Virgil E. Griffin v. Robert Carter

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 3, 2023*
Decided August 3, 2023
Before
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1462
VIRGIL E. GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROBERT CARTER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:22-CV-122-JD-MGG
Jon E. DeGuilio,
Judge.
O R D E R
Virgil Griffin, an Indiana prisoner, alleged that state prison officials
discriminated against him and others in administrative segregation, in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, by restricting their access to the commissary and other
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal. We have
agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the
facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED . R. APP. P.
34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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supplies. The district court screened and dismissed his complaint, concluding that the
heightened security risks involved in administrative segregation, and a recent string of
assaults on prison staff mentioned in Griffin’s complaint, provided a rational basis for
this distinct treatment. We affirm the judgment.
In December 2021, prison officials transferred Griffin from the Pendleton
Correctional Facility to the Indiana State Prison and promptly placed him in
administrative segregation. (He explains on appeal that they placed him there because
he had been involved in a fight at Pendleton.) According to his complaint, starting a few
months earlier, Indiana State Prison officials had implemented a new policy restricting
access to certain items for prisoners in administrative segregation, after a string of
violent assaults on prison staff. He alleged that prisoners in administrative segregation
could not order food from the commissary and could obtain only limited sanitation and
cleaning supplies, clothing, and bedding, compared to what was available to the
prison’s general population.
After three months in segregation, Griffin filed his complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against several high-ranking prison officials contesting these restrictions. He
promptly amended his complaint after filing and alleged that the restrictions
irrationally discriminated against prisoners in administrative segregation, relative to
those in the general prison population, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. He asserted that there was no reason to treat them differently
and subject them to such “inhumane” conditions because prisoners may be placed in
administrative segregation without committing a disciplinary infraction. Griffin’s
amended complaint also observed, however, that some prisoners were placed in
administrative segregation because they were “under investigation,” “may present a
threat to the safety of others,” or had “a record of violence [or] assault on staff.”
About a year later, the district court screened and dismissed Griffin’s complaint.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. It concluded that prisoners in administrative segregation were not
similarly situated to those in the general population and posed different security risks
based on Griffin’s own summary of the reasons why prisoners may be segregated.
Given these differences, the district court concluded that prison officials had a rational
basis for implementing the restrictions after the surge in assaults that Griffin described.
The court also considered whether Griffin might have a due process interest in
avoiding prolonged time in administrative segregation but concluded that his
complaint fell short of raising a due process claim. At the time of his complaint he had

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No. 23-1462 Page 3
been in administrative segregation for only three months, and the court, relying on
Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009), determined that this
reasonable duration was not long enough to implicate a liberty interest. Believing that
further amendment would be futile, the district court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice.
On appeal, Griffin first challenges the district court’s conclusion that prisoners in
administrative segregation were not similarly situated to prisoners in the general
population. He relies on our observation that prison officials have extensive discretion
to decide whether to place prisoners in administrative segregation, and that, therefore,
prisoners in administrative segregation and the general population are “one and the
same.” Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 2005). Because Griffin does not allege
that prison officials discriminated against him based on a protected classification, he
needed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that the officials treated him differently from
others similarly situated, and that the treatment was not rationally related to a
legitimate interest. See Flynn v. Thatcher, 819 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 2016). The state has
an obvious interest in ensuring prison security, and prison officials have broad
discretion to further that goal. Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 820 (7th Cir. 2020).
Griffin has not carried his burden to demonstrate that officials exceeded that
discretion and adopted an irrational policy. Even if we accept that prisoners in
administrative segregation and those in the general population are just one group, there
would still be reasons to treat them differently. Indeed, Lekas acknowledged the harsh
conditions in administrative segregation, relative to the general population, but
explained that these were just ordinary facts of prison life. See Lekas, 405 F.3d at 609. As
the district court recognized, Griffin’s complaint provided several reasons why
prisoners in administrative segregation pose different security risks: because they may
be under investigation, present a threat to others, or have a history of violence
(including against staff members). Although Griffin insists prisoners may also be
segregated for reasons not involving acute security threats, state officials may create
classifications that are over- or underinclusive without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Hope v. Comm'r of Indiana Dep't of Corr., 66 F.4th 647, 651 (7th Cir.
2023). The restrictions alleged here are logically connected to the goal of promoting
prison security, and no more tailoring was necessary. See Hammer v. Ashcroft, 570 F.3d
798, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Griffin next contends that the district court should have allowed him an
opportunity to amend his complaint a second time, to raise a claim that his prolonged

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No. 23-1462 Page 4
detention in administrative segregation violated the Due Process Clause. Although he
had spent only three months in segregation when he had filed the amended complaint,
Griffin clarifies on appeal that he was still in segregation by the time the district court
screened his complaint a year later. He asserts that this duration amounts to a
significant and atypical hardship that gives rise to a liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995); Marion, 559 F.3d at 698 (concluding prisoner stated procedural
due process claim after 240 days in disciplinary segregation). He otherwise contends
that the conditions in segregation were so inhumane that they implicated a liberty
interest even at three months. See Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2015) (“A
considerably shorter period of segregation may, depending on the conditions of
confinement and on any additional punishments, establish a violation … .”).
Even if Griffin had a liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation,
however, he has not pleaded any facts suggesting that he was denied process. See I ND.
C ODE § 11-10-1-7(b) (requiring review of non-disciplinary segregated status every
30 days). Moreover, he did not explain in his appellate brief or to the district court how
he would have amended the complaint to allege that he had been denied any process
that he was due, such as periodic reviews of his confinement status. See Isby v. Brown,
856 F.3d 508, 525 (7th Cir. 2017). And though Griffin maintains that he could not obtain
sufficient sanitation equipment or nutrition with limited commissary options, he does
not suggest that the conditions of administrative segregation amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment, independent of any process. See Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765,
772 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that challenge to conditions of discretionary segregation
is better analyzed under the Eighth Amendment). The district court did not abuse its
discretion here because courts may deny a motion for leave to amend when the plaintiff
does not explain how the amendment would cure the deficiencies in the complaint.
See Pension Tr. Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Kohl’s Corp., 895 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2018).
AFFIRMED

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