Devyn C. Hood v. LITTLE ROCK OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT and ERICA L. MURRY

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 23, 2024*
Decided January 25, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1777
DEVYN C. HOOD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LITTLE ROCK OFFICE OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT and ERICA
L. MURRY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 22-cv-6578
Mary M. Rowland,
Judge.
O R D E R
Devyn Hood wants a federal court to enjoin enforcement in Illinois of an
Arkansas court’s child-support order. He names as defendants the Little Rock branch of
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the
appellant’s brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral
argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. APP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1777 Page 2
the Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement (which we will call the Little Rock
Office) and the mother of his child (Erica Murry, whose name is spelled various ways in
the record). The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
and we affirm.
In an Arkansas court, that state’s government sued to establish Hood’s paternity
and obtain an order of support for his child with Murry. When Hood did not appear,
the state court entered a default judgment naming him as the father and ordering him
to pay monthly support (some of it retroactive). Ark. Off. of Child Support Enf’t v. Hood,
No. 60DR-22-1177-9 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Sept. 26, 2022). (Although the record before us
contains no copy of this judgment, it is publicly available, and we may take judicial
notice of it. See Guerrero v. Howard Bank, 74 F.4th 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2023).) Hood did not
appeal in state court. As authorized by Illinois law, 750 ILCS 22/501 (2023), the Little
Rock Office then sent an income-withholding order directly to Hood’s employer in
Illinois without involving that state’s courts.
Next, Hood sued the Little Rock Office and Murry in federal court in Illinois,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, expressly seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Arkansas child-
support order. But the district court, prompted by Hood’s motion for emergency relief,
concluded that Hood’s assertion of federal subject-matter jurisdiction was frivolous and
dismissed the complaint. The court reasoned that because Hood essentially sought
review of a state-court judgment (the Arkansas child-support order), federal jurisdiction
was lacking under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The court also flagged other
problems with this suit, but we need not address them if Rooker-Feldman defeats federal
subject-matter jurisdiction—which it does. And because Hood develops no separate
appellate argument about the denial of emergency relief (which he sought in part
against Illinois actors not named in the underlying complaint), we say no more about
that matter.
We review de novo the district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Fliss v. Generation Cap. I, LLC, 87 F.4th 348, 353 (7th Cir. 2023). Rooker-Feldman stems
from federal statutes that make the Supreme Court an appellate tribunal over state
courts on questions of federal law, but that afford to federal district and circuit courts
no similar power over state judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005); see also Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 2017).
Rooker-Feldman bars federal review when a party seeks relief “tantamount to vacating
the state judgment.” Mains, 852 F.3d at 675.

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No. 23-1777 Page 3
On appeal, Hood argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because the focus of
his challenge is not the Arkansas judgment itself, but instead the constitutionality of the
Arkansas child-support laws that underpin it. But even if Hood could identify a
constitutional problem with Arkansas’s statutory scheme, the state-court judgment
ordering child support is the ultimate source of his injury. See id. And what he seeks is
an order effectively declaring that judgment void. Hood’s claim thus falls squarely
within the set barred by Rooker-Feldman: “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. As Feldman holds, federal courts other
than the Supreme Court “do not have jurisdiction” to review “challenges to state-court
decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges
allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486;
see also Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue, 940 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding
constitutional challenge to state-court judgment barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
If there were merit to Hood’s constitutional arguments, then the forum for them
would be an Arkansas state court. See, e.g., Schultz v. Butterball, LLC, 402 S.W.3d 61,
66–67 (Ark. 2012) (considering on the merits, but rejecting, due process challenge to
Arkansas child-support laws). Federal review, on the other hand, is barred by
Rooker-Feldman.
For that reason, we cannot and do not address the merits of Hood’s appellate
contention that Arkansas’s child-support laws are invalid. To be sure, Hood’s appellate
brief characterizes the child-support proceedings as a “conspiracy” and accuses the
federal district judge of bias in favor of Arkansas. But these assertions are too
undeveloped to warrant discussion. See Shipley v. Chi. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 947 F.3d
1056, 1062–63 (7th Cir. 2020).
One wrinkle remains. The district court marked its dismissal “with prejudice,”
whereas the lack of federal jurisdiction means dismissal should be without prejudice to
pursuing any valid claims in an appropriate state court. See Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d
898, 904 (7th Cir. 2017). We thus modify the judgment of the district court to reflect that
the dismissal is without prejudice, and we affirm the judgment as modified.

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