk of suicide” violated a detainee’s constitutional
rights.
In a thorough memorandum opinion and order, the district court entered
summary judgment for all moving defendants except Santiago and Tabisz. The court
decided that these two officers were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because
“what they knew about the risk of suicide” depended on disputed facts and inferences.
For instance, a jury could conclude that “I guess I can go and die” was “a kind of
suicidal threat” that “communicated a morbid depression and a non-idle intent to”
attempt suicide, given Chilcutt’s prior “credibl[e] attempt.” Because Santiago’s and
Tabisz’s knowledge of the risk turned on disputed facts, the court concluded that it
could not yet grant qualified immunity. This interlocutory appeal by the officers
followed.

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II.
A.
A public official sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 enjoys qualified immunity except
when “the defendant violated a constitutional right,” at a time when that “right was
clearly established.” Estate of Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 549–50 (7th Cir. 2017).
Therefore, a district court properly denies a motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity when the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
create a genuine dispute about whether the defendants’ actions violated a clearly
established constitutional right. See id. at 550. If the court denies summary judgment,
the defendants may appeal immediately, under the collateral order doctrine, only if the
denial of the qualified-immunity defense turns on an “issue of law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). But we lack jurisdiction to review, on an interlocutory basis, a
decision denying qualified immunity “insofar as that order determines whether or not
the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.’’ Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S.
304, 319–20 (1995). “[O]ur jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal extends to pure questions
of law, not mixed questions of law and fact.” Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 735 (7th Cir.
2021).
The estate contends Tabisz and Santiago violated Chilcutt’s rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment when they failed to provide the booking officer with
information about the October 7 incident and took no steps to prevent him from
harming himself. Santiago even gave Chilcutt the blanket with which he hanged
himself. To prevail on the merits, the estate must show that the officers acted in an
objectively unreasonable manner. See Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th
Cir. 2018) (denial of medical care); Kemp v. Fulton County, 27 F.4th 491, 497 (7th Cir.
2022) (failure to protect). A wrinkle here is that, in 2017, objective unreasonableness was
not the standard applicable to pretrial detainees’ claims about their conditions of
confinement; they were still treated as deliberate indifference claims, which come with a
higher burden of proof. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 350–52.
We have not explicitly addressed how the change in the standard affects the
qualified-immunity analysis. In prior cases, we have applied current law (objective
unreasonableness) to determine on the merits whether there was a violation of a
constitutional right, and, for purposes of qualified immunity, looked to our deliberate
indifference cases to determine if the right was clearly established at the time. See,

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e.g., Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 820–22 (7th Cir. 2019). We need not decide the
issue here, though, because either way, the estate must show that the officers knew or
had notice that Chilcutt was at risk of suicide. See Jump v. Village of Shorewood, 42 F.4th
782, 793 (7th Cir. 2022) (no objective unreasonableness when “officer has no reason to
think a detainee is suicidal”); Estate of Clark, 865 F.3d at 551 (deliberate indifference
requires actual knowledge).
B.
Whether there is jurisdiction in an appeal challenging a denial of qualified
immunity is often a contested question. We consider whether (1) the district court
identified factual disputes and (2) the appellants “adopt the plaintiff’s facts, or instead
make a ‘back-door effort’ to use disputed facts.” Smith, 10 F.4th at 736.
On the first inquiry, the district court reasoned that it could not render a decision
on qualified immunity because that issue “turn[ed] on contested facts.” Specifically, the
court concluded that the estate had provided sufficient evidence for a jury to determine
that the officers “had actual knowledge of the substantial risk” to Chilcutt. This is a
strong indicator that the qualified-immunity denial is not appealable. See Flowers v.
Renfro, 46 F.4th 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2022).
But a district court’s assertion that it cannot resolve the qualified-immunity issue
because of factual disputes does not always foreclose our jurisdiction. See Jones v. Clark,
630 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2011). We still may hear the appeal if the officers accept the
estate’s version of the facts as true or, despite recognizing factual disputes, they “take
each disputed fact in the light most favorable” to the estate. Id. This must be a genuine
exercise. We will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction if the officers attempt to
contest the facts or use the appeal to “test the sufficiency of the evidence to reach the
trier of fact.” Id. An added nuance exists when—as here—there is video footage of the
events. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). If video footage “blatantly
contradict[s]” a party’s version of events so that “no reasonable jury could believe it,”
we will not adopt that version of events. Id. at 380.
In Section I of their brief the officers argue they are merely challenging the
district court’s conclusion that the right at issue was clearly established in October 2017.
We have jurisdiction to consider this legal argument. See Estate of Clark, 865 F.3d at 551.

