United States of America v. Carl Young, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 21, 2023
Decided November 21, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3293
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CARL YOUNG, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:22CR00051-001
Tanya Walton Pratt,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Carl Young was sentenced to 168 months in prison and 3 years of supervised
release after he pleaded guilty to possessing crack cocaine and marijuana with the
intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possessing a firearm in furtherance of his drug
crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and possessing a firearm as a felon, id. § 922(g)(1). Young
appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to
withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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nature of the case and raises potential issues that we would expect an appeal like this to
involve. Because the analysis appears thorough and Young has not responded to the
motion with additional arguments, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects
counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
In February 2022, Young’s mother told police responding to a disturbance call
that Young had stolen her Jeep. (Young also had fired a shotgun into the ceiling of her
home.) When police approached the Jeep in a nearby alley, Young sped away, blew past
a stop sign, and, at more than 70 miles per hour, struck another car, ejecting its two
passengers. The crash victims survived but suffered catastrophic injuries. As more
police cars arrived, Young rammed one before officers stopped him and got him out of
the Jeep. They found on the Jeep’s passenger seat a loaded shotgun, shells, and a
backpack containing 6 pounds of marijuana and 26 grams of crack cocaine.
At his combined plea colloquy and sentencing hearing, Young admitted these
facts, his intent to distribute the drugs, and his knowledge (at the time of the crime) that
he had previously been convicted of felonies. Testimony and written statements
detailed the crash victims’ trauma, their long and ongoing treatment, and their upended
life plans. The court adopted the Presentence Investigation Report’s calculation of the
sentencing guidelines range, considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and
imposed 168 months in prison—21 months above the range—and 3 years of supervised
release. The court also imposed a $2,000 fine.
Appellate counsel says that Young, after conferring about the risks and benefits
of challenging his plea, wishes to contest only his sentence, not the plea. Counsel thus
rightly avoids addressing whether the plea was valid. United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d
348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel next concludes, properly, that Young has no nonfrivolous challenge to
the length of his sentence. To start, counsel can identify no error in the calculation of the
guidelines range. The court grouped Counts 1 (cocaine) and 2 (marijuana), cited a base
offense level of 22 for the total converted drug weight, and added two levels for
obstruction, for a total offense level of 24. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(c)(9), 3C1.2. It then
calculated an offense level of 26 for Count 4 (firearm possession), given an initial
offense level of 20, id. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), plus four levels for possessing the gun in
connection with another felony (automobile theft) and two for obstruction,
id. §§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), 3C1.2. Using the greater offense level, id. § 3D1.4, and subtracting
three levels for accepting responsibility, id. § 3E1.1, the court reached a total offense
level of 23 for these counts. And Young’s criminal history category was IV, given his 9

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points (5 for felonies, 2 for a misdemeanor, and 2 for committing the present offenses
while on probation). The total offense level of 23 and criminal history category of IV
yielded a guidelines range of 70 to 87 months for Counts 1 and 4, see U.S.S.G. § 5A, and
a 60-month statutory cap for Count 2, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). And the court rightly
determined that the statutory minimum for Count 3 (the § 924(c) count) yielded a
guidelines sentence of 60 months, to run consecutively to the other sentences. 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i). So the total range was 130 to 147 months’ imprisonment.
Yet because Young’s aggregate 168-month term is above that range, counsel
considers arguing that it is substantively unreasonable, but concludes that doing so
would be frivolous. On Counts 1 and 4, Young’s concurrent terms of 87 months lie at
the top of the range. Count 2 carries a (concurrent) 60-month guidelines sentence. Only
as to Count 3 (the § 924(c) offense) did the court impose an above-range term:
81 months, rather than 60. But we would not disturb a district court’s sentencing
decision when, as here, the court reasonably justified the above-range sentence under
the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. McIntyre, 531 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 2008). The
court recognized Young’s difficult childhood and drug addiction but emphasized
aggravating factors as well: the severity of his offense conduct, given his reckless flight
and car crash, which seriously injured two people; his persistent criminal history,
including eight felonies and various misdemeanors (some involving impaired or
reckless driving); and the need for deterrence or incapacitation, since probation and
community corrections had not previously steered Young away from crime.
Finally, counsel considers whether Young could challenge his terms of
supervised release and financial penalty but properly concludes that he could not. The
court imposed three years’ supervision, which was within the guidelines range and
justified by the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 869–70 (7th Cir.
2016). And Young waived any challenge to the conditions of his supervised release
when, at the sentencing hearing, he confirmed that he had read the conditions, did not
object to them, and declined a formal reading of them. See United States v. Flores,
929 F.3d 443, 449–50 (7th Cir. 2019). As for his $2,000 fine, the court properly considered
Young’s financial condition, see U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(e), imposing a fine well below not only
the statutory maximum ($1 million, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)), but the minimum
guidelines recommendation ($20,000, see U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3)).
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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