United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 3, 2023*
Decided August 3, 2023
Before
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3266
IESHUH GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MILWAUKEE ELECTION
COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 3:22-cv-00140-jdp
James D. Peterson,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Ieshuh Griffin, an unsuccessful candidate in the 2022 Milwaukee mayoral
primary, appeals the district court’s denial of her third post-judgment motion
* The appellee was not served with process and is not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1
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challenging the dismissal of her complaint that alleged improprieties in the election.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
Griffin sued the Milwaukee Election Commission and various defendants
involved in the primary election, alleging that they manipulated the election results and
undercounted her share of the votes. According to printouts of media reports that she
attached to her complaint, she received nearly 100,000 votes—15.7% of the vote—a
figure that she says put her in second place and should have allowed her to advance to
the general election. But the official vote count reflects that Griffin received only
315 votes, a seventh-place showing.
The district court screened her complaint and dismissed it with prejudice for
failure to state a claim. The judge determined that Griffin’s claims were implausible
because her alleged tallies were “simply beyond mathematical possibility”: The
projected number of Milwaukee residents who would have to vote based on her alleged
percentages outnumbered the entire population of Milwaukee.
Griffin moved for relief from the judgment under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, asserting that the court did not have the authority to screen her
complaint. The judge denied the motion because she did not address the facial
implausibility of her claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Griffin proceeded to move for a default judgment against the defendants, saying
that she had since served the defendants with a copy of her complaint and a summons.
The judge denied the motion because only the court could issue a valid summons.
See F ED. R. C IV. P. 4(b).
Griffin then filed another post-judgment motion, rehashing many of the same
arguments the court had rejected in its two previous orders denying post-judgment
relief. The judge denied this motion, stating that Griffin had not raised any new
argument that justified a different result.
On appeal Griffin raises two arguments, both meritless. First, she contends that
the court abused its discretion in denying her relief from the order declining to enter
default judgment. But as the judge explained, a default judgment was not warranted
because whatever document Griffin says she served on the defendants was not a
summons: Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure plainly states that a valid
summons can be issued only by the court. See F ED R. C IV. P. 4(b). Second, she asserts
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No. 22-3266 Page 3
that the court wrongly dismissed her complaint by not giving her notice or an
opportunity to amend. Although ordinarily a plaintiff should be afforded an
opportunity to amend a complaint, see Kowalski v. Boliker, 893 F.3d 987, 996–97 (7th Cir.
2018), the judge here appropriately dismissed the complaint with prejudice because her
allegations were facially implausible. See Gandhi v. Sitara Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 721 F.3d 865,
869 (7th Cir. 2013).
We have considered Griffin’s remaining arguments, but none has merit.
AFFIRMED
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