United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 3, 2023*
Decided August 3, 2023
Before
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1342
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN ERICKSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 21-cr-40035-JPG
J. Phil Gilbert,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jonathan Ericksen was found guilty, after a jury trial, for attempted enticement of
a minor. Ericksen sought acquittal on the basis that his “hypothesis of innocence” was
consistent with the government’s evidence—a standard that he recognizes is foreclosed
by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Applying controlling precedent, the district
* We granted the parties’ joint motion to waive oral argument and have agreed to
decide the case on the briefs and the record. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(f).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1
-- 1 of 3 --
No. 23-1342 Page 2
court rightly concluded that a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Ericksen was guilty. We affirm.
At trial, the government introduced evidence that Ericksen exchanged sexually
charged messages with an individual who he believed to be named “Lindsey.”
“Lindsey” turned out to be an undercover FBI agent. In their communications,
“Lindsey” revealed that she was 15 years old. Undeterred, Ericksen made plans to meet
her at her home and have sex with her while her mother was away. Ericksen drove
from his home in Tennessee to the meeting point in Illinois. After arriving, Ericksen was
stopped by FBI agents. He then agreed to a post-Miranda interview. During the
interview, he admitted to agents that he had messaged “Lindsey” online and knew that
she was 15 years old.
Ericksen was charged with attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b),
and a two-day trial was held. The government called three of the participating FBI
agents to testify about the chats, the meeting plans, and the interview. After the close of
the government’s case, Ericksen moved for acquittal under Rule 29(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. He argued that, because he believed at times that
“Lindsey” was only a fictitious 15-year old, he could not have attempted to knowingly
induce a minor to engage in sexual activity—an element of the offense. The district
court denied the motion. Ericksen did not present evidence and rested his case. The jury
found him guilty.
Ericksen then renewed his Rule 29 motion for acquittal. This time, he argued that
the evidence presented was insufficient under the “hypothesis of innocence” test, which
requires the district court to enter an acquittal if the trier of fact could not reasonably
conclude that the evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis of the defendant’s
innocence. See, e.g., United States v. Moya, 721 F.2d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 1983). Ericksen
conceded that this test had been rejected by the Supreme Court and this court, Jackson,
443 U.S. at 325; Moya, 721 F.2d at 610, but he argued that he wished to preserve the
appeal for Supreme Court review.
The district court denied Ericksen’s motion. The court explained that the
hypothesis of innocence test was foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson
and Seventh Circuit precedent. And in any event, there was ample evidence—
Ericksen’s interstate travel, his messages, and his admissions at his interview with
agents—upon which the jury could convict him.
-- 2 of 3 --
No. 23-1342 Page 3
Ericksen states that the main purpose of this appeal is to preserve this issue for
Supreme Court review. This he has done. Jackson rejected the hypothesis-of-innocence
test; we remain bound by that decision. Until the Supreme Court revises its position, his
arguments in this court are foreclosed. See Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir.
2012).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
-- 3 of 3 --