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The officers dispute how the district court framed the asserted right. The court
ruled that in 2017 Chilcutt had a clearly established “right to be free from deliberate
indifference to the risk of suicide while in custody.” The officers contend the court
described the right too broadly. And although we have previously identified the right at
issue in prisoner-suicide cases as the right to be free from deliberate indifference to
suicide, see, e.g., Estate of Miller ex. rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984, 991 (7th Cir. 2012),
the officers are likely correct that the district court’s phrasing was overbroad. But the
officers’ characterization is so specific as to make this case one of a kind:
Was it clearly established in 2017 that failing to protect an inmate from
suicide violated the Fourteenth Amendment when the only facts the officers
knew were the inmate “potentially” attempted suicide two weeks prior and
he made a “vague and passive” statement in the booking room that “could”
have been interpreted as a “kind of a suicidal threat?”
In addition to incorporating disputed facts, this phrasing is too narrow. True, the
Supreme Court insists that, to determine whether a right was clearly established, courts
define that right at a high level of specificity, with reference to the “particular
circumstances” facing an officer. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90
(2018). But the specificity of the officers’ framing of the right here would impermissibly
require a plaintiff to find a case with facts identical to the officers’ interpretation of what
happened, not simply one in which officers were put on notice that their conduct was
unlawful. See Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7–8 (2021).
We applied these principles in Estate of Clark v. Walker, decided a few months
before these events. Estate of Clark also involved a claim of deliberate indifference to a
detainee’s risk of suicide. 865 F.3d at 546. As here, the defendant in Estate of Clark filed
an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity, defining the right at
issue at an extremely high level of specificity. Id. at 552. This court decided that
although courts may not define rights at too high a level of generality, it was clearly
established that the plaintiff’s right to be free from deliberate indifference to his risk of
suicide was violated if the defendant had actual knowledge of the serious risk of suicide
and “chose to do nothing.” Id. at 553. The same formulation applies here because the
parties dispute whether the officers knew of Chilcutt’s risk of suicide.
The officers argue Estate of Clark—in which the detainee’s score on a screening
tool indicated a maximum risk of suicide—defined the right with more specificity,

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albeit implicitly, because that decision discusses how the officers acquired their
knowledge. That discussion, however, was not part of our framing of the right at stake.
The “particular conduct” that violated clearly established law was an officer choosing to
take no action despite having knowledge that the detainee was at serious risk of suicide;
how they came about that knowledge was not relevant to the framing of the right.
See id.; see also Lovett v. Herbert, 907 F.3d 986, 994 (7th Cir. 2018) (describing Estate of
Clark as affirming denial of qualified immunity where defendant “‘chose to do nothing’
despite his knowledge that the inmate was a suicide risk”).
The rest of the officers’ arguments in Section I, although put forward as
challenges to whether the law was “clearly established,” are intertwined with disputed
facts and amount to impermissible sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges. We therefore
lack jurisdiction to consider them. See Jones, 630 F.3d at 680. For instance, the officers ask
whether it was clearly established that they violated Chilcutt’s rights “when the only
facts the officers knew were the inmate ‘potentially’ attempted suicide two weeks prior
and he made a ‘vague and passive’ statement in the booking room that ‘could’ have
been interpreted as a ‘kind of a suicidal threat.’” True, the district court described the
contested statement as “vague and passive” and a “kind of suicidal threat.” But the
officers’ description of the right fails to accept the court’s ultimate conclusion—that as a
whole, sufficient evidence allowed for the inference that the officers “had actual
knowledge of the substantial risk that Chilcutt could kill himself.” The officers may not
contest that determination in this appeal. See Smith, 10 F.4th at 741.
Elsewhere, the officers argue there were “significantly more indicators” that the
“decedents were at imminent risk of suicide” in the cases cited by the district court. But
Estate of Clark explains that this court’s “limited jurisdiction precludes considering” the
argument that prior cases were factually distinguishable—an argument that implicates
the sufficiency of the evidence. See 865 F.3d at 553. For example, the officers rely on
cases in which this court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants because the
plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to show actual knowledge. See, e.g.,
Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2010); Matos ex rel. Matos v. O’Sullivan,
335 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003). That is the opposite of the posture here. Whether the
district court correctly determined that the estate here had sufficient evidence of the
officers’ knowledge of the risk cannot be evaluated in an interlocutory appeal. See Estate
of Clark, 865 F.3d at 551. It was clearly established that if the officers had knowledge of
the serious risk, they could not “do nothing,” and it is undisputed that the officers did

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not enact any of the jail’s protocols for detainees at risk of suicide or inform the booking
officer about what they knew of Chilcutt’s involuntary commitment weeks earlier.
Finally, we observe that the officers’ version of the facts underpinning their
qualified-immunity argument in Section I shows that they are contesting the sufficiency
of the evidence. They do not accept the facts and make reasonable inferences favorable
to Chilcutt, as required. See Hurt v. Wise, 880 F.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 2018), overruled on
other grounds by Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2019). For instance, they
suggest they were not on notice of Chilcutt’s risk because, although Chilcutt
“potentially” attempted suicide two weeks prior, “Chilcutt’s discharge doctor
specifically ‘ruled out’ any attempt at suicide,” so “the potential attempt was never
even substantiated.” But the district court correctly noted that the officers lacked
evidence that, on October 21, they “knew what Chilcutt’s doctors had concluded about
their patient,” and that some doctors seemed more concerned about his risk of suicide.
Additionally, the officers argue that precedent does not clearly establish that they
violated Chilcutt’s rights because “Chilcutt exhibited such scant signs of being at any
risk of harming himself.” They assert that, when discussing the evidence for municipal
liability, the district court said that Chilcutt did not exhibit suicidal tendencies on
October 21 (apart from the contested statement). But the court also concluded that, as to
the officer’s liability, there were more than “scant” comments supporting the officers’
knowledge of Chilcutt’s risk.
For similar reasons, we do not reach the first step of the qualified-immunity
analysis—whether a constitutional violation occurred. The officers argue there was no
violation because they lacked sufficient notice of Chilcutt’s risk. But the district court
determined that what they knew depended on disputed facts and inferences, from
which a jury could conclude that the officers were aware of the risk. As discussed
above, we may not reevaluate whether the evidence was sufficient to show notice or
actual knowledge. Nor may we resolve disputed issues of fact. See Ferguson v.
McDonough, 13 F.4th 574, 584 (7th Cir. 2021).
III.
In Section II of their brief, the officers challenge in the alternative the district
court’s conclusions about the sufficiency of the estate’s evidence. But nothing here
justifies departing from the general proposition that this court lacks jurisdiction to

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entertain sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments in an interlocutory appeal of the denial
of qualified immunity. See Smith, 10 F.4th at 741.
First, the officers rely on McGee v. Parsano, 55 F.4th 563, 572 (7th Cir. 2022), to
argue that the undisputed record is so clear that this court can disregard the district
court and look at the evidence de novo. But McGee is distinguishable. That appeal
concerned “two purely legal issues,” which the court could resolve based only on the
video evidence and undisputed pertinent historical facts. Id. Here, the parties disagree
on the pertinent historical facts, including what the video and audio show, and these
facts are material to determining qualified immunity.
We will generally not disregard a district court’s assessment of the evidence
unless it is “blatantly contradict[ed]” by the record. Smith, 10 F.4th at 740. The officers
point to evidence that they may not have been aware of Chilcutt’s substantial suicide
risk—he was “calm and cooperative,” mentioned needing things after his release, and at
some points spoke “lightheartedly.” But this evidence does not “utterly discredit[]” the
district court’s inferences in Chilcutt’s favor. See Ferguson, 13 F.4th at 576.
Neither is the booking-room recording dispositive. The officers ignore the district
court’s statement, supported by the video, that Chilcutt appeared muted and depressed
at times during booking, at one point saying he needed to “find someone who cares” to
pay his bond. And their attempt to jettison altogether the disputed statement—“I guess
I can go and die”—goes too far. The officers contend it is pure “speculation” to infer
Chilcutt said this, because the recording is unclear; they submit he could have just as
plausibly said “guess not for tonight.” But the booking-room recording is not so
unintelligible as to be inadmissible. The district court, viewing the evidence in the
estate’s favor, concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Chilcutt said, “I guess I
can go and die.” If the video “flatly contradict[ed]” that account, we would not credit it.
See Hurt, 880 F.3d at 840. But it does not. It is possible that Chilcutt said, “I guess I can
go and die.” The video is open to interpretation, and the final interpretation must be left
to the trier of fact. Id.; cf. United States v. Nunez, 532 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that even when transcript of audio recording exists, jury should be
instructed to “rely on its own interpretation” of recording).
We end by observing that the officers may still be entitled to qualified immunity
should the case go to trial. See Smith, 10 F.4th at 750 (quoting Warlick v. Cross, 969 F.2d
303, 305 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he district court may properly use special interrogatories to

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allow the jury to determine disputed issues of fact upon which the court can base its
legal determination of qualified immunity.”)) We also do not differentiate between the
two officers for the purposes of this appeal. Qualified immunity is an individualized
inquiry, see Estate of Williams v. Cline, 902 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2018), and the officers’
actions were not identical. So, ultimately, the analysis may differ between the two.
Because the officers’ arguments cannot be separated from material factual
disputes, we DISMISS this interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction and allow the
case to proceed in the normal course.

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